



Brief Summary

Predicting the Quantity of Swine-Origin Quarantine Material Entering the U.S. Undetected through Air Passenger Baggage from Countries Affected by African Swine Fever

August 2019

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
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
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INTELLIGENCE NOTE



DHS-CWMD Intelligence: Increasing Awareness of Homeland Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Food, Agriculture, Veterinary, and other Health Security Threats, Risks, and Opportunities

Food, Agriculture, Veterinary

4 December 2020

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(U) Prepared by the Intelligence Division of DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). For questions, please contact: DHSCWMDIntel@hq.dhs.gov.

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Scope, Source, Reference, and Dissemination Information

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(U) This report was written by the Strategic Intelligence Branch within the Intelligence Division of DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Coordinated within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and externally with USDA. To provide feedback or for more information on this and other Homeland-related CWMD threat issues, please contact: DHSCWMDIntel@hq.dhs.gov.



Executive Summary

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
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DISCLAIMER

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Responsibility for the information contained in a self-declaration lies entirely with the OIE Delegate of the Member concerned.

Neither the OIE nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for:

- (i) any errors, inaccuracies or omissions in the content of a self-declaration,
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Self-declaration of the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean

Self-declaration submitted to the OIE on October 6, 2021, by Dr Burke L. Healey, Delegate of the United States of America (USA) to the OIE

1. Introduction

This is to formally request that the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) publishes the self-declaration of a *Protection Zone* (PZ) for African Swine Fever (ASF), as defined in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)*, established by the United States of America (USA) for its Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico¹ (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands² (USVI). This self-declaration explicitly follows the *Self-declaration publication SOP version 1.4, approved June 2021* and compliant with all of the following relevant chapters and articles in the *Terrestrial Code*:

- Chapter 1.4., Article 1.4.6.
- Chapter 1.6., Article 1.6.3.
- Chapter 4.4, Articles 4.4.1.-3., and Article 4.4.6.
- Chapter 15.1., Article 15.1.1., Articles 15.1.3.-4., Articles 15.1.8-30., Articles 15.1.32.-33.

This is the first self-declaration of a PZ by the USA. The USA has self-declared historical freedom from ASF, as provided in a separate document, and has conducted surveillance in compliance with the pathogen specific Chapter 15.1. All varieties of *Sus scrofa*, including domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive, farmed, or free range, used for the production of meat or other commercial products or use or for breeding, wild and feral pigs, and commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter (see section 2.4. of this document for details).

¹ Commonwealth of Puerto Rico – includes the islands of Mona, Monito, Desecheo, Caja de Muertos and numerous other small cays that lie offshore of PR.

² U.S. Virgin Islands – comprised of three principal islands – St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas – plus 50 smaller islands, cays and islets that are part of the Caribbean archipelago.

The geographical boundaries of the PZ are the U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for PR and the USVI. The extent of this PZ and its geographical limits has been established by the *Veterinary Authority* on the basis of natural, artificial, or legal boundaries, and made public through official channels (see Annex II for corresponding map).

The species and target subpopulation include all varieties of *Sus scrofa*, including domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive, farmed, or free range, used for the production of meat or other commercial products or for breeding, and wild and feral pigs.

The starting date of the declaration of the PZ is October 6, 2021. The statement that the USA Delegate takes responsibility for the self-declaration is attached (Annex I).

2. The following documented information supports compliance with the requirements of the Terrestrial Code

2.1. Evidence that the disease is a notifiable disease in the PZ

The Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean document contains the evidence that ASF is a notifiable disease in the entire country, including all of its Territories. In addition, APHIS has published a Federal Order that provides further authority for the establishment, operation, and enforcement of the self-declaration of the PZ for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean (referenced in this document).

2.2 History of absence

ASF has never been detected in the USA and its territories, including in wildlife. The USA has been a member of the OIE since 1976 and consistently reports cases of notifiable diseases to the OIE [World Animal Health Information System \(OIE-WAHIS\)](#). (examples of the 6-monthly reports from 2003 to the present can be found in [this link](#)).

2.3. Surveillance including an early warning system for all relevant species in the PZ

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the surveillance efforts conducted by the USA, including in the PZ.

2.3.1 Passive surveillance in the PZ

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the passive surveillance efforts conducted by the USA, including in the PZ.

From 2016 – 2021, 36 FAD investigations were conducted in the PZ (24 in 2021), accounting for 678 diagnostic samples submitted for testing. All results were negative for ASF.

2.3.2 Legal obligations to report suspect cases and cases of notifiable diseases

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the legal obligations to report suspect cases of notifiable disease, including ASF in the PZ.

2.3.3 Training and awareness programs

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the training and awareness programs conducted in the USA, including the PZ.

2.3.4 Active surveillance in the PZ

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the active surveillance being conducted in the USA, including in the PZ.

2.3.5 Enhanced surveillance in the PZ

In PR, there are approximately 45,710 domestic swine and 702 swine premises. Feral swine are present in PR. The swine industry in PR consists of commercial and subsistence (backyard) farms. Garbage feeding is permitted under the [Swine Health Protection Act](#) per [9 CFR 166](#). There are 5 APHIS Veterinary Medical Officers and 13 animal health technicians employed in PR; additional APHIS personnel have been temporarily deployed to assist in swine health activities and ASF prevention measures. There are approximately 170 large animal APHIS accredited veterinarians in PR.

Since June 2019, APHIS has carried out active surveillance in PR targeting higher risk swine facilities, including those that feed treated waste and those that are within 3 km of an illegal boat landing (IBL). Commercial swine producers were not targeted; however, they can submit samples for diagnostic testing to the [National Animal Health Laboratory Network](#) (NAHLN) approved laboratories. Furthermore, any highly suspect case is investigated as a FAD (per [VS Guidance Document 12001](#)), initiating testing for a variety of diseases, including ASF. Since October 2018, 673 inspections have been conducted at IBL sites (343 inspections) and the swine premises within 3 km of the IBL (330 inspections). From June 2019 through July 2021, 903 higher-risk diagnostic samples have been tested for ASF. All results were negative.

Enhanced surveillance within PR adds multiple surveillance components to the existing ASF surveillance, including swine slaughter surveillance and feral swine surveillance. Slaughter surveillance results in the sampling of condemned or ill swine at all 4 USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspected slaughterhouses in PR. Meanwhile, APHIS is implementing an urban and peri-urban feral swine eradication program. Urban feral swine have been reported in at least 67 of 78 municipalities in PR. All adult and subadult feral swine that are trapped are being sampled and tested for ASF. All results were negative. APHIS has 5 full-time employees working on the urban and peri-urban feral swine eradication program; additional APHIS personnel have been temporarily deployed to assist in feral swine depopulation efforts.

In addition to the [Swine Hemorrhagic Fevers: African and Classical Swine Fever Integrated Surveillance Plan](#), APHIS is drafting the *Puerto Rico Enhanced Integrated Active Surveillance for African and Classical Swine Fevers*. The PR Enhanced Surveillance Plan has increased the rate of inspection for higher risk facilities from once per year to three times a year. Each inspection includes a minimum of 5 animals being sampled and tested for ASF. Inspections of facilities within 3 km of an IBL have also doubled. Previously, only one visit 24-28 days after the IBL was required; now two visits are required (one 10 days post-IBL and one 10-14 days after the initial inspection). Further testing of commercial swine at aggregation points is being planned.

In the USVI, there are approximately 1,655 domestic swine and 68 swine herds (primarily located on Saint Croix). There are no commercial farms; all are subsistence (backyard) farms. Garbage feeding is permitted under the [Swine Health Protection Act](#) per [9 CFR 166](#). Although domestic (owned) swine occasionally escape or free roam, there are no significant populations of feral swine on the USVI. Thus far in fiscal year 2021, APHIS has culled 80 free-roaming swine; samples were collected and submitted for ASF testing. All results were negative. For livestock, there is currently one large animal accredited veterinarian and four USVI Department of Agriculture employees located on St. Croix. Currently, there is no enhanced surveillance in USVI for ASF; however, an active surveillance strategy is being developed. Passive surveillance for ASF is conducted by APHIS on USVI on dead and sick/euthanized swine; diagnostic samples are sent to the diagnostic laboratory in PR for ASF testing, per below. Additionally, the FSIS-inspected slaughter facility on St. Croix conducts antemortem and postmortem inspection of every animal at slaughter per [9 CFR 309](#) and [9 CFR 310](#). Any swine having clinical signs compatible with ASF trigger a FAD investigation (per [VS Guidance Document 12001](#)). APHIS is currently hiring 2 animal health technicians and 1 Veterinary Medical Officer to be located on St. Croix to assist with the domestic swine census; roaming and feral swine identification; ASF surveillance; biosecurity; and educational outreach for ASF to producers in coordination with the USVI Department of Agriculture.

2.3.6 Laboratory capacity in the PZ

The *Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean* document provides information and references to the laboratory capacity in the USA, including the PZ.

In addition, APHIS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) has established an ASF laboratory in PR to enhance laboratory capabilities and to expedite ASF testing in the PZ and surrounding region. The PR Laboratory has a capacity of 1,200 samples per week and assists in ASF diagnostic testing of samples from Puerto Rico and the USVI.

3. Measures implemented to maintain freedom in the PZ relevant to Chapters 15.1. and 1.4.

3.1. The Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean document provides information and references to the measure implemented to maintain freedom in the USA, including the PZ.

3.2. The USA Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and captive wild pig herds in the PZ (see section 2.1. of this document for details).

3.3. The USA Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of the species of wild and feral pigs and African wild suids present, their distribution and habitat in the country and the PZ. APHIS maintains data on feral swine, including escaped or released pigs, wild boar, and Russian or Eurasian boar; information can be found at [this link](#).

3.4. APHIS has established a Federal Order Suspending the Interstate Movement of Live Swine, Swine Germplasm, Swine Products, and Swine Byproducts from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; additional information can be found in [this link](#). The Federal Order suspends the interstate movement of all live swine, swine germplasm, swine products, and swine byproducts from Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) until APHIS can establish sufficient mitigations to authorize such movement. When APHIS has established such measures, it will issue an amended Federal Order.

3.5. Additionally, APHIS issued a Federal Order ([DA-2021-01](#)) imposing several restrictions on the importation of dogs for resale from regions where ASF exists or is reasonably believed to exist.

4. Conclusions

Based on this request and all the evidence provided herein, the USA requests the publication of the self-declaration of a PZ for ASF, as defined in the *Terrestrial Code*, established by the USA for its Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for PR and the USVI. This self-declaration explicitly follows the *Self-declaration publication SOP version 1.4, approved June 2021* and is compliant with all of the relevant chapters and articles in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The OIE Delegate of the USA declares the establishment of the Protection Zone (PZ) for African Swine Fever (ASF) that includes its Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) as of October 6, 2021, in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 1.4., 1.6., 4.4. and Article 15.1.4. of the *Terrestrial Code* (2021) and consistent with the information provided in OIE-WAHIS.

In accordance with Article 4.4.6., if the animal health status of an established protection zone changes owing to the occurrence of a case, the animal health status of the rest of the country or zone is not affected, provided the measures in place prevent the spread of disease and allow the subsequent establishment of a containment zone in accordance with the criteria in Article 4.4.7.

Annex I.

I, the undersigned, Burke L. Healey, Delegate of the United States of America (USA) to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), take responsibility for the self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever (ASF) for the entire USA, that includes all of its Territories, and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, that includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

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
Drawn up on October 7, 2021.

Signature of the Delegate:



Burke L. Healey, D.V.M. USA Delegate to the OIE

Annex II.



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Self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever by the United States of America and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean

Self-declaration submitted to the OIE on 6 October 2021 by Dr Burke L. Healey, Delegate of the United States of America (USA) to the OIE

1. Introduction

This is to formally request that the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) publishes the self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever (ASF), as defined in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)*, by the United States of America (USA), including all fifty (50) States and its Territories. The USA further self-declares the establishment of a Protection Zone (PZ) for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico¹ (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands² (USVI) in a separate document. This self-declaration explicitly follows the *Self-declaration publication SOP version 1.4, approved June 2021* and is compliant with all of the following relevant chapters and articles in the *Terrestrial Code*:

- Chapter 1.4., Article 1.4.6.
- Chapter 1.6., Article 1.6.3.
- Chapter 4.4, Articles 4.4.1.-3., and Article 4.4.6.
- Chapter 15.1., Article 15.1.1., Articles 15.1.3.-4., Articles 15.1.8-30., Articles 15.1.32.-33.

The USA is considered historically free from ASF and conducts surveillance in compliance with the pathogen specific Chapter 15.1. The geographical boundaries of historical freedom include all fifty (50) States of the USA and its Territories (Annex IIa.). All varieties of *Sus scrofa*, including domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive, farmed, or free range, used for the production of meat or other

¹ Commonwealth of Puerto Rico – includes the islands of Mona, Monito, Desecheo, Caja de Muertos and numerous other small cays that lie offshore of PR.

² U.S. Virgin Islands – comprised of three principal islands – St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas – plus 50 smaller islands, cays and islets that are part of the Caribbean archipelago.

commercial products or use, or for breeding, wild and feral pigs, and commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter (see section 2.4. of this document for details).

The USA is also self-declaring the establishment of a PZ for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). This is the first self-declaration of a PZ by the USA. The geographical boundaries of the PZ are the U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for PR and the USVI (Annex IIb.). The extent of this PZ and its geographical limits has been established by the Veterinary Authority on the basis of natural, artificial, or legal boundaries, and made public through official channels.

The species and target subpopulation include all varieties of *Sus scrofa*, including domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive, farmed, or free range, used for the production of meat or other commercial products or use, or for breeding, and wild and feral pigs.

The starting date of the declaration of the of historical freedom is October 6, 2021. The statement that the USA Delegate takes responsibility for the self-declaration is attached (Annex I).

2. The following documented information supports compliance with the requirements of the Terrestrial Code

2.1. Evidence that the disease is a notifiable disease in the entire country

The Animal Health Protection Act ([AHPA](#)) provides the authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to issue orders and promulgate regulations to prevent the introduction into the USA and its Territories of any pest or disease of livestock. The Secretary has delegated authority to issue such orders and regulations to the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The National Animal Health Reporting System ([NAHRS](#)) is the comprehensive reporting system for OIE-reportable diseases in the USA and its Territories. The NAHRS reportable disease list includes all OIE-reportable diseases, including ASF, and additional diseases of interest. [9 CFR 161.4](#) requires accredited veterinarians, who are approved to act as representatives for the Federal government (see section 2.3.2, below), to report to the Federal Veterinary Official and the State Animal Health Official all suspected or diagnosed cases of any animal disease not known to exist in the USA and its Territories. APHIS document ([VS Guidance 12001.4](#)) lays out the details for communicating a suspected or diagnosed foreign animal disease (FAD). The USA has a proposed federal rule that, once cleared, will be added to the *Code of Federal Regulations* and will provide the legal obligation to report detections of disease by any animal health professional³. Currently, all States and territories have legal reporting requirements for reportable animal diseases, including ASF. There is no one date when all State requirements went into effect, however those requirements date back at least 30 years.

2.2 History of absence

ASF has never been detected in the USA and its territories, including in wildlife. The USA has been a member of the OIE since 1976 and consistently reports cases of notifiable diseases to the OIE [World Animal Health Information System \(OIE-WAHIS\)](#). (examples of the 6-monthly reports from 2003 to the present can be found in [this link](#)).

2.3. Surveillance including an early warning system for all relevant species in the USA

The USA and its Territories have national regulations and procedures in place for the identification requirements for swine in interstate commerce and animal disease traceability. The swine industry has had mandatory identification for swine in interstate commerce since 1988. Identification of swine in

³ From the proposed federal rule, an *animal health professional* is an individual, corporate entity, or animal health organization with formal training in the diagnosis or recognition of animal diseases and/or pests of livestock. Examples of animal health professionals include, but are not limited to, veterinary medical professionals, diagnostic laboratorians, biomedical researchers, public health officials, animal health officials, trained technicians, zoo personnel, and wildlife personnel with such training.

interstate commerce is described in section [9 CFR 71.19](#). General requirements for traceability, recordkeeping, and documentation requirements for interstate movement of swine can be found in [9 CFR 86](#). Official identification and animal disease traceability are critical components of surveillance and monitoring systems, emergency response procedures, and control measures to prevent the spread of exotic swine diseases such as ASF, as described in the United States Department of Agriculture ([USDA](#)) [Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service \(APHIS\) African Swine Fever Response Plan Red Book](#).

2.3.1 Passive surveillance in the USA and its Territories

Passive surveillance for ASF virus applies to all swine and is constantly conducted within the USA and its Territories. Reporting by producers, veterinarians, animal health technicians, slaughter inspectors, and laboratory personnel is required (per [VS Guidance Document 12001](#)) for suspect or confirmed cases of FADs, program diseases, or diseases not known to exist in the USA. Any suspect case of ASF must be immediately reported to State and/or Federal animal health officials. Any suspect cases in domestic or feral swine having clinical signs compatible with ASF will trigger a FAD investigation. From 2016 – 2021, the USA conducted 171 FAD investigations in swine, accounting for 2,018 diagnostic samples tested for swine diseases, including ASF.

Feral swine that are found dead or visibly sick are euthanized and tested for ASF virus. [APHIS](#) field personnel routinely monitor feral swine populations and notify APHIS leadership of any suspect cases for ASF. APHIS works collaboratively with States with established populations of feral swine to reduce the number of feral swine and associated damages they inflict to agriculture, property, natural and cultural resources, and human health.

Additionally, there is passive surveillance for FADs by official personnel of the [USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service](#) (FSIS) via antemortem and postmortem inspection of every animal at slaughter per [9 CFR 309](#) and [9 CFR 310](#). FSIS employs approximately 1,100 Public Health Veterinarians and 7,600 inspection personnel to perform the in-plant inspection and food safety verification tasks.

2.3.2 Legal obligations to report suspect cases and cases of notifiable diseases

APHIS administers the [National Veterinary Accreditation Program](#) for accredited private veterinarians. This program authorizes private veterinary practitioners to work cooperatively with Federal veterinarians and State animal health officials. Regulations in [9 CFR 161](#) outline the requirements and standards for federally accredited veterinarians, which include disease reporting. Accredited veterinarians are required to immediately report to the Federal and/or the State Animal Health Official all diagnosed or suspected cases of a communicable animal disease for which APHIS has a control or eradication program, and all diagnosed or suspected cases of any animal disease not known to exist in the USA, including ASF. There are approximately 70,000 accredited veterinarians in the USA and its Territories.

2.3.3 Training and awareness programs

Awareness and education for producers, veterinarians, and the public, including travelers, is distributed through multimodal methods, including the [APHIS website for ASF](#) and various swine industry webpages, including the [National Pork Board](#), [National Pork Producers Council](#), and the [Swine Health Information Center](#); extension and outreach services; industry meetings; professional conferences; factsheets and pamphlets; videos; and other technical documents and resources. APHIS administers [training and professional development](#) to Federal and State Veterinarians, accredited veterinarians, diagnosticians, animal health technicians, epidemiologists, port veterinarians, foreign veterinary medical officers, APHIS program specialists, and others whose responsibilities require updated knowledge of animal disease diagnosis and identification. APHIS conducts annual training for Federal employees in a wide variety of topics, including FAD diagnostics, agriculture emergency response, and animal identification. Additional information on a specific course can be found in the [PDS Catalog](#).

2.3.4 Active surveillance in the USA and its Territories

In 2019, due to the increased spread of ASF in Asia and Europe, APHIS expanded the active classical swine fever surveillance program to include ASF. The program has resulted in strengthened detection capabilities to enhance outbreak preparedness and support claims of disease freedom for ASF. The comprehensive swine hemorrhagic fever surveillance plan focuses on three USA swine populations for surveillance, including larger commercial swine herds, higher-risk (less biosecure) swine herds, and feral swine. All populations are monitored by observation, and if clinical signs consistent with the case definitions for ASF are observed, an FAD investigation is immediately initiated. The details of this plan, [Swine Hemorrhagic Fevers: African and Classical Swine Fever Integrated Surveillance Plan](#), can be found on the [APHIS website for ASF](#) under technical documents.

APHIS evaluated the effectiveness of this plan in meeting outlined goals one year after its implementation. From June 1, 2019, to May 31, 2020, 6,522 specimens were tested for ASF, the majority of which were samples from slaughter and aggregation points, testing of samples from sick pigs submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and FAD investigations. All results were negative. Additional details can be found in the [Swine Hemorrhagic Fever Surveillance Evaluation Brief](#) (April 2021) on the [APHIS website for ASF](#) under surveillance.

2.3.5 Laboratory capacity in the USA and its Territories

At the national level, the [National Veterinary Services Laboratories](#) (NVSL) serves as the national veterinary diagnostic reference and confirmatory laboratory for foreign and emerging diseases of significant concern for animal health. NVSL is divided into two locations: the Diagnostic Bacteriology and Pathology Laboratory, Diagnostic Virology Laboratory, and Diagnostic, Bioanalytical, and Reagent Laboratory are in Ames, Iowa, and the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) is on Plum Island, New York. Animal health testing capabilities are expanded by the [NAHLN](#), which is a nationally coordinated network and partnership of Federal, State, and university-associated animal health laboratories. The NAHLN provides the capability to diagnose both endemic and foreign high-consequence livestock pathogens in animals and environmental samples and are likely to serve as the first-line laboratories for recognition of a pathogenic agent in animals. A list of the laboratories, accompanied by a summary of the diseases for which the laboratories are approved to test, can be found at [this link](#). A map of the NAHLN laboratories, depicted alongside the diseases for which they are authorized to test, can be found at [this link](#).

The diagnostic tests available to identify the ASF virus include antibody detection by Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), fluorescent antibody test, virus isolation, sequencing, and polymerase chain reaction (PCR). FADDL has a current non-emergency capacity to run 500 samples per week. Both FADDL and the laboratories in Ames, Iowa, have an emergency capacity to run 1,200 samples per week. Additionally, there are currently 48 NAHLN laboratories approved for ASF PCR testing with a capacity to run 57,000 tests per day, with pooled sample capacity at 285,000. For antibody detection by ELISA, 5,000 samples can be run per week with increased emergency capacity as needed. NVSL has established an ASF laboratory in PR to enhance laboratory capabilities and to expedite ASF testing in the U.S. Territories in the Caribbean and surrounding region. The PR Laboratory has a capacity of 1,200 samples per week and assists in ASF diagnostic testing of samples from Puerto Rico and the USVI.

3. Measures implemented to maintain freedom in the USA relevant to Chapters 15.1. and 1.4.

3.1. APHIS has conducted an analysis of the *Potential Pathways of ASF Introduction from Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico to Conterminous United States* to assess the overall risk for the introduction and spread of ASF into the PR and for the conterminous USA.

3.2. ASF is a notifiable disease in the entire USA and its Territories, and all suids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions suggestive of ASF are subjected to appropriate field and laboratory investigations; (see section 2.1. of this document for details). Samples from both wild and domestic suids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions are submitted to the NVSL and tested for ASF (see section 2.1. and 2.3.6. of this document for details).

3.3. An ongoing awareness program is in place to encourage reporting of all suids showing clinical signs or pathological lesions suggestive of ASF (see section 2.3.3. of this document for details).

3.4. The USA *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and captive wild pig herds in the country (see section 2.1. of this document for details).

3.5. The USA *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the species of wild and feral pigs and African wild suids present, their distribution and habitat in the country. APHIS maintains data on feral swine, including escaped or released pigs, wild boar, and Russian or Eurasian boar; information can be found at [this link](#).

3.6. For domestic and captive wild pigs, an appropriate surveillance program in accordance with Articles 15.1.28. to 15.1.31. and 15.1.33. is in place (see section 2.3. of this document for details).

3.7. For wild and feral pigs, a surveillance program is in place in accordance with Article 15.1.32., considering the presence of natural and artificial boundaries, the ecology of the wild and feral pig and African wild suid populations and an assessment of the likelihood of ASF spread including consideration of the presence of *Ornithodoros* ticks (see section 2.3. of this document for details).

3.8. The domestic and captive wild pig populations are separated by appropriate biosecurity, which is effectively implemented and supervised, from the wild and feral pig and African wild suid populations, based on the assessed likelihood of spread within those populations, and surveillance in accordance with Article 15.1.32.; Because ASF has never been detected in the USA or its Territories, the presence and/or control of *Ornithodoros* ticks is not relevant beyond typical, general health and hygiene practices associated with other pests and parasites.

3.9. The USA has implemented measures to maintain freedom in compliance with Article 1.4.6. (see section 2. of this document for details). In addition, APHIS prohibits imports of pork and pork products from ASF-affected countries (additional information can be found at [this link](#)).

3.10. The swine industry in the USA and its Territories is continually provided with information and guidance on methods to implement biosecurity best management practices by State and federal agencies ([APHIS Swine Biosecurity Factsheet](#)), including for swine raised with outdoor access ([APHIS Biosecurity for Outdoor Swine](#)).

3.11. APHIS oversees and performs animal import quarantines at designated import centers; performs inspection of imports of animals and export certification of animals and products; performs animal import inspections at designated Northern and Southern land border ports; collaborates with other units to provide a unified, seamless approach to developing and implementing import and export policies across the organization; and performs export certifications at designated Northern and Southern land border ports ([Import Controls](#)).

3.12. APHIS has established a *Federal Order Suspending the Interstate Movement of Live Swine, Swine Germplasm, Swine Products, and Swine Byproducts from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands*; additional information can be found in [this link](#). The Federal Order suspends the interstate movement of all live swine, swine germplasm, swine products, and swine byproducts from Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) until APHIS can establish sufficient mitigations to authorize such movement. When APHIS has established such measures, it will issue an amended Federal Order.

3.13. The Swine Health Protection Act (SHPA) at [9 CFR 166](#) regulates food waste containing any meat products fed to swine. Compliance with this act ensures that all food waste fed to swine is properly treated to kill disease organisms.

3.14. In accordance with [Title 7 Code of Federal Regulations 330.400 -330.403](#)), regulated garbage is not allowed to be imported into the USA and its Territories, except from Canada. Regulated garbage arriving on means of conveyances from foreign regions, other than Canada, and from U.S. Territories is allowed entry under certain conditions.

3.15. Additionally, APHIS issued a Federal Order ([DA-2021-01](#)) imposing several restrictions on the importation of dogs for resale from regions where ASF exists or is reasonably believed to exist.

3.16. The USA is also self-declaring the establishment of a PZ for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI).

3. Conclusions

Based on this request and all the evidence provided herein, the USA requests the publication of the self-declaration of historical freedom established by the USA for all of the country including its Territories, and the separate self-declaration for establishment of a PZ for its Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for PR and the USVI, for ASF, as defined in the *Terrestrial Code*. This self-declaration explicitly follows the *Self-declaration publication SOP version 1.4, approved June 2021* and is compliant with all of the relevant chapters and articles in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The OIE Delegate of the USA declares that the USA, including all of its territories, is a country historically free from ASF in compliance with the provisions of Articles 15.1.4. point 1) and 1.4.6. point 2) b. and the establishment of the Protection Zone (PZ) for African Swine Fever (ASF) that includes its Territories in the Caribbean, specifically for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (PR) and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) as of October 6, 2021, in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 1.4., 1.6., 4.4. and Article 15.1.4. of the *Terrestrial Code* (2021) and consistent with the information provided in OIE-WAHIS.

In accordance with Article 4.4.6., if the animal health status of an established protection zone changes owing to the occurrence of a case, the animal health status of the rest of the country or zone is not affected, provided the measures in place prevent the spread of disease and allow the subsequent establishment of a containment zone in accordance with the criteria in Article 4.4.7.

Annex I.

I, the undersigned, Burke L. Healey, Delegate of the United States of America (USA) to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), take responsibility for the self-declaration of historical freedom from African swine fever (ASF) for the entire USA, that includes all of its Territories, and the establishment of a Protection Zone for U.S. Territories in the Caribbean, that includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

DISCLAIMER

The OIE, after performing an administrative and technical screening of a self-declaration concerning the animal health status of a country, a zone or compartment ("self-declaration"), as described in the standard operating procedures for self-declarations, reserves the right to publish or not the self-declaration on its website. There shall be no right of appeal from this decision or any recourse of any kind.

The publication by the OIE of self-declaration on its website does not reflect the official opinion of the OIE. Responsibility for the information contained in a self-declaration lies entirely with the OIE Delegate of the Member concerned.

Neither the OIE nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for:

- (i) Any errors, inaccuracies or omissions in the content of a self-declaration,
- (ii) The use which may be made of the information contained in a self-declaration,
- (iii) Any direct or indirect consequences of any nature arising from or relating to the use of the information contained in a self-declaration.


Drawn up on October 7, 2021.

Signature of the Delegate:




Burke L. Healey, D.V.M. USA Delegate to the OIE

Annex IIa.



Annex IIb.





ASF Technical Working Group Action Plan

Jul 13, 2021

Roster

Industry-States

(b) (6)

Smithfield

NAMI

Tyson

NARA

NPB

AASV

NPPC

SHIC

NAHLN (IA)

NASDA (OK)

NASDA (IA)

NASAHO (IA)

NASAHO (MN)

NASAHO (NC)

APHIS

Jack Shere

Burke Healey

Alan Huddleston

Lisa Rochette

Jon Zack

Rachel Tell

Robin Holland

Oriana Beemer

Hallie Zimmers

Sharon Fisher

Ashley Glosson

Highlights

- A movement standstill will require a complete stop in live swine movement and swine germplasm; not of pork meat, feed or other transports.
- Purpose is to allow States, Tribes, and industry time to
 - gather and communicate critical information for a unified ASF response
 - establish initial control areas
 - conduct initial contact tracing
 - increase biosecurity levels.
- Understanding Federal, State, and industry actions at Time Zero to Hour 73 will be critical to a coordinated effort.

Time Zero to Hour 73

- Increase communication and education/outreach
- National Movement Standstill or individual State restrictive/protective action

(b) (5)

- Begin contact tracing and identify connections
- Prioritize risk factors
- Review movement data, implement aggressive quarantine strategy
- (b) (5)

Additional Discussion

Written guidance on process for sampling given additional sample types approved.

Call Schedule

Meeting/Call name	Meeting Time
ASF TWG Call	Tuesdays, 9:00 a.m.ET
ASF SPWG Call	Tuesdays, 11:00 a.m. ET



ASF Technical Working Group Action Plan

September 2, 2020

Roster

Industry-States

(b) (6)

Smithfield

NAMI

Tyson

NARA

NPB

AASV

NPPC

NAHLN (IA)

NASDA (OK)

NASAHO

NASDA (IA)

NASAHO

NASAHO

(NC)

NASAHO

(MN)

APHIS

Jack Shere

Burke Healey

Alan Huddleston

Lisa Rochette

Jon Zack

Hallie Zimmers

Sharon Fisher

Ashley Glosson

Discussion Points

- Future meetings will be held Tuesdays, 9:00 a.m. Eastern starting Sept. 8.
- Initial discussion topics will follow the five APHIS Swine Sector meeting commitments (listed below), beginning with Surveillance.
- The introductory meeting for each of the five commitments will consist of an APHIS presentation as to current state and discussion.

Actions/Assignments

- ✓ Hallie distributed the promised swine sector meeting commitments via email on 9/2.
- To help the Surveillance team prepare for next Tuesday's meeting, submit any specific surveillance topics, concerns or ideas to Hallie Zimmers by Friday afternoon.

African Swine Fever (ASF) Technical Working Group Purpose and Charge

This working group represents broad interests in swine production. To more effectively demonstrate forward progress in ASF planning, members are requested to participate in discussions openly, bringing honest assessments of what gaps exist, how they may be filled, and by whom.

Various APHIS staff will join this group's Tuesday meetings for presentation and discussion, as needed, based upon advance topic selection by this group. Support staff will capture major discussion points during the calls. Our first topic areas are expansive, and correlate with the requests and commitments made by stakeholders and APHIS, respectively, earlier this year: 1) surveillance; 2) diagnostic testing capacity and options; 3) maximizing effectiveness of a 72-hour movement standstill; 4) depopulation standards; 5) IT strategies for data management.

Call Schedule

Meeting/Call name	Meeting Time
ASF TWG Call	Tuesdays, 9:00 a.m.ET

African Swine Fever Talking Points

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(b) (5)




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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (OSEC)
STATEMENT AND TALKING POINTS**


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
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(b) (5)



(b) (5)



Burke L. Healey, DVM
Chief Veterinary Officer
Deputy Administrator
Veterinary Services
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Dr. Jaspinder P.S. Komal, DVM, MSc
Vice-President, Science Branch, Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Chief Veterinary Officer and OIE Delegate for Canada

Appendix 1

(b) (5)

