US Air Force Expeditionary Readiness Training (ERT)

Law of War (LoW) Advanced

Web-Based Training Lesson Transcript

Last Publish Date: 18 October 2018

Lesson Map

1.0 - LESSON TRANSCRIPT PREFACE

1.1 - LESSON DESCRIPTION, REGULATION, AND CONTENT POINT OF CONTACT

Description: Law of War (LoW) Advanced

Lesson Duration: 45 Minutes

Lesson Frequency: Prior to deployment

Lesson Regulation: AFI 10-405, and AFPD 51-4 (2018)

Operations and International Law Lesson Description: Replacement for Law of Armed Conflict

Lesson Content POC: Air Force Office of Operations and International Law Directorate

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2.0 - Welcome

2.1 - NARRATION

Welcome to The Law of War (LoW) Advanced lesson. For help with navigating this lesson, open the help screen by clicking the question mark or pressing the question mark key.

Click **Next** to continue.

2.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Welcome to The Law of War Advanced lesson.

3.0 - Introduction

3.1 - NARRATION

During this lesson, you will examine how the principles of LoW affect Air Force personnel in environments that feature non-combatants and civilians, and the employment of new technologies during hostilities.

You will then identify how the requirement to adhere to LoW in air operations is addressed by a meticulous targeting process; with guidance provided through Rules of Engagement that dictate, among other things, the mitigation of effects against civilian lives and property; partly done through the management of various target lists and procedures.

Most of this lesson will focus on how these principles of LoW impact various aspects of operations performed by Air Force personnel.

4.0 - Five Principles of Low

4.1 - NARRATION

If you are taking this lesson, it's because you most likely have been tasked to deploy. Therefore, it is necessary to expand your understanding of LoW, since you may find yourself in situations which require you to effectively apply it. From your initial Law of War lesson, you learned the five basic principles of LoW.

Click each **image** to refresh your knowledge.

4.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Military Necessity

Humanity

Distinction

Proportionality

Honor

4.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Military Necessity

The principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by LoW.

Humanity

The principle that forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.

Distinction

The principle that obligates parties in a conflict to distinguish between the armed forces and the civilian population, and between unprotected and protected entities.

Proportionality

The principle that, even where you are justified in acting, you must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive as it relates to the loss of civilian lives or property.

Honor

The principle that demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense, and a certain mutual respect between opposing forces.

5.0 - 10 Rules for Airmen

5.1 - NARRATION

You also learned previously that the Air Force has established the 10 Rules for Airmen, which provide guidance for your behavior during conflicts and that these rules align with the five basic principles of LoW.

Therefore, this lesson will more deeply explore those principles and how they affect you in the operational environment.

5.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Airmen:

1. Fight only combatants.
2. Do not harm enemies who surrender.
3. Do not kill or torture personnel in their custody.
4. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
5. Treat civilians humanely.
6. Do not attack protected persons or protected places.
7. Destroy no more than the mission requires.
8. Respect private property and possessions.
9. Act with excellence and do their best to prevent violations of LoW.
10. Act with integrity and report all suspected LoW violations to their superiors.

6.0 - Objectives

6.1 - NARRATION

The objectives for this lesson are:

- Describe how military necessity and distinction impact operations involving unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how humanity impacts new weaponry.
- Describe how distinction impacts operations against unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how proportionality impacts operations in populated areas.
- Recognize how the Law of War is operationally implemented through collateral damage estimation, rules of engagement, and target lists.

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- Describe how proportionality impacts operations in populated areas.
- Recognize how the Law of War is operationally implemented through collateral damage estimation, rules of engagement, and target lists.

7.0 - Military Necessity's Impact on Operations in Populated Areas

7.1 - NARRATION

To begin, let's examine the principles of military necessity and distinction and how they impact operations involving civilian objects.

The goal of military necessity is, "to identify and pursue lawful military objectives that achieve the conflict's aims and swift termination of hostilities."

Most military measures used to defeat the enemy focus on the nature, location, purpose, and use of people, places, or things that make an effective contribution to the enemy's military capability.

We take action against these things to destroy or degrade its activities, capture enemy facilities, or neutralize those things that produce a military advantage for friendly forces.

Click each **link** for definitions of these terms.

7.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Most military measures used to defeat the enemy focus on the **nature, location**, **purpose**, and **use** of people, places, or things that make an **effective contribution** to the enemy's military capability.

We take action against these things to destroy or degrade its activities, capture enemy facilities, or neutralize those things that produce a military advantage for friendly forces.

7.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Nature includes "all objects used directly by the armed forces," such as weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, etc.

Location includes an object or site which is of special importance for military operations in view of its location, such as a bridge, a deep-water port, or a piece of high ground.

Purpose is "concerned with the intended future use of an object," such as a construction site for a suspected new military facility.

Use is "concerned with the object's present function," such as a school being used as a military headquarters.

Effective contribution to military action describes the situation when something is clearly military in nature, but still may not qualify as a military objective if it fails to meet the "effective contribution" test (e.g., an abandoned, inoperable tank). The joint publication regarding targeting (JP 3-60) does provide greater latitude in targeting potential threats as well as an adversary's military capabilities. Still, resources should be directed towards the highest, priority targets first.

8.0 - Rendulic Rule Introduction

8.1 - NARRATION

A commander must be able to clearly express a military requirement, decide how to achieve it, and ensure neither violates LoW.

Unfortunately, there are limitations related to intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities in how we identify the nature and purpose of potential targets. LoW recognizes that a commander must assess the military necessity of what they want to do based on the information available to them at the time and therefore, cannot be judged for negative outcomes based on information that later comes to light.

This judgement is based on what is known as the Rendulic Rule.

Click the **image** to identify the Rendulic Rule.

8.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Rendulic Rule

LoW recognizes that a commander must assess the military necessity of what they want to do based on the information available to them at the time.

8.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Rendulic Rule

General Lothar Rendulic faced a charge of ordering extensive destruction of civilian buildings and lands in a "scorched earth" campaign while retreating from an expected attack by the enemy. In retrospect, he grossly overestimated the danger, but argued that Hague IV authorized such destruction if "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." The tribunal acquitted him of this charge, observing that Rendulic's judgement may have been faulty, but was not criminal. The tribunal ruled:

"The conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made." - *Opinion and Judgment of Military Tribunal V, United States v. Wilhelm List, X TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1230 (Feb. 19, 1948) (Case 7) [hereinafter Hostage Case].*

The Rendulic Rule is the standard commanders are held accountable for. Plainly stated, the rule suggests that a commander's liability for decisions are based on the information reasonably available at the time of the commander's decision.

9.0 - Rendulic Rule Applied

9.1 - NARRATION

In recent history, the Rendulic Rule was applied during the investigation surrounding the bombing of the al-Firdos command and control bunker in downtown Baghdad.

Coalition forces had evidence the bunker was being used as an Iraqi command and control center, but had no knowledge it was concurrently being used as a bomb shelter for civilians. Under LoW principle of military necessity, which permits the attack of structures used to further an enemy's prosecution of a war, the bunker was a legitimate military target.

In hindsight, if Coalition forces had known that Iraqi civilians were occupying it as a shelter, this knowledge would have affected their proportionality analysis; in which case, US forces may have withheld an attack until the civilians had removed themselves (although LoW does not require such restraint).

Click each **image** to learn more or click **Next** to continue.

9.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

The Incident

The Ruling

9.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

The Incident

On 13 February 1991, an attack was conducted on the Al-Firdos bunker (also sometimes referred to as the Al-'Amariyah bunker) in Baghdad. Originally constructed during the Iran-Iraq War as an air raid shelter, it had been converted to a military command and control (C2) bunker in the middle of a populated area. While the entrance(s) to the bomb shelter permitted easy and rapid entrance and exit, barbed wire had been placed around this particular bunker, its entrances had been secured to prevent unauthorized access, and armed guards had been posted.

It also had been camouflaged. These precautions, plus signals intelligence associated with C2 functions, indicated to analysts that the bunker was now being used for military purposes. Knowing Coalition air attacks on targets in Baghdad took advantage of the cover of darkness, Iraqi authorities decided to allow selected civilians, apparently the families of officer personnel working in the bunker, to enter the Al-'Amariyah bunker at night; sheltering them on a level above the C2 center.

Coalition authorities were unaware of the presence of these civilians in the bunker complex. The 13 February attack of the Al-'Amariyah bunker, deemed a legitimate military target, resulted in the unfortunate deaths of over 200 of those Iraqi civilians who had taken refuge there.

The Ruling

Analysts were unaware that the Iraqi government was allowing civilians to seek shelter in a facility used by military forces, a clear violation of LoW by the Iraqis. In reviewing an incident such as the attack of the Al-'Amariyah bunker, LoW recognizes the difficulty of decision making amid the confusion of war. Leaders and commanders have to make decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information reasonably available to them at the time, rather than what is determined in hindsight.

10.0 - Distinguish Military Objective and Military Necessity

10.1 - NARRATION

It is not always easy to know when something is justified as a military objective based on the principle of military necessity, or when it is a civilian object. The principle of distinction requires commanders to distinguish between the two.

Military necessity may allow the lawful targeting of objects that are not traditionally military targets if those objects, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations.

For example, in the case of operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) targets included such things as oil production or oil transportation assets and bulk cash storage sites. The principle of distinction requires us to differentiate between civilian objects and military objectives, and limits Airmen to only direct attacks against military objectives.

Click each **image** to learn more.

10.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

1. The target must make an effective contribution to enemy military action.

2. Attacks against these targets must be expected to create a definite military advantage.

10.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

1. The target must make an effective contribution to enemy military action.

ISIL regularly used petroleum to support its armed action. The money it received from sales of petroleum was used to purchase weapons and pay fighters. Similarly, the money found in cash storage facilities was used by ISIL to recruit and retain fighters or to buy weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies and equipment. Given this analysis, certain petroleum facilities (e.g., pumping stations or tanker trucks used to take the oil to market); as well as cash storage facilities were legitimate targets for attack.

2. Attacks against these targets must be expected to create a definite military advantage.

ISIL could not easily substitute petroleum or cash with other sources of ready fiscal income. So, the military effects of damaging or destroying ISIL-controlled petroleum facilities and cash storage locations did most certainly create the desired effect of denying ISIL's ability to buy weapons and fund fighters.

11.0 - Humanity's Impact on the Use of New Weapons in Operations

11.1 - NARRATION

Humanity complements military necessity. Whereas military necessity acts as a justification, humanity acts as a prohibition. Humanity prohibits the infliction of death, injury and destruction not actually necessary to achieve a legitimate military purpose.

The principle of humanity attempts to reduce the amount of undue or unnecessary injury or suffering to members of the military as well as civilians.

Review the **screen** for examples.

11.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Examples of prohibiting weapons for humanity include:

Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments (1980): Prohibits the use of any weapon where the primary effect is to injure by fragments which are not detectable in the human body by x-rays. The reason is that such fragments are difficult to remove and cause unnecessary suffering.

Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980): Prohibits the use of any incendiary weapon against civilians or civilian objects, or their use against military targets near civilians. Forests and other plants may not be a target of incendiary weapons unless they are used to conceal combatants or other military objectives.

12.0 - Autonomous Weapons

12.1 - NARRATION

These Convention protocols apply to "legacy" weapons, those munitions which are currently in our inventory. But what about newer technologies – those recently developed or are on the horizon? For example, what do the Conventions say about autonomous weapons, non-lethal weapons, or offensive cyber capabilities?

Autonomous weapons: Some weapons, such as mines, may have autonomous functions triggered by the presence, proximity, or contact with a person or vehicle, rather than by a human operator.
Other weapons may have more sophisticated autonomous functions that enable them to select targets or to engage targets automatically after being activated by a user. For example, the US has a weapon system for point defense with autonomous capabilities designed to counter time-critical or saturation attacks, including the AEGIS ship defense system and the Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) system.

Humans can strive to ensure they follow the principles of LoW, such as humanity. Similarly, if autonomous weapons can engage targets without human intervention, they must be able to discriminate between military targets and civilians, and to engage without inflicting undue suffering. LoW does not specifically prohibit or restrict the use of autonomy to aid in the operation of weapons. In fact, in many cases, the use of autonomy could enhance the way LoW principles are implemented in military operations with greater discrimination and less risk of incidental harm.

Click each **image** to learn more.

12.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

The AEGIS Weapon System (AWS)

Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM)

12.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

The AEGIS Weapon System (AWS)

The AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) is a centralized, automated, C2 and weapons control system that was designed as a total weapon system, from detection to kill. Arleigh-Burke-class guided-missile destroyers have a computer-based command and decision element whose interface makes the AEGIS combat system capable of simultaneous operations against multiple threats.

Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM)

Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) Intercept system provides protection to warfighter's personnel and high-value assets by detecting Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (RAM) launches and intercepting those rounds in flight. It is effectively a land version of weapons such as the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) radar-controlled rapid-fire gun Active Denial System or close in protection of vessels from missiles.

13.0 - Non-Lethal Weapons

13.1 - NARRATION

Non-lethal/less-lethal weapons: Non-lethal weapons, sometimes called "less-lethal weapons," have been defined as "weapons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment."

Click each **image** to learn more.

13.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Non-lethal weapons include, but are not limited to the following:

- Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response Rifle (PHASR)
- Active Denial System (ADS)
- Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device (VLAD)

Click each **image** to learn more.

13.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

**Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response Rifle (PHASR)**

The PHASR is a prototype non-lethal laser dazzler developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory's Directed Energy Directorate, US Department of Defense. It's designed to temporarily disorient and blind a target. The PHASR rifle is not prohibited under this regulation, as the blinding effect is intended to be temporary.

Active Denial System (ADS)

The ADS is a millimeter wave source that heats the water in the target's skin and thus causes incapacitating pain.

Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device (VLAD)

This is a pre-emplaced, man portable, expandable spiked net, and is a hot commodity for Soldiers in Iraq. When a vehicle runs over the spikes, they puncture and grab the tires, and the net wraps around the axle to stop the vehicle

14.0 - Cyber Warfare

14.1 - NARRATION

Cyber Warfare

Not all cyber capabilities classify as a weapon or weapons system. LoW does not prohibit the development of novel cyber weapons. The usual legal prohibitions on specific types of weapons result from a nation's own practice and judicial rulings concerning the legality of those weapons.

In some cases, cyber operations that result in non-kinetic or reversible effects can offer options that help minimize unnecessary harm to civilians. In this regard, cyber capabilities may in some circumstances be preferable, as a matter of policy, to kinetic weapons because their effects may be reversible and they may hold the potential to accomplish military goals without any destructive kinetic effect at all.

However, cyber weapons must be able to discriminate between military targets and civilians. For example, a destructive computer virus that was programmed to spread and destroy uncontrollably within civilian internet systems would be prohibited as an inherently indiscriminate weapon.

So, just because a weapon is new or employs new technology does not mean that it is illegal. Whether pursuing lethal or non-lethal effects against the enemy, the overarching mandate is to abide by LoW. This includes the principle of humanity, which requires operations to reduce, as much as possible, the unnecessary suffering of civilians.

14.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT:

- Cyber capabilities may be preferable to kinetic weapons.
- Cyber weapons must be able to discriminate between military targets and civilians.
- New weapon technology is not always illegal.

15.0 - Distinction's Impact on Operations in Populated Areas

15.1 - NARRATION

As we have seen, the principle of distinction, sometimes called discrimination, obligates parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Distinction may be understood as having two sets of reinforcing requirements:

1. Differentiating combatants from civilians while conducting attacks against the enemy; and
2. Distinguishing between one's own combatant force and one's own civilian population and locations.

Adhering to the second rule is relatively simple. US military forces comply by having all its personnel wear distinguishing uniforms and insignia. Additionally, LoW requires that the adversary also identify its representative forces in the same manner.

What becomes troublesome is when civilians not associated with a State's forces decide to take up arms. In other words, their civilian populace participates in hostilities even though they are not recognized as legal combatants. When this happens, adhering to the first rule becomes a challenge that must be dealt with.

Although LoW stipulates that unprivileged belligerents lack the right to engage in hostilities, international law states that if they do, they must observe the same rules as lawful combatants during their conduct of hostilities. Conversely, aside from the right to self-defense, our US forces are authorized to engage unprivileged belligerents once they are collectively declared hostile by an appropriate authority. Specific instructions on how to deal with unprivileged belligerents are typically spelled out in theater Rules of Engagement (ROE).

15.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Principally, when conducting operations, Airmen must ensure:

- They distinguish combatants from civilians.
- They distinguish between military objectives and protected property or places.
- They separate themselves from civilians and civilian objects, such as:
  - Boko Haram
  - Taliban
  - Al Qaeda

16.0 - Proportionality's Impact on Operations in Populated Areas

16.1 - NARRATION

LoW principle of proportionality exists to ensure that combatants weigh the anticipated gains of military operations against reasonably foreseeable consequences to the civilian population.

Proportionality does not strictly prohibit civilian casualties. It challenges us to weigh those expected casualties against the military advantages gained.

The principles of distinction and proportionality are closely associated. Distinction compels us to differentiate combatants and unprivileged belligerents from civilians; while proportionality compels us to prevent excessive loss of civilian life and property in relation to the military gain. When confronted with legitimate military objectives near civilian concentrations, these two principles sometimes collide.

Besides the mandated adherence to LoW, the Air Force planners' decisions are supported by a targeting process mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Analysts and planners MUST evaluate the potential damage to any and all civilian personnel and structures prior to engagement.

Shaping that decision-making process are the ROEs established by national authorities, combatant commanders, and local commanders.

Supporting this process further is the existence of various target lists which categorizes an objective's eligibility for engagement.

16.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

- Proportionality does not strictly prohibit civilian casualties.
- Distinction differentiates combatants and unprivileged belligerents from civilians.
- Proportionality compels us to prevent excessive loss of civilian life and property.
- Analysts and planners MUST evaluate the potential damage to civilians.

17.0 - Operational Implementation of Low Through Commander's Guidance

17.1 - NARRATION

The evaluation process which determines whether a target is too close to a protected location for engagement is known as the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM). CDM is a way for commanders to ensure they adhere to LoW by weighing the risk of collateral damage against military necessity and proportionality. The final product of this process is known as the Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE).

A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (3160.01C) mandates the CDM be used to ensure consistency in the targeting process amongst the services. CDM consists of a five-step evaluation process applied to all intended targets, with each subsequent step dependent on the determinations of the previous step.

If the calculated risk to civilian lives or property in the planned attack exceeds the limits allowed by the commander's ROE, then the decision to engage may well require national-level approval (For example, the Secretary of Defense or the President).

Although the CDM process is somewhat complicated, the DOD has specialists certified to perform this function with or without automated tools.

17.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) begins in the target development phase and continues through execution. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01C, No-strike and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM), details a specific DOD-wide collateral damage estimation methodology.

The framework of the CDM is built around five mutually dependent CDE levels (CDE Levels 1 through 5). Each level is based on a progressively refined analysis of available intelligence, weapons type and effects, physical environment, target characteristics, and delivery scenarios with specific risk thresholds established for each of the 5 CDE levels.

Targets with associated collateral damage concerns that are expected to exceed the theater combatant commander's (CCMD) thresholds are referred either to the SecDef or President using the Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR) process (Classified).

18.0 - Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM) Introduction

18.1 - NARRATION

CDM is part of the target development process which starts when commanders begin campaign planning for operations, and is refined during the execution of those operations.

18.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

- The evaluation process determines engagement proximity of a protected location.
- CDM weighs the risk of collateral damage against military necessity.
- CDM consists of a 5-step evaluation process.

19.0 - Rules of Engagement (ROE) Introduction

19.1 - NARRATION

As previously discussed, the decision to engage sensitive targets is based on whether the expected collateral damage exceeds the combatant commander's ROE.

But there are also numerous types of ROE that constrain Air Force operations. These are the main types of ROE:

- Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ROE (NROE)
- Mission-Specific ROE
- Special Instructions (SPINS)
- Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

No matter who authors a particular ROE, it is important to understand that ROE guidance can be MORE restrictive than LoW guidance, but never LESS.

Click each **link** for more information.

19.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

- Standing ROE (SROE)
- NATO ROE (NROE)
- Mission-Specific ROE
- Special Instructions (SPINS)
- Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

19.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) - Presented as a CJCSI, this document is the basic ROE guidance for all US forces during military operations. They provide implementation guidance on the inherent right of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment.

NATO ROE (NROE) - This is the basic ROE document for all forces participating in "NATO/NATO-led military operations."

Mission-Specific ROE - ROE specifically tailored to a particular operation are almost always included as an annex to the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP).

Special Instructions (SPINS) - This document is periodically issued as an attachment to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) that provides procedural and additional instructions to the tactical forces.

Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) - Apart from these specific sets of rules for the conduct of military operations, there is also guidance known as the **Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)**. While ROE is interpreted as a State's guidance for the rules for military engagements, RUF specifically provides guidance for the military's support to civil missions and land-based homeland defense missions within US territories, and for DOD personnel performing law enforcement functions at all DOD installations around the world.

20.0 - Target List Introduction

20.1 - NARRATION

Most targets in a conflict are identified and analyzed months, if not years, before an actual conflict as part of the target development process that supports operational planning. Several DOD agencies share the responsibility of studying a potential adversary's military capabilities and supporting infrastructure. The results of those studies are entered into a database, target-by-target, known as the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB).

20.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

- Most targets in a conflict are analyzed months ahead of time.
- Several DOD agencies share the responsibility for studying the adversary's capabilities.
- Results are entered into the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB).

21.0 - Target List Overview

21.1 - NARRATION

Significant civilian locations, usually protected sites, are also contained in the database, location-by-location, which contain relevant information associated with them as well.

21.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Protected sites include:

- Civilian objects
- Medical facilities
- Cultural property
- Objects indispensable to survival of the civilian population
- Natural environment
- Works and installations containing dangerous forces

22.0 - Target List Basic Facts

22.1 - NARRATION

Prior to the execution of hostilities, all targets relevant to a particular campaign plan are pulled from the MIDB and entered into a sub-database known as the Joint Target List (JTL). These targets are generally deemed eligible for strike in support of that particular campaign. As a result, no target may be considered for engagement during that campaign's deliberate targeting process unless it resides on the JTL.

Click the **link** to learn more.

22.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

No target may be considered for engagement during the campaign's **deliberate targeting process** unless it resides on the Joint Target List (JTL).

Military Objectives:

- Nature
- Location
- Purpose
- Use
- Effective Contribution
- Definite Military Advantage

Civilian Property

- Undefended Places
- Hospitals/Safety Zones
- Cultural Property
- Dangerous Forces
- Indispensable to Survival
- Natural Environment

22.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Deliberate Targeting Process normally supports the joint force's future operations effort.

23.0 - Target Misuse

23.1 - NARRATION

Just because a target IS ON the JTL doesn't necessarily mean it is automatically cleared for engagement. Due to operational requirements, intelligence concerns, or political sensitivities, some targets may be designated eligible for strike, but with restrictions. These targets are placed on what is known as a Restricted Target List (RTL).

Conversely, just because a target IS NOT on the JTL, for example, not eligible for strike, does not necessarily mean it cannot be targeted. If enemy forces occupy a protected location, doing so changes the function of that location, and thus it may be reclassified to one that may be eligible for targeting.

Click the **link** to learn more

23.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

This situation will usually be handled as part of the **dynamic targeting process**, most commonly associated with Troops-In-Contact (TICs) or in a self-defense scenario.

Military Objectives:

- Nature
- Location
- Purpose
- Use
- Effective Contribution
- Definite Military Advantage

Civilian Property

- Undefended Places
- Hospitals/Safety Zones
- Cultural Property
- Dangerous Forces
- Indispensable to Survival
- Natural Environment

Issues:

- Misuse for Military Purposes
- Dual Use Facilities

23.3 - INTERACTION-SCREEN TEXT

Dynamic Targeting Process is normally employed in current operations because the nature and time frame associated with current operations (usually the current 24-hour period) typically requires more immediate responsiveness than is achieved in deliberate targeting.

24.0 - Target List Basic Protected Objects and Sites

24.1 - NARRATION

Protected objects and locations are typically segregated to their own list. Targets, which MAY NOT be struck under any circumstance without a commander's approval, are placed on what is known as a No-Strike List (NSL).

CDM analysis is done on properties on the JTL and on targets considered for dynamic targeting events. Each proposed target must be scrubbed against the RTL and NSL to determine if that object is on or near a property on either list.

24.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

- Targets on a No-Strike List (NSL) MAY NOT be struck under any circumstance without a commander's approval.

- Each proposed target must be scrubbed against the RTL and NSL.

25.0 - Conclusion

25.1 - NARRATION

Congratulations! You completed the Law of War Advanced lesson.

In this lesson, you learned how to:

- Describe how military necessity and distinction impact operations involving unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how humanity impacts new weaponry.
- Describe how distinction impacts operations against unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how proportionality impacts operations in populated areas.
- Recognize how the Law of War is operationally implemented through collateral damage estimation, rules of engagement, and target lists.

25.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Congratulations! You completed the Law of War Advanced lesson.

This lesson covered the following objectives:

- Describe how military necessity and distinction impact operations involving unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how humanity impacts new weaponry.
- Describe how distinction impacts operations against unprivileged belligerents or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
- Describe how proportionality impacts operations in populated areas.
- Recognize how the Law of War is operationally implemented through collateral damage estimation, rules of engagement, and target lists.

26.0 - Appendix A – Acronyms / Glossary

26.1 - ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY TERMS USED IN THIS LESSON

ACRONYM/TERM	DEFINITION
ADS	Active Denial System
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AWS	AEGIS Weapon System
C2	command and control
CCMD	Combatant Commander
CDE	Collateral Damage Estimation
CDM	Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CIWS	Close-In Weapon System
C-RAM	Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JAOP	Joint Air Operations Plan
JTL	Joint Target List
LoW	Law of War
MIDB	Modernized Integrated Database
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSL	No-Strike List
NROE	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ROE
PHASR	Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response Rifle
RAM	Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
RUF	Rules for the Use of Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RTL	Restricted Target List

SRUF	Standing Rules for the Use of Force
SROE	Standing Rules of Engagement
SPINS	Special Instructions
STAR	Sensitive Target Approval and Review
TICs	Troops-In-Contact
VLAD	Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device

26.2 - References Used to Develop This Lesson

Number	REFERENCE
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4.	**AFTTP 3-4**, *Airman's Manual (Incorporating Change 1)*, 5 Aug 2015
5.	*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*, pg. 703, April 1992
6.	*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Aug 2017
7.	**AFPD 51-4**, *Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*, 4 Aug 2011
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9.	*Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, 12 Jun 2015
10.	*Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook*, 12 Jun 2015
11.	*Headquarters Air Force, Operations and International Law Directorate (AF/JAO), (Com) 703-695-9631, (DSN) 225-9631*
12.	**CJCSI 3121.01C**, *Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for US Forces*, 13 Jun 2005

US Air Force Expeditionary Readiness Training (ERT)

Talking Points

Law of War: Basic

Last Publish Date: 6 March 2019

Lesson Map

1.0 - LESSON TRANSCRIPT PREFACE

1.1 - COURSE DESCRIPTION, REGULATION, AND CONTENT POINT OF CONTACT

Description: This basic Law of War lesson targets Air Force personnel who must maintain continual currency for deployments or those who are tasked to deploy. This lesson is directed by Headquarters Air Force's, Operations and International Law Division to address a SECAF requirement for Airmen to have training on basic Law of War prior to their deployment to an AOR. This course describes the need for LoW, describes the five principles of LoW, and introduces Airmen to the new 10 Rules for Airmen.

Duration: 1 Hour Course

Frequency: Once every three years for YR coded Airmen, or prior to deployment

Course Regulations: AFI 10-405, and AFPD 51-4 (2018)

Replacement for Law of Armed Conflict Course Content POC: Air Force Office of Operations and International Law Directorate

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2.0 - WELCOME

2.1 - NARRATION

Welcome to the Law of War, Basic Airman Readiness course. For help with navigating this course, open the help screen by clicking the question mark or pressing the question mark key.

Click **Next** to continue.

2.2 - ON-SCREEN TEXT

Welcome to the Law of War (LoW) Basic Airman Readiness (BAR) course.