





Defense Intelligence Reference Document

February 1994 DOD-2600-KN-94, Vol 1

North Korean Military Forces

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North Korean Force Capabilities Handbook, Vol 1: National Military Overview



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National Military Overview

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National Military Overview

(U) Key Government Officials

- President: Kim Il-song
- Chairman of the National Defense Commission: Kim Chong-il
- Vice President: Yi Chong-ok
- Vice President: Pak Song-chol
- Vice President: Kim Yong-chu
- Vice President: Kim Pyong-sik
- Premier: Kang Song-san
- Minister of Foreign Affairs: Kim Yong-nam
- Minister of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Minister of Public Security: Vice Marshal Paek Hak-nim

(U) Key Military Officials

- Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces: Marshal Kim Chong-il
- Minister of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Director of the General Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Chief of General Staff, the Korean People's Army: Vice Marshal Choe Kwang
- Air Force Commander: General Cho Myong-nok
- Navy Commander: Admiral Kim Il-chol

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Type and Stability of Government

Secretary General of the Korean
orkers' Party (KWP), Chairman of the Central People's Committee, and Chairman of the Central
(b)(1),
Both Kims are also listed ranking first and second,
spectively, among the three-member Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the KWP. (b)(1),1.4
special configuration of the second control
Kim Chong-il is expected to succeed his father, Kim Il-song, as ruler of North Korea. Kim Chong-il
ready manages day-to-day affairs, although his father retains final control over important foreign
fairs.
im Chong-il's selection as successor is an unorthodox choice for a communist state. It was done to sure that his father's policies will be continued. (b)(1).1
issure that his father's policies will be continued. $(b)(1),1$
As expected in a communist state, ideology plays an important role in North Korea. Pyongyang's
omestic and foreign policies, for example, are commonly explained as manifestations of juche (self-
eliance) sasang (thought), a North Korean version of socialist philosophy. (b)(1)
By using juche as a multifunctional ideological
oncept, Kim II-song has firmly established his leadership in North Korea by sheer political pragmatism,
by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfunctional ressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U.S.
ressure of tratemar intervention of control from externar forces, and by referitessity attacking 6.5.
(b) <u>(1)</u> ;1.4 (c)
Military and Political Alignment
vilital y and I officer itingithem
have enhanced North Korea's position within the Third World and buttressed its image as
n independent communist state.
(b)(1),
External Threat and Government


External Threat and Government Counterstrategy


(b)(1),1.4 (c)


security. Pyongyang may credit combined ROK/U.S. forces in South Korea with the capability to mour a large-scale conventional and nuclear attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and along the North Korean coasts. (b)(1),1	
(b)(1),1	
(5)(17);	⊿
	.4 (6)
]
	(b) (1), 1.4 (c
	(=)(-),(-
North Korea has always made national defense and military preparedness its top	
minute, and it continues to be a viable military throat to South Vorce	b) <u>(</u> 1),1.4 (c)
	D)(_1); 1.4 (C)
North Korea portrays South Korea and the United States as hostile in order to mobilize its own	7
military and civilian sectors into a higher state of readiness.	
Internal Threat and Government	
Internal Inteat and Government (b)(1),1.4 (c)
Counterstrategy	
	\neg
the North	J (b)(1),1.4(
Korean regime is concerned with keepin	(b)(1), 1.4 (g
its population isolated from foreign influences,	Ī
(b)(1),1.4 (c)	


Foreign Influence

(U) Kim Il-song has shown extreme sensitivity to any sign of foreign interference, actual or imagined, in North Korea's internal affairs. In his view, relationships among countries should be governed by the	
principles of complete equality; respect for territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty; noninterference in one another's internal affairs; and fraternal assistance. (b)(1),1.4	(c)
(C) For Pyongyang, 1990 was one of its toughest years. By the end of	
1990, all the former East European socialist countries were reborn to emerge as newly democratic nations with market economy systems. Given North Korea's heavy economic reliance on the Soviet Union, the impact of Soviet disintegration was extremely distressing. Pyongyang had to search for new external sources of economic support to rescue its struggling economy. (b)(1),1.4 (c))
	1),1.4 (c)
economic ties in its effort to bail itself out of economic stagnation and diplomatic isolation due to its nuclear issue with the international community. The other was	
Foreign Military Presence (b)(1),1.4 (c)	4 (c)
No foreign troops are present in North Korea. Soviet troops left North Korea after the DPRK's establishment in 1948. Chinese troops left North Korea after the Korean armistice agreement in 1953.	
Military Strategy and Doctrine (b)(1);1.4 (c)	
Historical Evolution (b)(1), 1.4 (c)	









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Throughout the 1980s, as South Korea's economy was experiencing dramatic economic growth, North Korea concentrated on
momentum until the middle of the decade.
(b)(1),1.4 (c)
1990-95 War Preparedness Plan
(b)(1),1.4 (c)
Force Capabilities and Remaining Vulnerabilities
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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	(b)(1),1.4 (c)		

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(5) If current economic and political trends continue in North Korea, the overall readiness and capabilities of North Korea's forces will decline by the end of this decade.

(b)(1), 1.4(c)

<u> </u>				
Intellige	nce and S	Security		
		(b)(1),1.	4 (c)	

