

## **ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

#### REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD: Attached are comments from each unit setting forth the most noteworthy accomplishments of the Revolutionary Activities Section since the last Inspection. This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left organizations and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this Section, as are sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups.

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# SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

### REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. Shackelford: Attached are the comments concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification programs in effect against the Revolutionary Activities movement. This Section is responsible for the supervision of individuals involved in revolutionary activities, including terrorist individuals and groups engaged in bombings and arson, and other revolutionary groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campuses. Investigations concerning Trotskyite groups, underground publications, sabotage investigations and protest groups are also handled in this Section.

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# ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION 6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD. There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the Revolutionary Activities Section as of close of business, August 18, 1972.

	At	uthorized	A	ssigned
Front Office	2	Agents	2	Agents
		Clerks		Clerks
New Left		Agents		Agents
Groups Unit	4	Clerks	4	Clerks
New Left		Agents		Agents
Individuals Unit	7	Clerks		Clerks
Special Investigations		Agents		Agents
West Unit	5	Clerks	5	Clerks
Special Investigations		Agents		Agents
East Unit	6	Clerks	6	Clerks
Protest and Trotskyist		Agents	3	Agents
Groups Unit	4	Clerks	3	Clerks*
Total		Agents		Agents
	28	Clerks	27	Clerks
	50	Employees	49	Employees

<sup>\*</sup>Employee from Division Front Office is working in this unit but is assigned to Division Front Office until 8/21/72.

1. Two GS-4 Clerk positions. One in Protest and Trotskyist
Groups Unitemployee from Division Front Office working in
place but not yet assigned to Revolutionary Activities Section
(To be assigned 8/21/72). Employee
Special Investigations - East Unit, resigning close of business
8/25/72 and replacement needed. Both positions in authorized
complement.

2. One employee Clerk, GS-4, resigning 8/25/72. Acknowledgement of resignation not yet received.

3. Short one Clerk, GS-4, but full complement as of 8/21/72.

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Adequacy of Personnel Revolutionary Activities Section 6-E

- 4. At the time of the last inspection, this Section was authorized 27 clerical employees. The authorized clerical employees for the Section now is 28; however, there are 27 actually assigned. This increase was occasioned by intensification of investigations involving violence oriented individuals and such groups as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
- 5. The Revolutionary Activities Section, as of the last inspection, had an authorized complement of 26 Agents and 27 clerks. The current authorized complement is 22 Agents and 28 clerical employees.
- 6. As previously noted in Item 5, supra, this Section had an authorized complement of 26 Agents and 27 clerks. As of 8/20/71, first case count under new procedures, this complement handled 6,845 cases, averaging 334 cases per Agent on case assignment (excluding special assignments). At the present time we have an authorized complement of 22 Agents and 28 clerical employees handling 7,509 cases, averaging 395 cases per Agent on case assignment (excluding special assignments). In analyzing these figures, it must be borne in mind this Section's caseload involves 1,506 organizational cases (as opposed to cases on persons), 20 per cent of caseload, which is far above that of other Sections.

Of further significance is the intensification of our efforts to penetrate the Weatherman underground apparatus authorized by Mr. Gray and referred to in more detail in 4E and 4H in this report. Also of concern is the move toward a more violent posture by various communist infiltrated and/or controlled antiwar groups and emergence of the extremely violent Vietnam Veterans Against the War in Vietnam. It must also be noted Mr. Gray has under consideration transfer of Weatherman fugitive cases to this Section, and while it is not known at this time what decision will be made, should these cases be transferred to this Section, to be handled with our intensified efforts against the Weatherman underground apparatus, our manpower problem will be further aggravated. Should these fugitive cases be transferred to this Section, an analysis will be made and appropriate recommendations submitted concerning related manpower needs.

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Adequacy of Personnel Revolutionary Activities Section 6-E

The case load in this Section is extremely heavy. This coupled with increased responsibilities in areas of intensive investigative efforts has put a great strain on our manpower. It is recognized, however, there is a need for additional manpower in other areas of the Bureau's responsibilities as well as those handled within this Section. Therefore, manpower will be followed very closely and every effort will be made to obtain maximum utilization of existing personnel and to utilize clerical personnel where possible and practical.

7. Personnel adequacy is closely followed through monthly caseload and delinquency figures, daily discussion with Unit Chiefs and careful review of special cases. It is frequently necessary to make temporary assignments of Agents and clerks to other Units to meet emergency situations.



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ADDENDUM: INSPECTOR J. H. TRIMBACH (9-1-72 JHT:sjs)

Inspector concurs with your comments that the Agent complement of the Division is adequate and not excessive.

Your request to increase the clerical strength of the Espionage Section from 30 to 34 will be considered upon receipt of a separate memorandum being initiated by that section.

As the work of the Domestic Intelligence Division continues to increase, you should make every effort to absorb the additional responsibilities without additional personnel.

Assistant Director Miller please note.

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