

MEMORANDUM

Outside System

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8353X

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

December 5, 1972

OBE

(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

SUBJECT: Monitoring Soviet Efforts to Influence
U. S. Elites

I agree that to put out a memorandum Director of the FBI could cause problems. As an alternative, one that I would prefer in any case, you should have a meeting with them to discuss a joint effort on their part to monitor relevant Soviet activities and periodically report to the President.

25X1

I will supply talking points, if you want them, for such a meeting when it is scheduled.

I recommend that you schedule the meeting early next year after the inauguration.

Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.

— Agree — Disagree

NSS, FBI Reviews Completed

~~TOP SECRET~~ (XGDS) - 5B 2, 3

DECLAS - Date impossible to determine.

BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig

MEMORANDUM

7467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET

ACTION
November 16, 1972

Handwritten: ~~HAIG~~

Handwritten: [Signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

SUBJECT: Monitoring Soviet Efforts to Influence U.S. Elites

In a recent memorandum I suggested that you initiate an effort to monitor more closely the processes by which the Soviets try to influence U.S. officials and opinion leaders. You indicated agreement. See TAB B for a copy of my initial memorandum to you.

Attached is a memorandum from you Gray asking them to:

25X1

- Work out appropriate arrangements for such monitoring.
- Report to you at regular intervals.
- Focus their efforts on:
 - . The extent and nature of the Soviet efforts.
 - . The objectives of Soviet efforts.

I recommend you sign the memorandum at TAB A.

Hal Sonnenfeld *HS* concurs.

Handwritten in a large oval: I think this is dangerous to put out

TOP SECRET (XGDS) - 5B 2, 3
DECLAS - Date impossible to determine.
BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig

[IS - HR 1122C]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

[Redacted]

25X1

Acting Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation

SUBJECT: Reporting on Soviet Efforts to Influence U. S.
Officials and Opinion Leaders

The growing network of U. S. and Soviet contacts may lead to Soviet attempts to influence U. S. officials and opinion leaders, and thereby U. S. policy and behavior. An effort to monitor the processes by which the Soviets try to exert influence should be initiated. Appropriate arrangements [Redacted] should be worked out to carry out this effort.

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Summary reports on the results of the monitoring should be submitted quarterly to the President.

The focus on this effort should be to assess the:

- extent of the Soviet effort;
- target groups in the U. S. ;
- objectives as a function of the target group and aspect of U. S. policy;
- important trends or changes in level of effort, targets, or objectives.

Henry A. Kissinger

TOP SECRET (XGDS) - 5B 2, 3

DECLAS - Date impossible to determine

BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

ACT of [unclear]
Information
October 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

SUBJECT: Implications of Increasing U. S. - Soviet Contacts

I want to call your attention to the following:

[redacted] probably ask you about your willingness to discuss your observations of Soviet leaders, Soviet policy, etc., with a small group of people from [redacted] response to a growing complaint [redacted] that there is no feedback from your unprecedented contacts. Various limitations and inhibitions in the preparation of future [redacted] is alleged. The Soviet area, of course, is not the only point of interest.

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25X1
25X1

-- The growing net work of U. S. and Soviet relations create a major new opportunity for us to understand the operation of the Soviet governmental process, its bureaucratic politics, etc. In the future it will probably also create a competition as to which government, bureaucracy, or society will most influence the behavior of the other in the emerging relationship.

This suggests the following:

-- Some more systematic effort should be made to collect and analyze the insights obtained by the growing number of U. S. officials and U. S. businessmen, who will be personally involved in conducting negotiations, arranging joint projects, etc.

-- The insights may add significantly to our knowledge of the working of the Soviet government. A friend of mine who directs the

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(3)
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NSF Polar Research Program is coached by his Soviet counterparts as to the best sort of letters to write so that they can solve their internal bureaucratic problems, which are described to at least a limited extent, in moving forward on projects of joint interest.

-- It may be best to organize the effort separately from the A White House directed effort may be needed.

25X1

-- Such an effort, if successful, should gradually allow us to better assess the impact the net work of relationships are having in the Soviet Union.

-- A complementary effort is needed to monitor more closely the processes by which the Soviets try to influence U.S. officials and other elites with important roles in influencing U.S. policy and action. At the moment there does not appear to be any effort to put together a picture of Soviet efforts to influence relevant U.S. elites. While information is gathered on Soviet contacts with some U.S. individuals, there is no effort to look for patterns, or shifts of line, etc. Perhaps a more systematic effort is needed.

Would you like to take some initiative in these areas:

-- With regard to an effort to collect and analyze the insights of U.S. personnel in contact with the Soviets?

YES _____

NO _____

HK But willing to listen to us.

-- With regard to Soviet efforts to influence U.S. elite groups?

YES _____

NO _____

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