

SECRET

NO # 25 815 10

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100009-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

REVIEW STAFF
75-3566

SP - 123/75
25 November 1975

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR CONVERSATION with Pike Committee Staff

25X1A

PARTICIPANTS: (Staff) Mr. Greg Rushford
(CIA) [redacted]
PLACE: Room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters
TIME: 1415-1530, Tuesday, 25 November 1975

1. Mr. Rushford came to look at documents assembled by me and my staff in response to his written request for terms of reference, and conversations with Jan Lodal, related to the preparation of NIE 11-3/8-74. (His letter attached.) I had a one-inch stack which I described to him as covering three related categories of activity in the period December 1973-July 1974: (a) NIO/SP discussions with consumers and community to develop interagency work program leading up to the estimate; (b) negotiations with CIA and DIA about the who and how of preparing force projections for NIE's and DIPP; (c) preliminary planning and discussion about the form and content of the NIE itself.

2. Without looking at the documents, Rushford reported that he had reviewed about 1 1/2 feet of materials on Backfire and had selected about an inch for the Committee. The documents selected contained "prima facie" evidence that the books had been cooked by people in CIA so as to support a low estimate of Backfire performance which would be congenial to Dr. Kissinger's alleged aim of not including Backfire in SALT limitations.

3. When I pressed him for details, he cited a memo some years ago by Karl Weber which criticized OSR for trying to downgrade Backfire's performance, and last summer's internal CIA memo titled "Backfire, Son of

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100009-9

SECRET

25X1
Blinder." I asked him if he was going to interview Weber and he said yes, tomorrow. I said I knew nothing about such a memo, but that I thought the CIA efforts to get [redacted] to do independent work recently was a healthy development; that competition in this type of analysis was aimed at getting at the truth; that when the several analyses had come out reasonably close I had felt reassured about the raw capability part of the problem. We had scrubbed it about as thoroughly as we could in light of the evidence available.

4. I said I thought the "Backfire, SOB" paper had been a poor paper, not because of the detective work in it, but because it had ended on a note giving the impression that this new fact told the story about Backfire's performance. Rushford said he didn't fault the analyst, but those in CIA who had floated the paper to the NSC and thereby supported Kissinger's policy. I said management had promptly corrected the impression left by the memo with a clarifying memo. I said I thought the Backfire issue was an intractable problem of raw theoretical capability vs. probable Soviet design intent and operational mission, and I doubted that intelligence was going to be able to get the policymakers out of that problem.

5. Rushford then scanned the documents we had assembled, said they looked very helpful to an understanding of how the estimate got "used" (I corrected him to "born"), and said he'd write us a letter asking for them all.

6. Rushford indicated without definitely committing himself, that the Committee was not likely to call me as a witness unless I had something I wanted to say to it. I asked "About what?" He said about how intelligence books were cooked to support policy or how policymakers put pressure on us to draw conclusions supporting their policies. I said I had no such testimony to give. He urged me to "think deeply" about it and call him if I had anything more to offer.

STATINTL

[redacted]
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

SECRET

Distribution:

- 1 - Mr. [] (Review Staff)
- 1 - Dr. Karl Weber (D/OSI)
- 1 - D/DCI/NIO
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - SALT Support Staff
- 1 - NIO/WE
- 1 - NIO/SP
- 1 - NIO/RI

STATINTL

STATINTL

NIO/SP [] (26Nov75)

75-3505

November 20, 1975

STATINTL

[Redacted]


Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

STATINTL
Dear [Redacted]

STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
This is to request on behalf of the House Select Committee on Intelligence that [Redacted] review his files for memoranda which reflect conversations he had with Jan Lodal of the National Security Council staff prior to the 1974 NIE for the Soviet Union. Should [Redacted] be unable to locate any document which involves the terms of reference for that NIE, particularly as to the different force projections, I request an informal interview with [Redacted] to expand upon our brief conversation of this morning.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Gregory G. Ruskford
For the Committee

NOV 20 11 32 AM '75