

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Meeting with the Director, National Computer Security Center, National Security Agency

FROM:

Chief, Information Systems Security Division

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 14 April 1987



TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE	
RECEIVED	FORWARDED
16 APR 1987	4/17
17 APR 1987	20 APR
22 APR 1987	22 APR 1987

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/TSG

4/15/87

[Handwritten initials]

Attached is a memorandum for the record regarding my meeting with [redacted] Director, National Computer Security Center. The meeting was in follow up to a discussion I had with [redacted] regarding the need for a formal reporting mechanism for computer abuse cases involving U.S. Government computers. Such a reporting mechanism is needed in view of the mass confusion that resulted from

2.

3. DD/PTS

16 APR 1987

4/17

[Handwritten initials]

4.

5. D/OS

17 APR 1987

20 APR

[Handwritten initials]

6.

7. DDA - FYI 7 APR 1987

[Handwritten initials]

Good work. Continue the progress

(Note: Copy sent to C/ISSD)

DDA REGISTRATION
100-20

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

14 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Director, National Computer Security Center, National Security Agency [redacted]

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1. On 9 April 1987, the undersigned and [redacted] Deputy Chief, Information Systems Security Division, met with [redacted] Director, National Computer Security Center (NCSC). [redacted] is also the Chairman, Subcommittee on Automated Information Systems Security (SAISS). Also attending were [redacted] Deputy Director, NCSC, and [redacted] Special Assistant to [redacted]

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2. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss my concern about computer hacking into government unclassified (but sensitive) databases. I specifically referred to [redacted]

[redacted] My concern is that, at present, there is no formal reporting mechanism to which either government or commercial entities can report such abuses and receive advice and guidance or legal assistance, if requested. We agreed that domestic computer abuse efforts should be appropriately handled by the FBI (there is no question that the FBI is the appropriate focal point for this type of activity). The point that I wanted to stress is there is a need and should be a clearinghouse and formal reporting mechanism for computer abuse activities involving U.S. Government systems. [redacted]

25X1

3. The NCSC currently has a department that collects information concerning technical system vulnerability and has established a formal reporting mechanism for cataloguing this information. Corrective action ("fixes") to known vulnerabilities are made available to customers. A similar type of reporting mechanism should be available, on a national level, for computer abuse cases. [redacted]

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. I also brought up another point that I thought the NCSC or the NTISSC could assist this nation in terms of computer security awareness. Past computer abuse cases have indicated that hackers choose the least path of resistance. That is if they find a system that is password protected or where other basic computer security procedures have been implemented, the hacker simply looks for a system that is "wide open." I believe that this approach is typical of the [redacted] case. Through computer security awareness, formalized instructions and information notices, I believe that unclassified systems could be strengthened through the implementation of good security practices and procedures. In some cases, system managers are not aware of the modus operandi of hackers, and implementing basic, simplistic computer security procedures could, in fact, foil many hacker attacks. [redacted]

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5. [redacted] was of the opinion that both of these suggestions have merit and intends to discuss the matter with Al Bays, Assistant Director, Technical Services Division, FBI, to develop a course of action. It is possible that the most appropriate forum to raise these concerns is through the SAISS or NTISSC. [redacted]

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6. I also took the opportunity, at this meeting, to present [redacted] with the seal of the CIA in follow up to his request at a recent SAISS meeting. The seal was presented on behalf of the Director of Security with a note from [redacted] to [redacted]

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


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[redacted]

Chief, Information Systems Security Division
Office of Security

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 27 Apr 87
TO:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
EXA/DDA		27 APR 1987
ADDA		27 APR 1987
DDA		27 APR 1987
DDA/Registry		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION