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future plans would be. He stated in spite of anything he might have done in the past, he considers himself a loyal United States citizen and felt that information concerning the Panamanian situation should be a matter of which the United States State Department should be aware.

Bureau's attention is called to Bureau airtel to Miami dated January 21, 1959, captioned, "REUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA, IS - Panama," [identifying this person as a CIA informant. This person, it has been established is identical with RUBEN MIRO who contacted MEROLA and it was felt at the time because of MIRO's position in this matter, that he might be baiting MEROLA.] (S) (u)

On February 7, 1959, MEROLA informed he arrived Miami, 3:00 p.m., February 7, 1959, from Havana and was planning to depart at 10:25, same date, for return to Havana. MEROLA was advised of provisions of the Neutrality Act.

MEROLA stated he occupies Apartment 30-N in the Poesa Building, Havana, Cuba.

Miami teletype to Bureau dated March 2, 1959, reflects MEROLA contacted that date and he had talked by overseas telephone, evening of February 27, 1959, with RUBEN MIRO who was in Havana. MEROLA said MIRO, in double talk conversation confirmed fact that revolutionary group was ready to leave from Cuba during following week. This teletype also pointed out to Bureau that MEROLA is a suspect in connection with transportation of arms in case entitled, "STUART SUTOR, ETAL; Theft of Government Property," involving theft of arms from National Guard Armory, Canton, Ohio, October 14, 1958. On February 27, 1959, MEROLA was interviewed by FBI Agents, Miami, and was uncooperative in connection with this matter. MEROLA furnished information concerning Panamanian situation voluntarily and claimed to be one hundred per cent loyal United States citizen, and

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont *Alton* - 1 - Belmont **SECRET** DATE: April 23, 1959
- 1 - Donahoe
- 1 - Little

FROM : S. B. Donahoe *SB*

SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA

- Tolson _____
 - Boardman _____
 - Belmont _____
 - Mohr _____
 - Nease _____
 - Parsons _____
 - Rosen _____
 - Tamm _____
 - Trotter _____
 - W.C. Sullivan _____
 - Tele. Room _____
 - Holloman _____
 - Gandy _____
- DeLoach* ✓
McGuire
W.C. Sullivan

On 4/20/59 Joseph Merola, who is presently under indictment for transporting in interstate commerce guns stolen from a National Guard armory in Canton, Ohio, and a suspected jewel thief, advised Miami Office Ruben Miro, a Panamanian revolutionary [and a CIA source,] arrived in Miami on that date. Miro reportedly informed Merola a group of 150 revolutionaries departed from Cuba at 9 a.m. on 4/19/59 bound for Bocas del Toro, Panama, headed by Cesar Augusto Vega Pelegrino, a Cuban. According to Merola, Miro stated the departure of the group was authorized by Raul Castro, brother of Fidel Castro, present Prime Minister of Cuba. At 7:12 a.m., instant date, U. S. Navy advised that U. S. Air Force aircraft reported radar showed formation of eight ships smaller than normal ocean vessels approximately 200 miles north of Panama. No direction of movement or speed of vessels possible. Fifteenth Navy District unable to evaluate.

It is noted that the original information regarding the invasion attempt was received by Bureau through our contact with Merola. Miro is a CIA source but since he has been in Cuba, he has been out of contact with CIA. On 4/7/59 CIA advised Miro has served as a source of information but at no time has CIA controlled his activities nor has CIA been in a position to give him guidance. Miro presently in New York and his activities are being followed. He was interviewed by Miami Office 3/16/59 and stated he was not engaged in activities in violation of laws in U. S. and declined to discuss activities in Cuba.

ACTION:

None. The above is for your information.

109-12-223

1 - 105-75663 (Ruben Miro)

HWL:jlw
(5)

DECLASSIFIED BY 5608 SW/HSP
ON -5-30-98

63 MAY 1 1959

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 5-20-98

REC-69

APR 29 1959

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for review at FBIHQ by
request.
100-117090

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;
2. ██████████ to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;
3. ██████████ and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and ██████████, a staff writer for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;
4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full knowledge of the FBI.

Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance in his experience was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence except that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance, has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail" received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord had shortly before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

~~SECRET~~

These all involved plotting in the United States for action to take place against foreigners in foreign countries. The level of approval of these projects could be critical, since the Federal Criminal Statute probably applicable is 18 U.S.C. 960 (expedition against friendly nation). The language of the statute covers the preparation of any military or naval expedition to be carried on from the United States, but a 1917 case interpreted military or naval expedition to include such action by a single individual.

II. Probable Violations of Agency Charter.

1. Project MERRMAC, page 15. February 1967 - November 1971. Office of Security proprietary agents covertly monitored dissident groups in the Washington area considered potential threats to Agency installations and personnel. In addition, Office of Security field offices collected intelligence on dissident groups.
2. Project PARAGON, page 11. Upon DCI approval of a CI Staff request, the Office of Security surveilled Thelma King, a Latin American revolutionary, and several associates in New York City and Detroit. There was surveillance and mail coverage of several American citizens in regard to a plot reported by Ms. King to assassinate Vice President Agnew and DCI.
3. Project SIESTA and Project REDFACE I, see I.3 and 4.
4. Project CELLOTEX/1, page 12. Physical surveillance of Michael Geller of the Washington Post, October 1971 - January 1972, to determine Geller's source of classified information appearing in his columns.
5. Project CELLOTEX/2, page 12. Surveillance of Jack Anderson, Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, 15 February - 12 April 1972, to determine source of classified Agency information appearing in Anderson's syndicated columns.
6. Project BUTANE, page 13. Surveillance of Victor Marchetti, 23 March - 20 April 1972, at the direction of the DCI to determine his activities and contacts with Agency employees and others in regard to his publications exposing Agency operations.

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*sup'd 05 Aug 71
jm*

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1997**

July 7-22-97

4 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Project ~~PARAGON~~ - Information on Persons
Associated with New Orleans Urban Guerrilla
Group *

REFERENCE : Our memorandum dated 3 August 1971, Subject:
Project ~~PARAGON~~ - Cathy STERN

Attached are summaries of FBI information on individuals known to be associated with the New Orleans Urban Guerrilla Group mentioned in attachment A to reference.

1/2/ [signature]
Richard Ober
C/CI/SO
W

- Attachments:
- A. Thetis Kathleen BRAGG
 - B. Vernon Townes GRIZZARD
 - C. Antonio NARANJO
 - D. Hilary LNU
 - E. Nathalie Marie MUSSON
 - F. Frances HEBERT
 - G. Wilfred CHAVEZ

Based on: BRAGG, GRIZZARD, MUSSON 201
DBD-07929, 10 Mar 71

Originated by: CI/SO: ~~JGross:jm~~

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - ~~PARAGON~~ sens
 - 1 - BRAGG
 - 1 - GRIZZARD
 - 1 - NARANJO
 - 1 - LNU, Hilary
 - 1 - MUSSON
 - 1 - HEBERT
 - 1 - CHAVEZ
 - 2 - RO

*file - ~~PARAGON~~
cc - STERN*

7180

**SANITIZED VERN. FOR REV. BY
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON ASSINTS.**

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

Attachment F

SUBJECT: Frances HEBERT

Frances HEBERT works at the library of Delgado College in New Orleans and has allegedly developed ties with New Orleans District Attorney, James GARRISON. His wife may be Margaret HEBERT, who, according to the FBI, has power of attorney for Roxanne DUNBAR's checking account, number 3634-32-037 at the National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans.

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~~SENSITIVE~~

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3 DEC 63

201-002273

she continued to be truthful, but that he obviously could make no prediction if she continued to be deceitful whenever it suited her purpose. It was at this point in the conversation that the first news was received of GPIDEAL's death. This had a profound effect on [2]SAGE-1. Her first reaction was that it must have been done by racial extremists and she spent a considerable time extolling the virtues of GPIDEAL and what he had been trying to do. [2] was in and out of the room during this time, so operational discussion was suspended. On his departure for the National Assembly, he asked [2]SAGE-1 to write a statement to be given in the Assembly that afternoon; she agreed to do so. When [2] finally departed, she, without any warning, took out of her pocketbook the tickets and papers for her trip to Red China and announced that in the face of this terrible happening, she could not possibly travel to Red China, whereupon she tore up the tickets and papers and burned them. She then proceeded to write the eulogy, a copy of which was pouched to Headquarters in Reference A.

3. PONCHAY did not meet again with [2]SAGE-1 until 27 November. This meeting took place during lunch at his home, and produced nothing new of operational significance. [2]SAGE-1 spent a great deal of time on what she had read in the press and what she had heard from other sources about the death of GPIDEAL, suggesting that there was a sinister plot being concealed by the police having to do with extreme right wing in PBPRIME. PONCHAY told her he was not going to listen to Communist propaganda and he hoped she was not going to let herself become a victim of such. He then cited to her briefly and bluntly the known facts and suggested she confine her thinking to that until further accurate information became available. She made quite a point of saying that she was absolutely positive that AMTHUG-1 could have had nothing to do with the act. PONCHAY made no comment in this regard, other than to say that speculation was dangerous unless based on fact.

4. Comments on communications were reported through the Special Channel. The matter of the alleged ten PBRUMEN organizers coming to Panama again arose. As in the past, [2]SAGE-1 would give no positive information in this regard other than to say that she believed these people were due to arrive on or shortly after December 1963, and that they would be travelling legally. At this point, PONCHAY does not know whether she has any details in this regard or whether she has fabricated the entire thing. The chances are that she has not, but it is most likely that she has twisted some element of the story to confuse the true plan.

5. During the meeting [2]SAGE-1 also said she wanted to correct the statement that she had made some time ago to the effect that she believed one Mario VELASQUEZ had taken over the activities originally carried on by Diogenes PINO (para 1D, Reference C.) She said she realized she had made a mistake in this and that VELASQUEZ was innocent of any involvement. PONCHAY

Date: 2/25/03

8/6/98

Barry,

Per our conversation of this morning, and per Tenet's recent instruction to search once again for information relevant to JFK's assassination, I think we need to call up the entire HYSAGE-1 ([05]) file.

According to Jake Esterline, in a phone conversation on the afternoon of 5 (11/8) August, he (Jake) was debriefing her and the meeting was interrupted by Sammy BOYD (Panamanian business leader) announcing JFK's assassination. [05] immediately broke down, began crying and said something to the effect of they said they would not do it. Jake tried to obtain more information but [05] regained her composure and added nothing more. Jake is convinced that as they had been talking about Fidel, Che, Raul and PINIERO (head of Cuban intelligence), [05] was referring to them. Further, according to Jake, [05] at one time or another talked of meeting OSWALD, possibly in Cuba or elsewhere. Jake had reported the above information, but it was very closely held at the time so it may not have moved into the JFK material.

[03]



9-6-98

Note for Record

rec'd 8/11/98
BH

Per Mickell Combs,
reviewed 201 file
at HQ - found no
additional material
relevant to JFK
assassination. No
further action required

[03]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORT

Date 12/15/59

On December 11, 1959, I. IRVING DAVIDSON telephonically advised that RUBEN MIRO and LEOPOLDO ARAGON were present at his, DAVIDSON's, office when he arrived at 4:45 p.m. Upon his arrival DAVIDSON stated that ARAGON advised that he, ARAGON, and MIRO did not see "eye to eye on things." ARAGON said that although he is sympathetic with MIRO's cause, that is, the planned invasion to overthrow the Panamanian Government, he does not believe that the United States Government is going to do whatever MIRO wishes.

DAVIDSON said he told MIRO and ARAGON that he checked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Department of State and both the FBI and the State Department are unaware as to the "green light" for the Panama invasion. DAVIDSON stated at this point that he told MIRO he was quite angry because MIRO was only talking about the "green light" backing by the United States. DAVIDSON advised that MIRO then wanted a long distance telephone call to be placed to one [06] telephone number [08] Panama City, Panama. MIRO said that [06] is an Agent for the Central Intelligence Agency and that MIRO's code name is CARLOS VASQUEZ when dealing with *alias of Ruben Mire*

Although the telephone call was placed it was without success. The call was then postponed until Monday, December 14, 1959, and DAVIDSON stated it would be placed from his office at 10 a.m.

MIRO also stated that [06] came from Panama to Miami in April, 1959, and determined that MIRO was then in New York City. MIRO said that [06] then came to New York to find MIRO and encourage an invasion plan by MIRO.

DAVIDSON stated that MIRO acted very discouraged at this December 11, 1959, meeting and requested that DAVIDSON try to arrange for a job in Nicaragua so he,

Interview with I. IRVING DAVIDSON File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/11/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/14/59
by Special Agent DONALD HOETING /bsb

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate 12/17/59~~SECRET~~

RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA, who resides in Washington, D. C., with his sister, Mrs. PAULXWADE, at 2901 Park Drive, S. E., was interviewed at the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was advised that he need make no statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that he had a right to legal counsel.

MIRO advised he did not return to Panama in early October, 1959, as he had previously stated he planned to do, because he feared that if he were in Panama, he would be blamed, unjustifiably, for the continual demonstrations against the Panamanian Government. He said he has recently been engaged in an attempt to obtain employment with some international organization, either in the United States, or somewhere outside of Panama, in Latin America. He said if he is successful in obtaining this employment, he does not plan to return to Panama for at least five years, but added he had no immediate prospects for such a job.

MIRO was specifically asked whether or not he had been attempting to obtain in the United States, financial backing for an invasion of Panama and claiming, in that regard, that he had been promised that the United States Government would "look the other way," if such an invasion took place. He at first denied that he had done either and later said that since he had been assured he would not have to say anything, he preferred to go on record as saying that he neither affirmed nor denied the allegations, but rather, refused to discuss them.

When asked about [Ob J] MIRO said he first met [Ob J] in Panama, around 1940, or 1941, when he defended [Ob J], who was charged as an accomplice in a murder case. He said he believes [Ob J] is associated with a United States intelligence agency because of his activities and apparent contacts, but denied that [Ob J] had told him the United States Government would "look the other way," if MIRO instituted an invasion to overthrow the Panamanian Government.

Interview with RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/17/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/17/59
by Special Agents HERBERT J. MORGAN, JR., RICHARD B. KELLOGG:ekh

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military agrees to mandatory retirement after 25 years, Noriega would be forced to choose a more junior officer on the General Staff--such as Chief of Intelligence Wong or his relative Lieutenant Colonel Sieiro. The prospects of a purged officer, such as Lieutenant Colonel Herrera Hassan, being selected as Defense Chief are extremely remote. [REDACTED]

25X1

* * *

This paper discusses the degree of political power a new Defense Chief and the military would retain following Noriega's resignation and identifies possible successors to Noriega as Defense Chief. The assumption underlying our analysis is that Noriega will step down as Defense Chief and that a government of national reconciliation divided between present regime supporters and the opposition will be formed as part of a negotiated solution to the crisis. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Roots of the Military's Supreme Position

The strongman tradition of the Military Commander in Panama dates to the 1940s when Police Chief General Jose Remon dominated politics and removed presidents at will. The current military-dominated political system in Panama was created by General Omar Torrijos, who fostered broad grassroots support for the military through coopting interest groups across the political spectrum and extensive civil action programs. The military's predominance in all facets of Panamanian political life has reinforced public perceptions that it is the only institution capable of running the country and has perpetuated weak civilian institutions. Panama's military commanders have demonstrated a willingness to use their power to ensure that political developments do not threaten the military's preeminent position in Panama; Noriega and his predecessor--General Ruben Paredes--removed three Panamanian presidents in the last six years and rigged the last presidential election to assure that the military's preferred candidate won. [REDACTED]

25X1

A New Defense Chief's Power

Whomever the new Defense Chief is, we believe he will be less powerful than Noriega. He probably will need to devote time and energy to heal wounds in the officer corps stemming from the prolonged crisis. He may also concede some latitude in decisionmaking to the national reconciliation government as a result of a negotiated settlement. The military, however, is likely to strongly resist sacrificing any control of government institutions for fear of losing financial benefits and patronage positions. [REDACTED]

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INTEL/DFAA

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [Redacted]

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 25X1

COUNTRY Panama

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE DISTR. 8 Jan. 1952

SUBJECT Political Situation in Panama

NO. OF PAGES 1

25X1
PLACE ACQUIRED [Redacted]
DATE OF INFO. [Redacted]

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 25X1

[Redacted]

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* See below

25X1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1 [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1 The Remon coalition is reportedly maneuvering to force President Alcibiades Arosemena's resignation because of his inability to cope with the political situation.

Since Vice-President Jose Ramon Guizado reportedly may refuse the Presidency, several cabinet members desire to form a junta.

25X1 Comment. Although Remon is displeased with Arosemena's handling of the situation, a junta might result in some opposition appointments to the cabinet, thereby weakening Remon's chances. A strong possibility of Arosemena's resignation is indicated in the trend of the past three weeks.

Document No. 013
No Change in Class.
 Escalated
Date Changed: Jan 13 1952
BY: [Signature]
[Redacted]

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ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI					

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including discrimination against foreign firms, expropriation of some foreign-owned property, and emphasis on the nation's Hispanic origins. The new constitution also discriminated against West Indian Negro and Asian minorities.

Arias' increasingly dictatorial methods and the furor created by his arbitrary constitution set the stage for a coup d'etat late in 1941. Arias left Panama secretly on 7 October for Cuba to visit an eye specialist. [redacted]

[redacted] Because he had failed to ask the National Assembly for permission to leave as required by the constitution, Arias' opponents seized the opportunity to oust him. Unable to arrange a flight back to Panama, Arias had to book passage by steamship. When he arrived in Cristobal less than a week after his overthrow, Canal Zone police escorted him to the Colon city limits where he was arrested by Panamanian police. After five days of imprisonment he was permitted to fly to Nicaragua, where he began four years of exile that included stays in Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and finally Argentina.

The Second Presidency and Downfall

Arias was allowed to return to Panama in October 1945, and was soon at work forming a new party to launch another campaign for the presidency. By 1948 he was making a strong bid for US support for re-election, promot-

ing the initiation of a new base treaty with the US as a major campaign issue. An unpopular treaty signed by the incumbent government had been unanimously rejected by the National Assembly in December 1947 following massive nationalist and Communist-inspired protest demonstrations before the assembly building.

Although Arias probably received a plurality of the votes in 1948, the government-backed candidate was declared the winner [redacted]

[redacted] Arias immediately took refuge in the Canal Zone and left for Costa Rica, claiming that his life was endangered. In the fall of 1949, however, an attempt by President Daniel Chanis to remove the chief of police, Colonel Jose Remon, prompted Remon to stage a coup, recount the 1948 ballots, and install Arias as president.

Arias had not learned from his past mistakes, and his second presidency was characterized by conspicuous irresponsibility and rampant political corruption. The president and his cronies used public funds freely to enrich themselves, and nepotism in government reached new heights even for Panama. Arias was one of the most culpable and at one point his relatives occupied four of the principal cabinet posts. The few constructive accomplishments of Arias' second term--including efforts to strengthen relations with the US--were offset by Arias' disregard for constitutional government and a propensity to sidestep the law when it stood in the way

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of ousting enemies or placing friends in office.

The freewheeling president quickly alienated members of the oligarchy, the legislature, and the national police with his efforts to stamp out opposition to his increasingly high-handed methods. Once most of his opponents were jailed, Arias tried to reimpose his authoritarian 1941 constitution, a move that created new and widespread opposition.

The ax fell early in 1951 when the assembly, reacting to

Arias' determination to suspend it, impeached him and elevated the first vice president to office. Although the Supreme Court upheld the assembly action, Arias had to be physically dislodged from the presidential palace by National Guard chief and later president, Colonel Jose Remon, who played a major behind-the-scenes role in the overthrow. After more than three hours of bitter fighting between armed government forces and Arnulfistas, the blood-stained Arias was carried off to jail shouting "Volveremos" (We shall return).



"We Shall Return"

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25X1A


ANNEXPanama: The National Guard: A Look at the "People in Arms"

Since displacing the old civilian elite from government in 1968, the National Guard has been the dominant source of power in Panama. The Latin American Trends offers a synopsis of a recent assessment of the political behavior of the Guard by US Embassy political officer Robert Homme.

Prior to seizing power on October 11, 1968, the National Guard was a semi-independent and generally compliant partner of the ruling civilian establishment. Principally concerned with maintaining its organizational and command integrity relatively free from political interference, the Guard was generally responsive to civilian authority, largely non-partisan, and more disposed to political restraint than the military in most other Latin American countries.

This tradition of military restraint was not so much the result of a greater commitment to constitutionalism as it was a reflection of Panama's unique political development. For the first 33 years of its independence, Panama's internal and external security was provided by the US under the terms of the 1903 treaty. When these missions were transferred to Panama in 1936, they were assumed by its small police force, which in 1953 was reorganized as the National Guard. The US military presence in the Canal Zone remained, however, and the Guard as a result retained essentially a police function.

The Guard was also confronted with an entrenched political establishment, which had ruled since independence through highly personalized political parties and dominated Panama's economic life. In exchange for its acquiescence in this closed-circuit system, the oligarchic

June 11, 1975

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regimes generally respected the Guard's institutional autonomy and tolerated a certain measure of graft. When the Guard did intervene, it was not to change the system, but to arbitrate disputes within it. On the only occasion prior to 1968 when a Guard commander ruled the country--Colonel Jose Remon, from 1951 to 1955--he organized a conventional political party rather than involve the Guard directly in government.

The Guard used its influence on behalf of President Robles in the 1964 election, and in the 1968 contest it attempted to prevent Arnulfo Arias--whom it had ousted in 1941 and 1951--from again reaching the presidency. Charismatic and demagogic, Arias represented, in the Guard's eyes, the one political leader with both the will and the ability to challenge the Guard's traditional independence and command integrity. Ten days after he took office and attempted to punish the Guard for its blatant opposition, it ousted him in a bloodless coup.

Although motivated by self-preservation rather than ideology, the 1968 coup radically changed the Guard's role and opened a new chapter in the history of Panama's political development. Having for the first time taken direct control of government from civilians, and sensitive to the need to rationalize its disregard for constitutional procedures, the Guard decided to picture the new administration as a "revolutionary" regime committed to creating a modern, progressive, and more just society and nation.

Strongly identifying with the middle class, from which most of its officers were drawn, the Guard shifted from being the principal supporter of the oligarchy to its chief adversary. Under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, the Guard now was to become "The People in Arms." Torrijos consulted with his senior subordinates on a wide range of policy issues. The General

June 11, 1975

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Staff, far more than the emerging new civilian bureaucracy, was the final arbiter of national programs and priorities. An abortive coup within the Guard in December 1969, however, convinced Torrijos that he had to consolidate his position by securing support outside the Guard. Advocating a moderately reformist program, Torrijos worked to forge a constituency of students, workers, and peasants, and he also reached a modus vivendi with the Communists. The election of a legislature, the adoption of a new constitution, and the indirect election of a new President and Vice President in 1972 gave the Torrijos government legal standing. The constitution elevated the Guard to a sort of "fourth branch" of government, and gave Torrijos for six years the dual role of Guard commander and chief of government.

The National Guard and civilian bureaucrats and advisers constitute the new elite that runs Panama under Torrijos. The civilian component has come increasingly to the fore as the government has had to cope with the complex problems of running and developing the nation. As this has occurred, the direct participation--but not the ultimate power--of the Guard in governmental affairs at the national level has diminished. The members of the General Staff, none of whom is particularly sophisticated, experienced, or professionally qualified to deal with complex socio-economic problems, have remained involved in national decision-making, but increasingly have had only a general input into most domestic programs. The Guard hierarchy has accepted this civilian ascendancy, but does not entirely trust the technocrats' motives and methods. Of most concern to some officers is the degree of the influence exercised by leftist officials and advisers and their own uncertainty over the General's long-range plans for social and economic reforms.

Faced with reconciling its concern for order with its desire for change, the Guard has adopted an approach designed to encourage progressive reform without severe

June 11, 1975

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economic dislocations or unnecessary social antagonisms. While it has accorded considerable emphasis to fostering social stability, the Guard has not neglected the preventive aspects of maintaining internal security. The Guard is still largely organized as a police establishment, and the individual Guardsman is a respected and feared law enforcement agent. Working closely with the community, attuned to its moods, and familiar with its personalities, the Guard officers have made violent crime less common than in many other Latin countries.

Complementing these police capabilities, and in many respects more important in terms of Torrijos' concept of internal security, is the Guard's extensive and increasingly professional intelligence apparatus. Responsible for all facets of intelligence and national security, the Guard's G-2 is directed by the competent Lt. Col. Manuel Noriega--probably the second most powerful man in Panama. Operating in an environment in which organized domestic political opposition is regarded as a threat to the Torrijos system, the G-2 has focused its surveillance and penetration efforts on the country's politically-conscious movements and organizations. Exiled former Guard officers and politicians, students, professional groups, the Communists, and probably members of the civilian government bureaucracy are subject to surveillance, wire-tapping, and on occasion, intimidation and reprisals.

Despite its pre-eminent role under Torrijos, the Guard has been reasonably frugal in handling its finances and has not indulged in a policy of rapid or inflated promotions. However, this self-denial has left its members exposed to the pinch of inflation and the inherent frustrations of a long-time-in-grade promotion system. To solve their economic problems, many senior officers use their positions for economic advantage. Although Panamanians are long accustomed to corruption, it does

June 11, 1975

-14-

SECRET

tarnish the Guard's revolutionary image and provides ammunition for the institution's opponents.

Even if Torrijos were to leave the scene, there is little likelihood of a drastic shift in the role of the Guard or major changes in the country's institutional structure and political direction. For the foreseeable future, the Guard has no intention of returning to the barracks and surrendering its broad political role. The senior officers take seriously their role as "The People in Arms," they fully share Torrijos' desire for social and economic improvements, and they are convinced that the pre-1968 oligarchy-dominated party system or any comparable variation cannot be responsive to Panama's needs.

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June 11, 1975

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The Security Forces of Panama

18. The Panama National Police is friendly to the United States and probably can and will handle any disorder before it becomes dangerous to the Panama Canal. There is no indication of Communist infiltration in the National or Secret Police. While the attitude of the National Police is anti-Communist, it has not been motivated by political considerations in dealing with Communist activities.

19. Panama has no armed forces other than the Panama National Police and the Panama Secret Police. The present active strength of the National Police is 2,453, that of Secret Police 130. The National Police is fairly well equipped with small arms but has little other equipment. Morale is good and it is unlikely that the current political campaign will cause any significant division within the National Police. Recent changes in the top command of the organization have been favorably received by the officers and men. The new Commandant, Lt. Col. Vallarino, although not as capable as his predecessor Remón, can be expected to maintain the usual standard of efficiency of the police. Vallarino is supporting Remón's presidential candidacy but is not subservient to him. Major Saturnino J. Flores, Second Commandant, who virtually controls the Arms Room, is loyal to Remón.

Communist Capabilities

20. Several factors militate against the possibility that Communists and pro-Communists could seize control of or dominate


SECURITY INFORMATION

NSC BRIEFING

8 December 1959

PANAMA

- I. Extremists are continuing to plan further anti-US violence in Panama.
 - A. Foreign Minister Moreno told Ambassador Harrington on 4 December that Panama would issue a press statement within the next few days declaring "no progress whatsoever" has been made in recent US-Panamanian negotiations.
 - B. Student groups are reported to be organizing a meeting for 12 December to celebrate the anniversary of the Panamanian rejection of a US bases agreement in 1947.
 - C. Unconfirmed reports indicate that extremists are plotting to assassinate Ambassador Harrington, Canal Zone Governor Potter, and Panamanian National Guard Commander Vallarino.

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 12-28-79 REVIEWER: 37204

SNIE 84-55

11 January 1955

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 84-55

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT REMON OF PANAMA

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 11 January 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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
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10. Comment on ouster of Panamanian president Guizado:

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
Panamanian president Guizado was ousted early on 15 January. He had been implicated in the 2 January assassination of President Remon [redacted]

25X1



[redacted] Guizado earlier in the day was confined to his residence by the National Guard, which announced that a

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
25X1A



solution to the murder was near. Also arrested were Guizado's son, one of his business associates, his minister of agriculture and commerce, and many followers of former president Arnulfo Arias.

Guizado's removal because of implication in the crime would not necessarily involve a break in the constitutional order. Ricardo Arias, vice president and foreign minister, would legally become president.

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Colonel Saturnino Flores, second commandant of the National Guard, is apparently assuming control of the situation and is emerging as the "strong man" of Panama.

15 Jan 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 12




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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

3 May 1956

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
PANAMA

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The leadership of Panama's next administration seems likely to be determined less by the national elections scheduled for 13 May than by the outcome of the bitter struggle for power within the administration's corrupt machine, the National Patriotic Coalition Party (PCPN). If some degree of unity can be restored to the PCPN, its compromise presidential candidate, Ernesto de la Guardia, appears assured of an election victory over Victor F. Goytia, candidate of the only legal opposition party, the weak and divided National Liberal Party (PLN). If PCPN unity is not restored, one of its two contending factions may attempt to seize the government by force.

De la Guardia and outgoing president Ricardo Arias appear to have lost control of the PCPN and seem powerless to stop the open feuding within the party. The PCPN faction now apparently strongest is led by Alejandro Remon, the ruthless and power-hungry minister of government and justice, who would have no stake in a De la Guardia administration. Remon may have the backing of Lt. Col. Saturnino Flores, second in command of the National Guard, Panama's only armed force.

25X1



25X6

Remon Assassination

The still unsolved assassination of President José A. Remon in January 1955 continues to be an unsettling factor of major importance in Panamanian politics. The administration has attempted to pin the blame on José Ramon Guizado, who briefly succeeded Remon as president and was then ousted and summarily convicted as an accessory to the assassination. Ruben Miro, the alleged principal, still awaits trial and has reportedly retracted the confession which implicated Guizado.

Public suspicion and dissatisfaction over the government's handling of the case were apparently the cause of the rioting in Panama City on 21 April, and mutual recriminations regarding responsibility

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
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

3 May 1956

for the murder appear to be responsible for the widening rift in the PCPN.

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
Opposition Tactics

The American embassy sees a strong possibility that opposition candidate Goytia might withdraw from the presidential race in a dramatic gesture protesting PCPN machine control. This, in the embassy's opinion, would increase the possibility of a coup by a PCPN faction. If Goytia withdraws, the PCPN would be unopposed in the elections and the administration would be stripped of much of its facade of democracy and legalistic propriety. The desire to maintain this facade, mainly for the benefit

of international opinion, probably has restrained PCPN factions from blatantly grabbing power in the 15 months since Remon's assassination.

Among the organized opposition political groups attempting to exploit the present instability is the "third positionist" Popular Resistance Alliance (ARP), which is ineligible to participate in the elections. This group is heavily influenced by anti-American and pro-Communist elements. So far it has concentrated its fire mainly on the corruption and self-seeking of the "oligarchy," which it equates with the PCPN and the PLN.

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The ARP, which reportedly is calling for revolution, is capable of instigating rioting and of further arousing the already restive public against the government.

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CUBAN REVOLT

The revolt in the city of Matanzas on 29 April seems to have left President Batista's grip on Cuba unshaken. Popular dissatisfaction with his regime, however, is becoming more widespread, and opposition elements, though still apparently incapable of subverting the armed forces, will probably continue to exploit the uneasy situation.

The Matanzas revolt is the latest and bloodiest of several uprisings against Batista's regime since he ousted President Prio in the coup of March 1952. The revolt of 29 April was reportedly planned

by one of Prio's lieutenants, Fidel Castro, who led the abortive attempt against the Santiago garrison in July 1953. Batista, having suspended constitutional guarantees for 45 days to facilitate his crack-down on further revolutionary activity, had scores of people arrested throughout the island, including Prio and a number of his followers, on charges of instigating the uprising. Prio himself has since been released.

The majority of the armed forces, still the key to power, apparently remains loyal to Batista, who has treated the

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NSC BRIEFING NOTES

WESTERN DIVISION
4 January 1955

ASSASSINATION OF PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT MAY BRING INSTABILITY TO
PANAMA

- I. Assassination of Panamanian president Remon on 2 January may introduce a new period of political instability in Panama.
 - A. José Remon Guizado, first vice president and foreign minister sworn in as president on 3 January. He will, according to constitution, complete Remon's term scheduled to end in October 1956.
 - B. Guizado's administration can not be expected to have the strength which characterized that of Remon, whose position was based on personal following among politicians, the National Guard, and the public.
 - C. The government remains in control of the situation, however, and the National Guard, Panama's only armed force, reportedly is supporting Guizado.
- II. Remon's death may delay formal signing--now scheduled for 12 January--of new agreements between Panama and the United States on the Canal Zone.
 - A. Guizado, whose attitude toward the United States is unclear, stated on 31 December that his sole interest is getting the new agreements signed "earliest."

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2
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III. A.

[REDACTED]

considers

the assassination a prelude to a Central American

25X1X6

flare-up.

[REDACTED]

Remon

had reported to President Perez Jimenez two weeks

ago that Cuban gunmen were planning to liquidate

both presidents.

g/s

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1. Guizado an ardent admirer of anti-US Arnulfo Arias, ousted former president of Panama, in the late forties. He later gave strong support to the United States in the UN during the Seventh General Assembly.
2. Guizado was active in the negotiations for revision of the canal zone treaty, and visited various Central American countries and Mexico seeking support for the Panamanian stand.
3. One report indicated that Guizado has a "none too savory" reputation in business and public office.

B. Communists, numbering only 50, with perhaps 200 additional sympathizers, may in combination with other oppositionists attempt to exploit the assassination and the treaty issue through disorders.

III. Still no definite clue as to the identity and motives of the assassins. Seems likely that Arnulfo Arias--deposed by Remon in 1951--may have engineered the assassination. Possibility that some followers of President Figueres of Costa Rica might have been involved cannot be entirely discounted.

A. Some indications that President Remon might have been indirectly involved in some Venezuelan-Nicaraguan plan to eliminate Costa Rican president Figueres.

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1. Principal connections between Remon and Venezuela appear to be:
 - a. An informal economic agreement which appeared to be a straight business transaction.
 - b. A Venezuelan military mission which has been training the Panamanian National Guard-- Panamanian military officials in Venezuela for training.
 - c. Various shipments of arms to the Panamanian National Guard early in 1954.
 - d. Long standing friendship between President Perez Jimenez and Remon.
 - e. Only on one occasion did Remon become involved directly in the continuing Central American war of nerves: 25X6A

25X6A

-
2. Remon apparently disliked and distrusted Figueres, and possibly was willing to assist indirectly in making trouble for him.
 - a. Reports of collaboration between Arnulfo Arias and Figueres, however, are not substantiated.

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- b. Panama arrested one Costa Rican revolutionary leader on 5 December at the request of the Costa Rican Chargé, and in July asked the brother of former Costa Rican president Picado to leave Panama.
 - c. Costa Rican Foreign Minister, however, as late as December suspected that Revolutionary activities against Costa Rica might start or be assisted from Panama.
3. Remon and Nicaraguan dictator Somoza apparently have remained cordial.
- a. One report indicated, however, [REDACTED]
- 25X1X6 [REDACTED]
- Remon did not trust Somoza.
4. Available reports do not indicate the nature of the relationships of newly installed President Guizado and Presidents Perez Jimenez, Figueres, and Somoza.

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
NSC BRIEFING

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4 January 1955

ASSASSINATION OF PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT

I. Still no definite clue to identity and motives of assassins who gunned down Panamanian President Remon on 2 Jan 55.



A. Venezuelan security chief Pedro Estrada considers murder a prelude to Central American flare-up. On 3 Jan, he stated that Remon had reported to Venezuelan President Perez two weeks ago that Cuban gunmen were planning to liquidate both presidents.

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- B. Some indications Remon indirectly involved in some anti-Figueroa plans of Venezuela and Nicaragua.
1. Panama has informal economic agreement with Venezuela--but seems straight business transaction.
 2. Venezuelan military mission has been training Panamanian National Guard. Panamanian officers being trained in Venezuela.
 3. Venezuela shipped arms to Panamanian National Guard early in '54.
 4. Friendship between President Perez Jimenez and Remon is long-standing.


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D. Although Panama ostensibly neutral in Figueres matter-- example: arrested one Costa Rican revolutionary leader on 5 Dec '54 at request of Costa Rican Chargé, in July '54 asked brother of Costa Rican ex-president Picado to leave country--Costa Ricans remain suspicious of Panamanian assistance to anti-Figueres groups.

-3-

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E. Remon and anti-Figueroes Nicaraguan dictator Somoza apparently were cordial.

F. Available reports do not indicate nature of relationships between new Panamanian President, Guizado, and Presidents Perez Jimenez, Somoza and Figueres.

II. Murder may bring period of political instability.

A. José Remon Guizado, first vice president and foreign minister, sworn in as president on 3 Jan. According to constitution, will complete Remon's term (to Oct '56).

B. Guizado's regime will not be as strong as Remon's, whose position based on personal following among politicians, National Guard--which he once ran--and public.

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

C. Government presently in control of situation, however, and National Guard--Panama's only armed force--reportedly is supporting Guizado.

III. Remon's death may delay formal signing--now scheduled for 12 Jan--of new Canal Zone agreements with US.

A. Guizado was active in negotiations of new treaty, visited various Central American countries and Mexico seeking support for Panamanian stand.

B. Communists (numbering only 50, with perhaps 200 additional sympathizers) might join with anti-regime groups in an attempt to exploit both assassination and treaty issue by means of disorders.

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC BRIEFING

4 January 1955

ASSASSINATION OF PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT

I. Still no definite clue to identity and motives of assassins who gunned down Panamanian President Remon on 2 Jan 55. Seems likely that former president Arnulfo Arias (booted by Remon in 1951-- may have engineered killing. Also cannot entirely discount possibility that some followers of Costa Rican President Figueres were involved.

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
A.

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[REDACTED] murder a prelude to Central American flare-up. On 3 Jan, he stated that Remon had reported to Venezuelan President Perez two weeks ago that Cuban gunmen were planning to liquidate both presidents.

- B. Some indications Remon indirectly involved in some anti-Figuera plans of Venezuela and Nicaragua.
1. Panama has informal economic agreement with Venezuela--but seems straight business transaction.
 2. Venezuelan military mission has been training Panamanian National Guard. Panamanian officers being trained in Venezuela.
 3. Venezuela shipped arms to Panamanian National Guard early in '54.
 4. Friendship between President Perez Jimenez and Remon is long-standing.

25X6A



- C. However, reports of collaboration between prime suspect Arnulfo Arias and Figueres are not substantiated.
- D. Although Panama ostensibly neutral in Figueres matter-- example: arrested one Costa Rican revolutionary leader on 5 Dec '54 at request of Costa Rican Chargé, in July '54 asked brother of Costa Rican ex-president Picado to leave country--Costa Ricans remain suspicious of Panamanian assistance to anti-Figueres groups.

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- E. Remon and anti-Figueraes Nicaraguan dictator Somoza apparently were cordial.
 - F. Available reports do not indicate nature of relationships between new Panamanian President, Guizado, and Presidents Perez Jimenez, Somoza and Figueres.
- II. Murder may bring period of political instability.
- A. José Remon Guizado, first vice president and foreign minister, sworn in as president on 3 Jan. According to constitution, will complete Remon's term (to Oct '56).
 - B. Guizado's regime will not be as strong as Remon's, whose position based on personal following among politicians, Natbna³⁰⁰⁰l Guard--which he once ran--and public.

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REP. PANAMA POPULAT

C. Government presently in control of situation, however, and National Guard--Panama's only armed force--reportedly is supporting Guizado.

III. Remon's death may delay formal signing--now scheduled for 12 Jan--of new Canal Zone agreements with US.

A. Guizado was active in negotiations of new treaty, visited various Central American countries and Mexico seeking support for Panamanian stand.


B. Communists (numbering only 50, with perhaps 200 additional sympathizers) might join with anti-regime groups in an attempt to exploit both assassination and treaty issue by means of disorders.

TENSIONS INCREASE
IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The assassination of Panamanian president Remon has increased tensions in Central America.

The chief of the Venezuelan national security forces told the American embassy in Caracas on 3 January that he considers Remon's killing the prelude to further trouble in Central America. He also said that Remon had reported to Venezuelan president Perez Jimenez two months ago that Cuban gunmen were planning to kill both Perez and Remon.

The Venezuelan dictator and Nicaraguan dictator Somoza may use Remon's murder to "justify" intensified efforts to eliminate Costa Rican president Figueres.



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In Panama itself, Remon's murder will probably introduce a new period of instability. José Ramon Guizado, the new president, will not be as strong as Remon was, and Communists and other opposition elements may try to exploit the situation by stirring up disorder and making other difficulties.

The American embassy in Panama City reported on 4 January that the Guizado government will sign the new agreement with the United States on the Canal Zone "without question." The president and his foreign minister admittedly fear that "material postponement after 15 January would be widely interpreted as a lack of United States confidence" in the new government.

6 Jan 55


CRITICAL SITUATIONS

Page 6

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Remon's assassins and their motives remain
unknown.

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6 Jan 55

CRITICAL SITUATIONS


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
Western Hemisphere

PANAMA'S NEW ADMINISTRATION

President-elect Marco Robles seems genuinely anxious to reform Panama's corrupt political system, to improve its economy, and to have amicable relations with the US during his four-year term which starts on 1 October. Some long-entrenched interests, however, see Robles as a threat to their power.




Robles is not a widely popular political figure, but is apparently honest and well intentioned. In the May elections he managed to gain the votes of most of the opponents --both right and left--of popular demagogue Arnulfo Arias. To win an election in which 19 parties competed for some 300,000 votes, Robles made deals with many disparate elements. Some of them are powerful enough to curtail seriously his control of his administration and his freedom of action.




Robles can count on only a bare majority of votes in the new National Assembly, which will probably be the focal point of pressure on the United States for treaty concessions on the present canal and any studies for a sea-level canal. Irresponsible criticism of the United

States is favorite political tender in Panama, particularly this year when resentment over last January's riots has been nurtured by the Chiari government and sensationalist news media. Two Assembly members are pro-Communists and represent banana workers' unions at odds with the United Fruit company in provinces where there is subversive activity.



Robles' anti-Communist record as minister of government and justice from 1960-63 offers great improvement over President Roberto Chiari's evident weakness for extreme leftist counsel. Many intelligent, capable, and well-trained ultranationalist leftists, however, still have key positions in government and news media. Robles will be hard put to identify and oust those who may indeed be responsive to Communist or Cuban direction. There is also in Panama, as in other Caribbean countries, increasing evidence that Castro is encouraging early action by groups who favor hard-line tactics of violence and subversion. Castro-contact Thelma King has recently returned from a visit to Peiping, the latest of a number of Panamanians to return this year from Cuba and the bloc, some after extensive training courses.



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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Page 15

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8. DEFENDANT'S ACQUITTAL IN PANAMANIAN ASSASSINATION TRIAL MAY SPARK DISORDERS

25X1A



The atmosphere in Panama is tense and conducive to disorders as the result of the acquittal on 6 December of Ruben Miro, accused assassin of former President Jose Remon, Alejandro Remon, politically powerful brother of the slain president, is strongly opposed to the acquittal

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
The American embassy believes, however, that the national guard will continue to maintain control.

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The politically charged trial, which opened on 21 October, had been delayed almost three years by the maneuvering of powerful politicians, who apparently were attempting to prevent the revelation of possible incriminating facts related to the assassination.

The verdict will require a review of the impeachment and prison sentence of former President Guizado, Remon's successor. Guizado was convicted as an accomplice in the murder solely on the basis of Miro's confession, which was later retracted.

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Henry J. Taylor / The race ahead



THE ill-fated ouster of Panama's Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos should warn us to stop allowing ourselves to be talked out of the secure U. S. zone protecting the Panama Canal — Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright notwithstanding.

Our taxpayers have invested \$5 billion in the Canal Zone. And as a spokesman for changing the zone's status to Panamanian, Sen. Fulbright is, again, and as usual, muddleheaded.

Such worried men as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas H. Moorer could tell you about the canal's global strategic importance. And as for Latin America, 80 per cent of Peru's and Chile's imports and exports pass thru it. The dependency is equivalent along the entire Pacific side of the continent.

THE Republic of Panama is threatened by communist guerillas internally and on either side of its two frontiers. How can anyone ignore the fact that Panama (population 1.4 million) borders on chaotic Costa Rica and Colombia? Is it news that imported Red guerillas are staging a horrible shooting war in nearby El Salvador? Are we blind to the Red-instigated eruptions in neighboring Guatemala and Honduras?

I dined with Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Jr., who spelled out for me the Red attacks closing in on Panama. Except Nicaragua, our 10-mile-wide Canal Zone is the only zone of stability in the entire region.

Demagogues abound in Panama's faction-ridden political jungle. Their most popular sport is to kick Uncle Sam at every opportunity. Worried Admiral Moorer finds that Fidel Castro's guerilla fleet is moving fighters and

their arms into Panama. Their embarkation point is La Colma, Cuba — Soviet-occupied.

• • •

THE CIA, in turn, finds that air deliveries are from the Soviet air base at heavily-guarded San Julian, 90 miles southeast of Havana. The CIA also finds all deliveries growing steadily and that they are paid for by Soviet gold. The propaganda support comes — and at a new high pitch — from Castro's powerful Russian-built radio station on Cuba's key Breton peninsula.

Havana-based Costa Rican Julio Sunol is one of Latin America's most famous communists. Bloody-fisted Sunol often presides in Moscow at the annual "conference of the peoples," the party's assembly of guerilla revolutionary cadres. Castro has now reinstated Sunol in Costa Rica, on Panama's border, as the operation's director.

Castro's resident agent in charge in Panama, communist Thelma King, won her spurs in 1964 when four U. S. soldiers were killed in the riot in our Canal Zone. In fact, Thelma King herself led the rioters into the Canal Zone and has been boasting about killing these U. S. soldiers ever since in Panama City.

The real question we face is not the surrender in U. S. control of the canal versus Panamanian control. The real question is U.S. control versus Communist control.

It should be debated in the Senate on that basis.

~~SECRET~~

February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ZRKNICK Operation (Non CS Material)

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998**

Job # 75-752 (Box #4)
File # 200-5-38
Volumes: 6
Dates: 1961 - Feb 65

1. Description:

Investigation of Cuban espionage net in Miami, Fla., by FBI who shared take with CIA. CIA corresponded with field stations re same. Was international in scope.

2. Findings: (See attached)

Roberto-Themla King folders. Panama connection. Thelma King was a Panamanian left-wing politician, pro-Castro Deputy to the National Assembly. Was personal field of Fidel CASTRO. She was recruited by Fidel in August 1962 to perform espionage mission in Panama. Trained in SW, commo, etc. She was reportedly head of the Cuban-directed commo network in Panama.

HZPA 13,960 dated 3 Dec 63:

Dispatch from Panama City to Hqs. re 22 Nov 63 Jake Esterline [4] meeting and her comments re Kennedy and Castro.

LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: JZ

~~SECRET~~

February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ZRKNICK Operation (Non CS Material)

Job # 75-752 (Box ?
unnumbered)

File # 200-5-38

Volumes:

1. Description:

FBI investigation of Cuban espionage net in Miami, Fla., was international in scope; take shared with CIA.

2. Findings: (see attached)

a. PACY 1073 (IN 48464) 26 Oct 63: Vol. III

Cable from Panama City to Hqs. Jake Esterline and Station CI group dissatisfied with unresolved aspects of [2] SAGE [4] ops.

b. MEXI 6969 (IN 64256) 19 Nov 63: Vol. III

From Mexico City to Hqs. re involvement of Francisco "Paco" AMADO with Guatemala guerrillas.

c. DIRECTOR 84449 dated 21 Nov 63: Vol. III

From Hqs. to WAVE. re sensitive information that Cuban Intelligence was targetting against person employed in State Dept office in Miami.

d. DIRECTOR 84791 22 Nov 63: Vol. III

From Hqs. to Panama City. Re fact [2] SAGE-2 much affected by death of President.

e. DIRECTOR 86343, 27 Nov 63: Vol. III

From Hqs. to WAVE and Panama City. Hqs.

suspects Blanca Alicia FRANCO may be spearhead of penetration AMOT/CIA ops on behalf of ZRKNICK complex.

f. HDCA 3405, 29 Nov 63: Vol. III

Dispatch from Santo Domingo to Hqs.,

concerning one Eduardo TAVARES Justo.

g. HMMA 22632, 18 Dec 63: Vol. III

Dispatch from Mexico City to Hqs. re

Francisco AMADO and visits from emissaries of Fidel CASTRO.

Reported to have CASTRO's confidence and perform services for the Communists.

h. DIRECTOR 90507, 20 Dec 63: Vol. III

From Hqs. to Panama City and Bern. Someone

may have used [2]SAGE-1's ticket.

i. DBA 57414, 21 Nov 63: Vol. IV

Re Manolo GARCIA who had driver's license

in name of Manolo RODRIGUEZ who may be iden/with Cuban DSE officer in 64 allegedly responsible for recruiting Emilio ECHARTE Pedroso to enter U.S. to assassinate Cuban exile, Manolo RAY.

j. UFGW-3350, 25 Feb 64: Vol. V

From Hqs. to JMWAVE. re list of names and

addresses on Cuban Intelligence Service Censorshio Lists.

k. PACY 4074 (IN 30576) 17 July 64: Vol. VII

From Panama City to Hqs. Station will try hard

to get additional answers and clarification from [2]SAGE-1.

1. BOGO 4761 (IN 41774) 3 Aug 64: Vol. VII
From Bogota to Hqs. re pro-Castro group in
the Civil Aeronautics Admin.

m. [22]1721, 15 Oct 64: Vol. VIII
To [16-13] from Hqs. When Pres. Kennedy
DGI officer directed officers in National Liberation Bldg.,
to prepare radio commo for transmission by Radio Havana.

LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: CDH
MB
JZ

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

Form 1 (Rev. 5-2-65)

~~SECRET~~

NOV 27 1959
DBF-39257

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: IHS, District Office, WDC; US Customs, WDC; IHS, Miami;
US Customs, Miami; OSI, MACDILL, AFB; G-2, Fort McPherson,
Georgia; OSI, Sixth Naval District, DIO, Charleston, S. C.
Report of: HERBERT J. MORGAN, JR. Office: Washington, D. C.
Date: DEC 21 1959

Field Office File #: 97-1159 Bureau File #: 105-75663

Title: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA @ CINCEL VASQUEZ
MIRO GUARDIA

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA; REGISTRATION ACT - PANAMA;
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

Synopsis:

Subject met I. IRVING DAVIDSON at DAVIDSON's office 12/8/59. Desired assistance of DAVIDSON for invasion of Panama in January, 1960. Again met at same place with DAVIDSON and LEOPOLDO ARAGON, 12/9/59 and 12/11/59. Discussed above invasion plans. MIRO told DAVIDSON he had support of US Government for invasion. DAVIDSON told MIRO 12/11/59, he had checked with US Government agency and could not verify any backing for MIRO. DAVIDSON told MIRO he would give no assistance. MIRO told DAVIDSON that [ob] CIA representative, Panama, could verify support of US for MIRO. Subject interviewed 12/17/59. At first denied above and later stated he did not desire to discuss the matter.

Invasion of Panama

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

[24]

23 DEC 1959

~~SECRET~~

WFO 97-1159

On November 17, 1959, Mr. VOPE advised SA COLE that MIRO had made application to extend his stay in the United States. The application revealed that MIRO was born October 29, 1911, was an attorney by occupation and was in the United States for the purpose of "visiting and pleasure." His address was shown as in care of his sister Mrs. PAUL WADE, 2901 Park Drive, S. E., Washington, D. C. Subject's wife was residing at 8-30 Third Street, Panama, and was identified as MAGDALENA HERRERA.

On the application, MIRO indicated he would depart the United States on January 31, 1960. While in the United States, he is supporting himself from a yearly income of \$4,000, which is obtained from ownership of personal property. MIRO indicated his yearly expenditures as \$3,000.

Mr. VOPE advised SA COLE that subject's visa had been extended on October 22, 1959, to be valid until April 30, 1960.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate 12/11/59

I. IRVING DAVIDSON, Suite 306, 1612 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., advised on or about December 7, 1959, he received a telephone call from a friend whom he declined to identify who is connected with a labor union in Washington, D. C., which he declined to identify, indicating that an individual by the name of RUBEN MIRO had contacted the unidentified individual and union for assistance regarding an invasion of Panama. This person told DAVIDSON that the union did not desire to become involved in any matter similar to this and in order to "get MIRO off their backs" this person desired to send MIRO to see DAVIDSON. DAVIDSON felt that the reason MIRO was sent to see him was due to the fact that DAVIDSON in the past has sold arms and this fact has been publicized in various newspapers.

On December 8, 1959, DAVIDSON received a telephone call from an individual identifying himself as RUBEN MIRO. MIRO expressed a desire to see DAVIDSON and did visit DAVIDSON at his office on December 8, 1959. DAVIDSON exhibited a register maintained in his office which contained the signature RUBEN MIRO, 2901 Park Drive, S.E., and dated December 8, 1959.

At the outset MIRO advised DAVIDSON that he was aware that DAVIDSON was registered as an agent of the Nicaraguan Government. He explained that he, MIRO, had previously been jailed for three years in Panama as the alleged assassin of a former Panamanian President. MIRO further stated that he had joined a CASTRO group in Cuba in order to invade Panama. MIRO claimed that he had notified United States officials of this invasion and had received assurance from the unnamed United States officials that no action would be taken by the American Government to discourage his plans. At that time, MIRO had explained to the United States Government officials that he would cleanse the Panamanian Government of anti-American factions and because of this, he had received their blessings. MIRO told DAVIDSON that in

Interview with I. IRVING DAVIDSON File # WFO 97-1159
 on 12/10/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/11/59
 by Special Agents DONALD HOETING and HERBERT J. MORGAN, JR.:ahw

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WFO 97-1159

order to formulate plans for this invasion, he had traveled to Cuba and conferred with Cuban Premier FIDEL CASTRO, his brother, RAUL CASTRO, Head of the Armed Forces, and Commandante ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. MIRO explained that he was "sucked in" by communist ideology and became disillusioned because the Cubans desired to conduct the invasion of Panama in their own way. As a result, he was summoned to the office of RAUL CASTRO and made to stay in that vicinity until the invaders had departed Cuba. DAVIDSON recalled that this had taken place in April of 1959.

Upon being released, MIRO stated that he had fled to Miami, Florida, whereupon he had immediately called Panama and notified unidentified persons of the imminent invasion. MIRO claimed that he had instructed that the invaders be captured but not killed since they had been deceived by the Cubans.

MIRO told DAVIDSON that he planned to invade Panama in January, 1960. He desired that DAVIDSON assist him in obtaining \$50,000 and enough equipment and armament to outfit 250 men for the invasion. DAVIDSON advised that he had a list of this equipment but could not locate it at that particular moment, but when it was located, would furnish the list to the FBI. DAVIDSON recalled that the list did include four PBV's, 250 .30 caliber machine guns, 300 Garand rifles, 3,000 "K" rations, which MIRO indicated would be enough for ten days, 250 knapsacks, 250 canteens, 250 bayonets, an unrecalled quantity of 60 millimeter mortars, an unrecalled number of 100 pound Napalm bombs, and one LST.

DAVIDSON recalled that even though MIRO desired enough rations for ten days, he had stated that the invasion would end in a successful revolution in Panama within 72 hours.

MIRO desired that DAVIDSON attempt to acquire the above material and equipment through the Nicaraguan Government. He subsequently told DAVIDSON that he, MIRO, had the complete backing of the United States Government

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concerning the invasion. He would not identify any individuals by name, but indicated that his "green light" had been obtained through United States officials in the Panama Canal Zone. At this point DAVIDSON told MIRO he was going to check on his story to ascertain if, in fact, he did have any backing from United States Government officials. He subsequently told MIRO that he would contact the FBI, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There were no specific objections raised by MIRO and he told DAVIDSON that he would have to contact high officials to verify his story.

MIRO told DAVIDSON that if his assistance would be given, DAVIDSON would be granted cutting rights on 100,000 acres of timber land in Panama subsequent to the success of the revolution.

DAVIDSON stated that on December 9, 1959, MIRO reappeared at his office and reiterated the above information.

Shortly thereafter, he was joined by LEOPOLDO ~~ARAGON~~, who was introduced by MIRO as a friend. ARAGON explained his presence by merely saying that he was there to insure that MIRO was contacting persons of substance in his efforts to effect an invasion of Panama. ARAGON affirmed to DAVIDSON that MIRO had the backing of the United States Government regarding his plans. From conversation with ARAGON, it was ascertained by DAVIDSON that ARAGON had previously been associated with labor organizations in Panama and DAVIDSON felt that ARAGON had possibly been instrumental in introducing MIRO to the previously mentioned labor group in Washington, D. C.

While in DAVIDSON's presence, ARAGON and MIRO became engaged in an argument and it was obvious to DAVIDSON that there seemed to be friction between the two. ARAGON gave the impression on December 9, 1959, through conversation with MIRO in DAVIDSON's presence, that he felt that MIRO was too hasty and erratic in his actions.

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DAVIDSON advised that another meeting was scheduled for the above three persons in his office for 4:30 PM, December 11, 1959. At this time, DAVIDSON is to advise MIRO and ARAGON whether he will be of any assistance. DAVIDSON indicated that he is not at all interested in becoming involved in the above endeavors.

DAVIDSON stated that in his opinion ARAGON is a very intelligent individual, however, he considers MIRO highly emotional and possibly somewhat unstable. By explanation, he related that when on December 9, 1959, the subject of United States backing for MIRO was again broached, MIRO became incensed and indicated a desire to immediately call his contact in the United States Government, Panama Canal Zone, and have DAVIDSON talk with this person. He further stated that MIRO, when discussing high United States officials, stated that he has an entree with ALLEN DULLES, Director, CIA, through DULLES's maid, whose name was furnished by MIRO as NATALIE. MIRO went on to say that his nursemaid as a child is a close friend of NATALIE, both of whom are in Washington, D. C. He indicated to DAVIDSON that any time he desired to see Mr. DULLES, he could make arrangements through NATALIE. MIRO has further indicated to DAVIDSON that he still desired to call the aforementioned United States Government official in the Panama Canal Zone when he visits DAVIDSON on December 11, 1959. DAVIDSON stated that MIRO repeatedly intimated that he felt that DAVIDSON could obtain the necessary equipment from Nicaraguan President LOUIS SOMOZA. DAVIDSON stated that there was no indication that MIRO had tried to obtain this equipment from Nicaragua by direct contact.

The only other person mentioned by MIRO as being implicated in the above invasion plans was described by MIRO as a top police official in Panama whose name was furnished to DAVIDSON as JUARINA (phonetic).

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MIRO told DAVIDSON that he planned to depart for the invasion from Mexico and that "D Day" had to be in January, 1960, so that MIRO would have enough time to stabilize the Government and still keep the National elections scheduled for May, 1960. He felt by doing this, he would show the people of Panama that his revolution was for the good of all. The invasion force would consist of 30 Panamanians who would leave Cuba and join MIRO in Mexico. These persons would be joined by other Panamanians, number unknown, at which time they would board the LST and depart.

In conclusion, DAVIDSON stated that at approximately 2:00 PM, December 10, 1959, he received a telephone call from ARAGON, who stated that he, ARAGON, would have nothing further to do with MIRO and his plans, since he does not like MIRO's actions and attitude. ARAGON told DAVIDSON, however, that he would appear at DAVIDSON's on December 11, 1959, since he does not desire that MIRO become immediately aware that he, ARAGON, is not planning to further develop invasion plans concerning Panama.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate 12/11/59

WFT-1 advised that he had obtained the following information concerning the recent activity of RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA and LEOPOLDO *ARAGON ESCALONA, both of whom are Panamanian nationals residing in Washington, D. C.

MIRO has recently been in contact with a person in Washington, D. C., whose identity is not known to the informant and who is interested in getting into the lumber business in Panama. This person has advised MIRO that he is attempting to obtain financial backing for this venture from persons in New York City, and about two and one-half weeks ago advised MIRO that WILLIAM HOFFA, brother of Teamsters Union President "JIMMY" HOFFA, as well as a Mr. GIBBONS (first name unknown) who is located at the headquarters of the Teamsters Union in Washington, D. C., might be interested in backing him in this venture.

Possibly as a result of this mention of the Teamsters Union, MIRO, about two weeks ago, asked ARAGON to call GIBBONS at the Teamsters Union and make an appointment for them to see GIBBONS. ARAGON did make this appointment and on Thursday, November 26, 1959, ARAGON and MIRO went to the Teamsters Union headquarters in Washington, D. C., to fulfill this appointment. On their arrival there they were told that GIBBONS was not available but a Mr. STEINBERG (first name unknown), who was identified to them as "JIMMY" HOFFA's personal assistant or secretary, was expecting them.

At this meeting MIRO furnished STEINBERG with information concerning MIRO's background as regards Panamanian revolutionary activities and his recent difficulties in attempting to arrange for an invasion of Panama from Cuba. According to the informant, MIRO, after laying this groundwork, told STEINBERG that if the Teamsters Union would back him in an invasion of Nicaragua, that Union could have a free hand in organizing labor both in Panama and in the Panama Canal Zone. MIRO also mentioned to STEINBERG that gambling activity in Panama will undoubtedly increase in the future but he made no commitments concerning the granting

Interview with WFT-1 File # WFO 97-1159
 on 12/10/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/11/59
 by Special Agents RICHARD B. KELLOGG and ANDREW J. SHANNON RBK:rcd

WFO 97-1159

of gambling concessions to the Teamsters Union if they backed his venture. MIRO indicated to STEINBERG he would desire that the Union put up \$50,000 and in addition, either furnish the arms and equipment which MIRO would require or put up another \$400,000.

According to the informant, STEINBERG gave no indication that he had previous knowledge of what it was MIRO desired to discuss with him and did not act particularly surprised at the above proposition. STEINBERG made no comments but only stated that he would have to talk to "HOFFA" about the matter and MIRO would be contacted. MIRO gave STEINBERG the address and telephone number where he could be contacted. The informant said that to the best of his knowledge there was no mention made at this conference concerning a lumber venture in Panama.

The informant stated that on December 7, 1959, ARAGON telephonically contacted STEINBERG and was advised that MIRO would be contacted in the near future by his friend. According to the informant, MIRO, later that day, advised ARAGON that he had been contacted by STEINBERG's friend who had not identified himself but who had listened to MIRO's story and then stated he would have to check on MIRO and would contact him at a later date. The informant said MIRO had advised STEINBERG's friend, in addition to what he had told STEINBERG, that the United States Government would "look the other way" concerning MIRO's proposed invasion of Panama. On December 9, 1959, ARAGON went to the Teamsters Union headquarters in Washington, D. C., and left a note for STEINBERG indicating that it was urgent that he, ARAGON, meet with the man who had contacted MIRO. Later that day, according to the informant, ARAGON was contacted by a man who said his name was DAVIDSON, who indicated he was calling with reference to the above note, and requested that ARAGON meet him at his, DAVIDSON's, office at 1612 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. According to the informant, ARAGON then telephonically contacted MIRO, advised him that he had an appointment to see DAVIDSON, and requested that MIRO come to his apartment to babysit. The informant said MIRO did go to ARAGON's apartment for this purpose and ARAGON met with DAVIDSON in DAVIDSON's office at approximately 3:30 p.m. on December 9, 1959. At the time of this meeting DAVIDSON told ARAGON that MIRO had been to his office earlier that day and told him to have nothing to do with ARAGON since this entire matter was being handled by MIRO. The informant stated it is his understanding that ARAGON questioned this and called MIRO from DAVIDSON's office at which time MIRO advised ARAGON that DAVIDSON was not

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telling the truth. When ARAGON so informed DAVIDSON, DAVIDSON got on an extension of the same telephone being utilized by ARAGON and when he confronted MIRO with the facts, MIRO said ARAGON was acting on his own.

Very shortly after the above telephone conversation, MIRO arrived at DAVIDSON's office and in the presence of DAVIDSON and ARAGON acted, according to the informant, in a highly emotional, excited and irrational manner. He shouted that he could take DAVIDSON to people at the Department of State who would tell him the Department of State would look favorably on a proposed invasion and MIRO several times picked up the telephone in DAVIDSON's office stating he was going to call Panama or FIDEL CASTRO in Cuba and they would give DAVIDSON the true facts. The informant said this meeting was concluded when DAVIDSON stated that he would check on MIRO in his own way. They agreed to meet again on December 11, 1959, at DAVIDSON's office at which time DAVIDSON would give them his answer concerning assistance for MIRO in his proposed invasion.

The informant noted that at the time of this meeting DAVIDSON had in his possession the note which had been left at the Teamsters Union by ARAGON. The informant also noted that DAVIDSON had stated that he believed MIRO to be "crazy".

According to the informant, MIRO and ARAGON intended to meet with DAVIDSON at DAVIDSON's office at 4:30 p.m., December 11, 1959.

The informant also stated that ARAGON has expressed a fear of "crossing" MIRO in this matter as he too feels MIRO is a "mental case" and might very well do bodily harm to ARAGON.

The informant advised that on December 4, 1959, MIRO, utilizing a typewriter owned by ARAGON, typed a memorandum concerning the equipment which would be required for his proposed invasion along with the conditions surrounding the obtaining of that material and the privileges that would be given to the person furnishing that material. The informant made available a copy of that memorandum which is as follows:

"Memorandum

"Conditions:

"1.-Mr. X name will not be mentioned under any circumstances;

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- "2.-Mr X may clearly indicate privileges and grants he desires for his group and affiliate groups;
- "3.-Mr X will receive a grant of 100,000 acres of timber land, for a period of 30 years, at the point chosen by his representatives;
- "4.-Action to take place during the month of January. To all indications will be successfully accomplished in less than 72 hours. No excesses intended.
- "5.-Immediately after end of operation equipment shall be returned;
- "6.-Offers to Mr X to be fulfilled within 30 days after taking control of office.

"Equipment required:

- "1 LST boat;
- "4 Catalina flying boats equipped with 20 mm. cannons and 30 cal. machine guns, rocket launchers and bomb racks.
- "100 light bombs.
- "200 Rockets.
- "500,000 30 cal. shots.
- "60,000 gallons of airplane gasoline.
- "1 Tv set.
- "1 radio set.
- "1 radio transmitter and receptor.
- "3,000 X rations.
- "Food and medical supplies.
- "100 Garand Rifles.
- "100 Browning automatic rifles.
- "250 M1 carbines." (30-30).
- "250 knives.
- " 50 thompsons.
- " 6 mortars (60 mm. cal.)
- "30 Machine guns (30 cal., air cooling).
- "20 Field glasses.
- "10 compasses.
- "20 walkie-talkies.
- "500 Canteens.
- "500 Belts.
- "250 pistol holders.
- "500 pairs of boots, assorted sizes (mainly 7, 8 and 9).
- "1,000 pairs hose.
- "300 mortar shells cal. 60 mm.
- "150,000 45 cal. shots.
- "500,000 Garand and Browning shots.
- "100,000 30-30 cal. shots.
- "150 thompson magazines.
- "300 Browning magazines.
- "500 M1 magazines (large ones.)
- "400 pounds dynamite and accessories."

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The informant advised that it is his understanding that the "Mr. X" mentioned in the above memorandum is no specific individual but is anyone who will finance MIRO's invasion plans or furnish the above equipment for that purpose.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate 12/15/59

On December 11, 1959, I. IRVING DAVIDSON telephonically advised that RUBEN MIRO and LEOPOLDO ARAGON were present at his, DAVIDSON's, office when he arrived at 4:45 p.m. Upon his arrival DAVIDSON stated that ARAGON advised that he, ARAGON, and MIRO did not see "eye to eye on things." ARAGON said that although he is sympathetic with MIRO's cause, that is, the planned invasion to overthrow the Panamanian Government, he does not believe that the United States Government is going to do whatever MIRO wishes.

DAVIDSON said he told MIRO and ARAGON that he checked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Department of State and both the FBI and the State Department are unaware as to the "green light" for the Panama invasion. DAVIDSON stated at this point that he told MIRO he was quite angry because MIRO was only talking about the "green light" backing by the United States. DAVIDSON advised that MIRO then wanted a long distance telephone call to be placed to one [06] telephone number [08] Panama City, Panama. MIRO said that [06] is an Agent for the Central Intelligence Agency and that MIRO's code name is CARLOS VASQUEZ when dealing with *alias of Ruben Miro*

Although the telephone call was placed it was without success. The call was then postponed until Monday, December 14, 1959, and DAVIDSON stated it would be placed from his office at 10 a.m.

MIRO also stated that [06] came from Panama to Miami in April, 1959, and determined that MIRO was then in New York City. MIRO said that [06] then came to New York to find MIRO and encourage an invasion plan by MIRO.

DAVIDSON stated that MIRO acted very discouraged at this December 11, 1959, meeting and requested that DAVIDSON try to arrange for a job in Nicaragua so he,

Interview with I. IRVING DAVIDSON File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/11/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/14/59
by Special Agent DONALD HOETING /bsb

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WFO 97-1159

MIRO, could support his family. DAVIDSON advised MIRO that all he could do is suggest this request to MORALES at the Nicaraguan Embassy.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORT

December 14, 1959

WFT-1 telephonically advised that RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA and LEOPOLDO ARAGCN ESCALONA had met with I. IRVING DAVIDSON that afternoon in DAVIDSON's office, 1612 K Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., as planned. He said DAVIDSON advised he had talked with his "contact" at the United States Department of State who had indicated that the Department of State is somewhat sympathetic with MIRO's plan to overthrow the Panamanian Government but did not want to become involved in the matter. DAVIDSON stated he was advised that although ARAGCN is all right, he, DAVIDSON, should stay away from MIRO as MIRO is "hot". DAVIDSON also indicated to MIRO and ARAGCN he had been advised by his "contact" that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had MIRO's sister's telephone "bugged" even before MIRO got into the United States. DAVIDSON advised therefore that he wanted absolutely nothing to do with MIRO's plan as he did not want to get in trouble with the United States Government.

According to the informant, when MIRO learned this he voiced the opinion that the United States desired to keep him here so it could keep an eye on him and he asked DAVIDSON if DAVIDSON could arrange for him to go to Nicaragua where he could remain for a few months and "see how things work out". The informant stated DAVIDSON made no promises concerning this but told MIRO he would have MORALES at the Nicaraguan Embassy send a message to Nicaragua and see if this could be arranged. The informant said DAVIDSON did not further identify MORALES but informant believed MORALES is a military attache at the Nicaraguan Embassy.

Informant said MIRO attempted to call from DAVIDSON's office the man in Panama who can supposedly vouch for him and for the fact that the United States will turn its back on MIRO's planned invasion. He was unable to complete the call but is supposed to try again from DAVIDSON's office at 10.00 a.m. on December 14, 1959.

The informant said that MIRO, using the name, CARLOS VASQUEZ, tried to place this call person-to-person

Interview with WFT-1 File # WFO 97-1159
 on 12-11-59 at Washington, D. C. Date Dictated: 12-14-59
 by Special Agent RICHARD B. KELLOGG/ AJC

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WFO 97-1159

to [* 06] (phonetic) at Panama City, Panama, [08]
He said MIRO claimed that [06] is affiliated with the
Central Intelligence Agency; that [06] had contacted MIRO
in the United States after MIRO was expelled from Cuba and
told him the United States was sympathetic with MIRO's cause
and would look the other way if his invasion takes place.
The informant said MIRO also stated he had defended [06]
in a trial in Panama several years ago when [06] was
accused, along with two other Americans, in a robbery or
burglary.

The informant advised that from MIRO's reaction
he believes MIRO has no immediate plans for obtaining
backing for his revolutionary movement. The informant
also indicated it is his belief that ARAGON will have
nothing more to do with MIRO in this regard.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORT

Date December 16, 1959

On December 14, 1959, Miss PATRICIA BOLAND, Secretary to I. IRVING DAVIDSON, Suite 306, 1612 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., telephonically advised that RUBEN MIRO visited DAVIDSON's office at 10:30 a.m. on December 14, 1959, to place a telephone call to [06] telephone number [08] Panama City, Panama.

Miss BOLAND stated that after one and one half hours MIRO was still unsuccessful in getting his call through to [03] and MIRO decided to have his call transferred to his, MIRO's, wife in Panama.

After the termination of the call to MIRO's wife, MIRO stated to Miss BOLAND he would telephone DAVIDSON later that day. Miss BOLAND stated MIRO never called back as he said he would. Miss BOLAND said MIRO's conversation with his wife was in Spanish, a language she does not understand.

Interview with Miss PATRICIA BOLAND File # WFO 97-1159
on 12-14-59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12-15-59
by Special Agent DONALD HOETING:pep

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate December 16, 1959

On December 15, 1959, I. IRVING DAVIDSON, 1612 K Street, N.W., telephonically advised that he returned to Washington, D. C., from Miami during the evening of December 14, 1959, and, therefore, was not present when MIRO arrived at his, DAVIDSON's, office at 10:30 a.m., December 14, 1959. DAVIDSON stated that MIRO was to make a telephone call at that time to [06] at telephone number [08] Panama City, Panama.

DAVIDSON stated that according to his secretary, Miss PATRICIA BOLAND, MIRO placed the call to [06] but after one and one half hours without success, MIRO had the call transferred to his, MIRO's, wife who resides in Panama.

DAVIDSON said that he does not plan to engage in any activities with MIRO and is not going to request MORALES of the Nicaraguan Embassy to find a job in Nicaragua for MIRO.

Interview with I. IRVING DAVIDSON File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/15/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/15/59
by Special Agent DONALD HOETING:pep/vjh

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORT

December 17, 1959

I. IRVING DAVIDSON, Suite 306, 1612 K Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., furnished the following information relative to the sequence of events surrounding his meetings with RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA and LEOPOLDO ARAGON ESCALONA. DAVIDSON said his recollection was not too clear regarding the exact sequence of these events, but the following is to the best of his recollection.

When he was informed by his friend at the labor union about December 7, 1959, about MIRO and ARAGON, he was given the names of both of those persons along with MIRO's telephone number. He said he tried unsuccessfully to call MIRO and left his number with a request that MIRO call him back. He stated MIRO did call, an appointment was made, and MIRO came to his office and told him about his proposition. DAVIDSON said later that day he was told by his friend from the labor union that ARAGON had attempted to call him and when unsuccessful left a note for him. DAVIDSON said this man asked him to see if he could contact ARAGON and "get him off of the union's back." DAVIDSON said he called ARAGON and asked him why he continued to contact the union when he, DAVIDSON, had already seen MIRO, and ARAGON answered that he wanted to see who it was that MIRO was dealing with so DAVIDSON invited ARAGON to his office. He said ARAGON did come to his office later that morning and DAVIDSON told him he saw no reason to talk with him when MIRO was not present as they were apparently together in this matter and while ARAGON was still there they called MIRO and arranged for both MIRO and ARAGON to meet with DAVIDSON in his office that afternoon. He said that meeting did take place as did another meeting two days later and on each occasion, as best DAVIDSON could recall, ARAGON and MIRO were waiting for him at his office when he got there so he did not know if they came together.

DAVIDSON said on the occasion of his second meeting with ARAGON and MIRO he told MIRO, in order to get rid of him, that he was too "hot" for him to associate with. He said to impress him further along this line, he told him that MIRO's activities were being watched and, in fact, MIRO should be careful what he says on the telephone as his telephone is probably "bugged." DAVIDSON said no

Interview with I. IRVING DAVIDSON File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/16/59 at Washington, D. C. Date Dictated: 12/16/59
by Special Agents RICHARD B. KELLOGG and DONALD HOTTING:kar

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WFO 97-1159
RBK:kar

one had told him this and he had no reason to believe it to be true, and he only said it in an effort to get rid of MIRO.

DAVIDSON also advised that ARAGON called him on December 15, 1959, for an appointment and came to his office at about 2:30 p.m. that same date. He said ARAGON explained he is as much interested in seeing the Government of Panama overthrown as MIRO is, but cannot agree with MIRO's solution to the problem and wants no part of violence. He said ARAGON said he believed the Government of Panama is so shaky that it would take very little to topple it and his plan was to utilize propaganda and pressure at the proper places and at the proper times to cause the downfall of that government. DAVIDSON said ARAGON asked if he would be interested in backing such a move or if he knew anyone who would be and DAVIDSON answered him in the negative in both instances.

DAVIDSON said ARAGON argued that DAVIDSON, as a representative of the Government of Nicaragua, should be very much interested in Panama as Nicaragua would undoubtedly suffer if the "Cuban communists" gained control in Panama. He said he told ARAGON if he had any such information, he should pass it on to the Nicaraguan Ambassador as he, DAVIDSON, only represents Nicaragua in commercial matters. DAVIDSON said he refused ARAGON's request that he introduce ARAGON to the Nicaraguan Ambassador.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW REPORTDate 12/17/59~~SECRET~~

RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA, who resides in Washington, D. C., with his sister, Mrs. PAULSWADE, at 2901 Park Drive, S. E., was interviewed at the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was advised that he need make no statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that he had a right to legal counsel.

MIRO advised he did not return to Panama in early October, 1959, as he had previously stated he planned to do, because he feared that if he were in Panama, he would be blamed, unjustifiably, for the continual demonstrations against the Panamanian Government. He said he has recently been engaged in an attempt to obtain employment with some international organization, either in the United States, or somewhere outside of Panama, in Latin America. He said if he is successful in obtaining this employment, he does not plan to return to Panama for at least five years, but added he had no immediate prospects for such a job.

MIRO was specifically asked whether or not he had been attempting to obtain in the United States, financial backing for an invasion of Panama and claiming, in that regard, that he had been promised that the United States Government would "look the other way," if such an invasion took place. He at first denied that he had done either and later said that since he had been assured he would not have to say anything, he preferred to go on record as saying that he neither affirmed nor denied the allegations, but rather, refused to discuss them.

When asked about [06] MIRO said he first met [06] in Panama, around 1940, or 1941, when he defended [06], who was charged as an accomplice in a murder case. He said he believes [06] is associated with a United States intelligence agency because of his activities and apparent contacts, but denied that [06] had told him the United States Government would "look the other way," if MIRO instituted an invasion to overthrow the Panamanian Government.

Interview with RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA File # WFO 97-1159
on 12/17/59 at Washington, D. C. Date dictated 12/17/59
by Special Agents HERBERT J. MORGAN, JR., RICHARD B. KELLOGG:ekh

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 97-1159

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DBF 39251

Washington, D. C.

DEC 21 1959

RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA;
REGISTRATION ACT - PANAMA;
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

WP T-1 utilized in the report of Special Agent
Herbert J. Morgan, Jr., dated and captioned as above has
not been contacted a sufficient number of times to judge
his reliability.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
May 26, 1964

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201-196-

RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA

RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA, a Panamanian citizen and attorney, with offices located at Plaza de Francia 4, Panama City, Panama, was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at Miami, Florida on February 10, 1964.

MIRO, among other things, furnished the following information:

He departed from Panama City on February 7, 1964, and went to San Juan, Puerto Rico at the invitation of MAX GROSO, a Cuban who is connected with the London Distributing Company, distributors of vending machines. GROSO was interested in soliciting MIRO's cooperation in placing a quantity of vending machines, such as Seeburg phonographs, on a trial basis in Panama. GROSO was attempting to dispose of some sixty of these machines, which he desired to ship to Panama from Jamaica. MIRO said he counseled GROSO not to send these machines to Panama at this time.

MIRO remained in San Juan, Puerto Rico until coming to Miami on the evening of February 9, 1964. He indicated his only reason for a stopover in Miami was for personal shopping and pleasure purposes. He indicated his visit was

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

in no way connected with his political aspirations in Panama, explaining that he is a candidate for election as a Deputy to the National Assembly in that country, in the elections to be held in May of 1964.

MM T-1,

advised on February 11, 1964, that he had learned MIRO had gone to San Juan, Puerto Rico from Panama for business purposes. He had learned that MIRO's travel expenses were paid by a group in San Juan, Puerto Rico. MIRO had explained the San Juan group was interested in the operation of a number of vending machines which they felt MIRO would be able to handle for them. MM T-1 pointed out that MIRO subsequently came to Miami, Florida for shopping purposes, as well as pleasure, and stated he personally knew that MIRO had gone to the Hialeah Race Track on February 10, 1964. MM T-1 pointed out that MIRO planned to return to Panama on February 11, 1964.

MM T-1 stated he felt that MIRO's trip was in no way connected with his political aspirations in Panama, and that there was nothing questionable concerning MIRO's visit to Puerto Rico and Miami, Florida. He stated MIRO is very popular with the middle and poor class of people in Panama, and felt MIRO had a good chance of winning a seat as a Deputy of the National Assembly in the elections to be held in May of 1964.

On April 1, 1964, the Washington Field Office furnished the following information:

On March 9, 1964, a search was made of the records of the Central Office, Immigration and Naturalization

2.

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

Service (INS), Washington, D. C., concerning MIRO. These records contain "Arrival-Departure Record" forms, reflecting he was admitted at Washington, D. C., on October 1, 1959 on a B-2 (temporary visitor for pleasure) visa, issued September 9, 1958, at Panama City, Panama. He arrived via National Airlines (NAL) Flight 106 from Havana, Cuba. He departed August 9, 1960, from Miami via Pan American Airways (PAA) en route to Panama. He was again admitted on February 7, 1964 at Miami, Florida on a B-2 visa, issued February 5, 1964 at Panama. On both entries, his permanent address was 830 - 3rd Street, Panama City, Panama.

On May 15, 1964, MM T-1 advised he had learned MIRO had arrived at Miami, Florida that date. He ascertained that MIRO was staying at the Ponce de Leon Hotel, 231 East Flagler Street, Miami, Florida.

On May 15, 1964, EDWARD TELLA, Clerk, Ponce de Leon Hotel, Miami, Florida, advised MIRO checked into the hotel at 8:00 AM on May 15, 1964. He indicated his permanent residence to be 3rd Street, #830, Panama City, Panama.

On May 17, 1964, Mr. TELLA related that MIRO made a telephone call to the Dominican Republic (DR) from the hotel sometime during the early morning hours of May 16, 1964. MIRO called number 29071, and talked to someone at that number for approximately two minutes. TELLA was unable to furnish any additional information concerning the telephone call.

On May 18, 1964, TELLA advised that MIRO had made telephone calls to local Miami numbers since his arrival, which are set forth as follows:

3.

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

JE 2-2311

HI 6-2591

CA 1-6076

FR 1-1745 (which had been changed to 691-1775)

FR 4-0428

624-5336

JE 8-1005

TELLA also related that MIRO had received a message to call OLGA RIVERO at Miami telephone 373-8066.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Date 5/26/641

Records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami, Florida (SBT&T) reflect the following information concerning subscribers of numbers set forth below:

JE 2-2311 is listed to the National Hotel, 1677 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida

HI 6-2591 is listed to the Sevilla Hotel, 162 Alcazar Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida

CA 1-6076 is listed to LOUIS A. FILOS, 8270 Southwest 11th Terrace, Miami, Florida

FR 1-1745, changed to 691-1775, is listed to JESSIE BERRIAN, 6337 Northwest 24th Court, Miami, Florida

FR 4-0428 is listed to ISABEL S. BUJOL, 1526 Northwest Second Street, Miami, Florida

624-5336 is listed to BYRD FULLUM, Apartment #12, 240 Northwest 193rd Street, Miami, Florida

JE 8-1005 is listed to LOUIS FLORIO, Apartment #10, 653 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida

373-8066 is listed to OLGA R. AUSTIN, 355 Southwest 22nd Road, Miami, Florida

The above records are confidential, and can be made public only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. PRESTON M. COLLINS, South Florida Manager, SBT&T Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

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On 5/20/64 at Miami, Florida Miami, 97-261
by Special Agent LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR. :plm 5/25/64
Date dictated

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Date 5/26/64

Records of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (SBT&T), Miami, Florida, reflect 373-8066 is subscribed to by OLGA R. AUSTIN, 355 Southwest 22nd Road, Miami, Florida. She was identified as an unemployed housewife, owning her home at the above address. Her husband, OSWOND AUSTIN, was identified as an employee of the Panama Canal Zone, working in the Lock Division of the Mina Flores Locks in the Panama Canal Zone.

Telephone service at the above address had been in effect from August of 1963 until April of 1964. It was disconnected in April of 1964, and reconnected on May 2, 1964.

Telephone records noted that AUSTIN's husband is due to retire in about two years.

The above records are confidential and can be made public only upon issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. This subpoena should be directed to Mr. PRESTON M. COLLINS, South Florida Manager, SBT&T Company, Miami, Florida, or his authorized representative.

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On 5/21/64 at Miami, Florida File # Miami 97-261

by Special Agent LEWAN L. STAFFORD, JR.:plm Date dictated 5/25/64

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

On February 11, 1964, MM T-2, another government agency which conducts security and intelligence investigations, acquired information from a Cuban national exile with good contacts among Cuban exiles, as follows:

At 4:00 AM on February 7, 1964, CARLOS JOVANE GUINARD, Panamanian, 37 years of age, son of CARLOS JOVANE and ROSINA GUINARD, Panamanians, was arrested by members of the Guardia Nacional (GN - National Guard), Panama, Republic of Panama, shortly after his arrival at Tocumen International Airport, Panama, Republic of Panama, from Miami, Florida, aboard PAA Flight #81. He was arrested on charges of smuggling explosives and weapons into Panama.

On the same flight arrived one MIGUEL MURCIANO, a Cuban national, described by MM T-2 as a possible agent of Cuban Premier FIDEL CASTRO. MURCIANO claimed to be a professional pilot, with residence at 561 Southwest 37th Avenue, Miami, Florida, where he claimed to operate or be employed with the United American Associates, Inc. His business telephone in Miami was set forth as 444-7581. MURCIANO disappeared on February 7, 1964, and was being sought by members of the Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones (DNI - National Department of Investigations), Panama, for questioning concerning his possible connection with CARLOS JOVANE GUINARD. MURCIANO was believed to have made previous trips to Panama connected with the smuggling of weapons. On those past occasions, the weapons probably were consigned to or received at the airport by people having parliamentary immunity, such as Deputies to the Panama National Assembly, JOSE PABLO VELASQUEZ, and ~~THELMA KING~~, a pro-CASTRO sympathizer, or persons with a well-known revolutionary background, such as RUBEN MIRO, Panamanian attorney, and ROBERTO "TITO" ARIAS, 201-55929, former Panamanian Ambassador to Great Britain.

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7.

CIT. PANAMA A PANAMA - CONFIDENTIAL

Subj prob receiving smuggled weapons
at Tocumen Airport, Panama.

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

MI T-2 continued that JOVANE's arrest was probably effected because of the failure of the contacting individuals to appear on time at the airport to help in clearing his baggage through Panamanian Customs.

MURCIANO was considered a dangerous pro-CASTRO individual, and allegedly had been reported as having been engaged in similar activities in the Congo area. It had been reported that MURCIANO, on one of his previous trips to Panama, attempted to charter for seven hours a plane for \$12,000 from a local air cargo firm in the Republic of Panama, the Panaven, headed by GUILLERMO "BILLIE" FORD, a wealthy Panamanian businessman. One of the main stockholders of this firm is MANUEL J. CASTILLO, a Panamanian citizen. MURCIANO stated to CASTILLO at the time that he wanted the plane to transport "certain merchandise" to Colombia. CASTILLO became suspicious, and assuming that the so-called "merchandise" could be some kind of a contraband, refused MURCIANO's request.

MI T-2 related it was believed that MURCIANO, on his first or second trip to Panama, stayed at the home of OLGA RIVERA DE AUSTIN, a naturalized United States citizen of Cuban extraction, who was residing at 0838 Amador Road, Balboa, Canal Zone. It was MI T-2's source's opinion that MURCIANO might have sought asylum at AUSTIN's residence or at one of her close friends' home in the Canal Zone. It was believed that MURCIANO was probably traveling under a special tourist document or a forged passport.

The OLGA RIVERA DE AUSTIN may be identical with OLGA RIVERO called by MIRO at Miami, Florida.

8.

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

On May 19, 1964, DONALD RICHARD SANDERS, also known as "RED", residing in Apartment #10, 653 West Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, telephone JE 8-1005, furnished the following information:

SANDERS was born in Oklahoma, and was active as an oil driller and in the construction business for a number of years. He served in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) until 1945, at which time he was discharged for medical reasons, and is currently receiving a disability compensation from the Veterans Administration (VA). During the period 1958 and 1959, SANDERS, who had previously served in the USMC in Cuba, spent a considerable amount of time in Cuba in connection with a construction job and seaport project.

SANDERS identified himself as a close friend of FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, also known as FRANK FIORINI, an American soldier of fortune who at one time served in the Cuban Air Force under Cuban Prime Minister FIDEL CASTRO.

SANDERS further identified himself as being friendly with various anti-CASTRO leaders and some Panamanian personalities, indicating he had married a Panamanian girl and had worked in Panama on several occasions in connection with construction projects.

SANDERS said he had, during the past several years, become acquainted with RUBEN MIRO.

On May 18, 1964, RUBEN MIRO and SANDERS met coincidentally on West Flagler Street in downtown Miami. MIRO stated he was planning to spend several days in Miami. On the evening of May 18, 1964, SANDERS drove MIRO to the

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

residence of HOWARD EDWARDS. EDWARDS resides at 240 Northwest 193rd Street, Miami, Florida, and has telephone number 624-5336. SANDERS identified EDWARDS as the owner of the Mercy-Wood Hospital, which was formerly the Monroe-Jackson Hospital in Hollywood, Florida. According to SANDERS, this hospital is now closed for financial reasons.

SANDERS said MIRO had become acquainted with EDWARDS in Panama several years ago in connection with a real estate deal.

After meeting at EDWARDS' residence, the three individuals had dinner at the Sands Restaurant, located on Highway 441, just north of the Dade County Line in Broward County. SANDERS related that EDWARDS and MIRO talked about the development of certain properties in Panama, and MIRO was trying to induce EDWARDS to put some money into the development of the property. SANDERS stated there was nothing questionable that occurred during the conversation between EDWARDS and MIRO.

SANDERS continued that he mentioned to FRANK STURGIS that MIRO was in town, and thereafter SANDERS and STURGIS made an appointment to see MIRO on May 19, 1964. They met for lunch in downtown Miami at noon on that date. SANDERS stated that MIRO and STURGIS spent approximately two hours "shooting the bull" about each other's experiences in Cuba. SANDERS described STURGIS as a braggart and egotist, who dominated the conversation. SANDERS related that MIRO did discuss the current political situation in Panama in general terms.

10.

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~~- CONFIDENTIAL -~~

RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

After lunch, SANDERS and STURGIS drove MIRO to the Hong Kong Restaurant, located at 147 Northeast Second Avenue, where they waited in the automobile while MIRO went in to visit an unidentified person, with whom he spent approximately five minutes. SANDERS said he was planning to drive MIRO to the airport in order that he might take a flight back to Panama City that afternoon; however, MIRO said it would not be necessary, that he had arranged transportation for a woman to drive him there. MIRO did not identify this female by name.

On May 19, 1964, MM T-1 advised he had knowledge of some activities of MIRO during his Miami visit.

MM T-1 related that on May 17, 1964, HOMERO VIDAL VELASQUEZ FERNANDEZ, a Panamanian citizen who has been engaged in some revolutionary activities in the past, arrived at the Miami International Airport (MIA) aboard an APA Panama Airways Flight at approximately 6:30 PM on May 17, 1964.

That same evening, VELASQUEZ was visiting at the home of a Panamanian citizen, whom MM T-1 identified as ERNESTO FILOS, 805 East 32nd Street, Hialeah, Florida. While at FILOS' residence, RUBEN MIRO came by to visit ERNESTO FILOS, and MM T-1 described it as a coincidental meeting. MIRO was accompanied by a friend, described by MM T-1 as ENRIQUE NUNEZ, a Panamanian citizen employed as an automobile mechanic in a Standard Oil station located at Southwest 8th Street and 12th Avenue, Miami.

MM T-1 said that VELASQUEZ was one of the three organizers in the political campaign of MARCO ROBLES, who was the successful Presidential candidate in the Panamanian

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

elections held in May of 1964. MM T-1 commented that VELASQUEZ had appeared quite content over the results of the election, and it was MM T-1's belief that VELASQUEZ will now be selected to take a Cabinet post in the ROBLES government. MM T-1 recalled that VELASQUEZ had stated that ROBLES favors a program of agrarian reform in Panama, and that VELASQUEZ is going to push that particular program, and indicated he had personally told ROBLES that should ROBLES later oppose it, VELASQUEZ would go against him.

MM T-1 related that MIRO was a candidate on the ticket of the unsuccessful Presidential candidate, ARNULFO ARIAS. MIRO had little comment to the remarks of VELASQUEZ.

MM T-1 advised that VELASQUEZ departed from the MIA on NAL Flight 604 at 10:00 PM, May 17, 1964, for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He said he was going to Philadelphia to visit with his wife, JENNIE, whom he had not seen for approximately three months. He did not indicate when he would return to the Republic of Panama.

MM T-1 went on to relate that MIRO had come to Miami, and was planning to go on to Washington, D. C., to contact some attorneys. MM T-1 stated MIRO indicated he was attempting to interest some people in the United States in leasing some mining properties in Panama. According to MM T-1, MIRO would have gone to Washington, D. C. to stay for two or three weeks; however, he made several long distance telephone calls to that city, and apparently found it unnecessary to go North. MM T-1 related that MIRO had departed for Panama on May 19, 1964.

On May 19, 1964, records of INS, Miami, Florida, disclosed that RUBEN MIRO GUARDIA departed from Miami on PAA

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RE: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA


Flight 511 at 4:00 PM, May 19, 1964, for Tocumen, Republic of Panama. His I-94 Form disclosed he had arrived in Miami and was admitted on a B-2 visa May 15, 1964, valid to June 20, 1964. He had arrived aboard PAA Flight 80. His permanent residence was listed as Central Avenue, #34-90, Panama City, Panama. His Passport Number is 53399. He was born October 29, 1911 in Panama, Republic of Panama.

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
May 26, 1964

Title RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA

Reference Memorandum, dated and captioned
as above, at Miami, Florida.

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FROM SAC, MIAMI 3P

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PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES, FPM-PANAMA. REBURAD APRIL

SIXTEEN. ON APRIL SIXTEEN, JOSEPH MEROLA, CONFIDENTIALLY AND

VOLUNTARILY FURNISHED FOLLOWING. RUBEN MIRO CAME MIAMI FROM HAVANA

APRIL SIXTEEN. MIRO HAS RECEIVED CASH, IN FORM OF CHECK FOR ONE

THOUSAND DOLLARS AND CLAIMS PROMISED TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS

ADDITIONAL FOR PURPOSE CARRYING OUT PANAMANIAN INVASION. MONEY GIVEN

MIRO IN HAVANA BY CHICAGO, ILL., ATTORNEY VICTOR GOULDING ON BEHALF

UNIDENTIFIED GREEK. MIRO TO GIVE GAMBLING CONCESSIONS PANAMA TO

LATTER INDIVIDUAL. THIS PERSON ALSO INTERESTED NARCOTICS. MIRO

ALLEGEDLY TAKING MONEY BUT DOES NOT PLAN CARRY OUT AGREEMENT. MIRO TOLD

MEROLA EIGHTY REVOLUTIONARIES DEPARTED HAVANA APRIL FIFTEEN, FIFTYNINE,

BOUND FOR NICARAGUA ON CUBAN VESSEL OTHERWISE UNIDENTIFIED. MIRO

SAYS THIRTYFIVE TO FORTY REVOLUTIONARIES, FOLLOWERS OF ROBERTO ARIAS

DEPARTED HAVANA APRIL FOURTEEN, LAST ABOARD VESSEL OF FNU GARCIA.

GROUP HEADED BY ONE FNU MERALES OR MORALES AND STILL EXPECTED LAND

TWELVE MILES EAST OF COLON, PANAMA APRIL SEVENTEEN INSTANT. MIRO-S

GROUP HAS NOT YET DEPARTED. JUAN RUFFO SANCHEZ, PANAMANIAN, REINTERVIEWED

APRIL SIXTEEN LAST, ADMITTED CALLING COL. SATURNINO FLORES, PANAMANIAN

NATIONAL GUARD, PANAMA CITY, PANAMA, APRIL FOURTEEN, AND AMONG OTHER

THINGS MENTIONED "RESTLESS II" AND WAS TOLD TO CALL PANAMANIAN

AMBASSADOR RE MATTER. ADMITS SEVERAL CALLS TO PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR

RICARDO ARIAS.

END PAGE ONE

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PAGE TWO

RUFFO ESCORTED BY AGENT TO " RESTLESS II " AND POINTED OUT TO AGENT GAS TANK HE " PRESUMED " WAS INSTALLED MARCH NINETEEN FIFTYNINE. RUFFO DID NOT SEE ACTUAL INSTALLATION BUT SAW MEN WORKING ON GAS LINES LEADING THERETO. U. S. CUSTOMS, MIAMI, OF BELIEF THIS TANK WAS ABOARD VESSEL AT TIME OF SEIZURE DEC., FIFTYEIGHT. RUFFO ~~QUOTED~~ MET TWO WHITE MALES, SPANISH SPEAKING INDIVIDUALS, NEAR " RESTLESS II " EVENING APRIL THIRTEEN, LAST. ONE OF THEM ALLEGEDLY NAMED ~~QUOTE~~ MAZOLA ~~END QUOTE~~ - (PHONETIC) CONVERSED WITH RUFFO AND AMONG OTHER THINGS MENTIONED RUBEN MIRO AND OTHER PANAMANIAN. THIS PERSON CLAIMED HE WAS GOING TO JACKSONVILLE, FLA., APRIL FIFTEEN, FOR MEETING, NATURE UNKNOWN TO RUFFO, AND INVITED RUFFO TO GO ALONG. RUFFO UNABLE TO GO BECAUSE OF WORK COMMITMENT. RUFFO CLAIMS THERE WAS NO CONVERSATION RE ARMS, REVOLUTIONS, OR POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION " RESTLESS II " ON PART THESE INDIVIDUALS, BUT RUFFO STATED THESE PERSONS ~~QUOTE~~ " CAPABLE " ~~END QUOTE~~ OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. RUFFO ADMITTED DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR. RUFFO ADMITTED HEARING REPORTS IN PANAMA IN FEB. NINETEEN FIFTYNINE, THAT ROBERTO SAMUDIO, PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY, WAS IN MIAMI, ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS. RUFFO CLAIMS HE HAS NO FIRST HAND INFO THAT ROBERTO SAMUDIO IS, OR WAS, IN MIAMI, ALTHOUGH RUFFO ADMITTED DISCUSSING THIS INDIVIDUAL WITH PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR.

END PAGE TWO

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PAGE THREE

(u) [CIA IN REPORT APRIL FIFTEEN, LAST MAY BE REFERRING TO RUFFO AS UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT AND PANAMANIAN OFFICIAL MAY BE SATURNINO FLORES IN VIEW RUFFO-S CALL TO THAT INDIVIDUAL. BUREAU REQUESTED CONFIRM THIS THROUGH CIA.] RUFFO CLAIMS INFO FURNISHED BY HIM HAS BEEN EXAGGERATED BY PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR. RUFFO IS OF EXCITABLE NATURE, RAMBLES IN CONVERSATION, VAGUE RE DETAILS. IT IS BELIEF OF MIAMI OFFICE THAT HIS INFO UNWORTHY FURTHER INQUIRY. MEROLA STATED APRIL SIXTEEN LAST HE AND MIRO VISITED "RESTLESS II" THAT DATE AS MATTER CURIOSITY, REITERATED ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS FOR BELIEF SHIP WILL BE USED FOR PURPOSE PANAMANIAN OR ANY OTHER INVASION. VESSEL WILL CONTINUE TO BE SPOT CHECKED AND CAPTAIN PLACIDO GONZALEZ WILL BE INTERVIEWED UPON RETURN FROM CUBA. CUSTOMS ADVISED . INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. DENVER ADVISED AM.

END AND ACK

WA 2-32 AM OK FBI WA ELR

TU DISC

Orally Reviewed 4/17/59
 1) Mrs. Judy Brown, State, 10:00 AM
 2) Mr. F. Davis, 10:10 AM
 3) Mr. Palmer, 10:15 AM
 4) Mrs. Jane Roman, 10:30 PM

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IMMEDIATE

CITE DIRECTOR 87-0597

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1. FOLLOWING NAMES ON INDEET WATCH LIST. PLS REPORT ANY INFORMATION ON RE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING TRAVEL, OF THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED BELOW, WHICH IN YOUR JUDGMENT MAY EFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TRIP. [24]

] PLS ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS IF THEY ARE LISTED AS LAST BEING IN YOUR AREA. FORWARD ALL INFORMATION BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE TO HQS AND TO [15-9, 15-2, 15-1]

A. ALBEROLA-SURINACH, OCTAVIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 3/4/28 AT ALAYO, SPAIN. WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (REPORTED 3/18/70) ALIASES: EILARGO, JUAN AND SURINACH-ALBEROLA, OCTAVIO. CITIZEN OF SPAIN.

B. ALI-KHAN, TARIQ; ASIAN MALE, BORN 10/21/42 AT LAHORE W. PAKISTAN. LAST KNOWN LOCATION (REPORTED 7/28/69) LONDON, ENGLAND ALIAS: KHAN-ALI, TARIQ. CIT: PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN PP AC 063065.

C. ANTIMUCCI, ITALO DEMENIC; WHITE MALE, 5'3" 135 LBS BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 11/30/26 AT TIRANO, ITALY. LAST KNOWN LOCATION (REPORTED 4/21/69) PIAN DORTA, ITALY. CITIZEN OF ITALY.

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D. BLACK, ANTHONY JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 11/1/27 ~~REDACTED~~, IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION IRELAND REPORTED 7/8/64. ALIAS: BLACK, PATTY. CIT OF AUSTRALIA; AUSTRALIAN PP E382029.

E. CITRYNELL, HAROLD, WHITE MALE, 6'0" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR BROWN EYES, BORN 3/10/23 AT NEW YORK, N.Y., LAST KNOWN LOCATION STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 1/24/70). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP D757574.

F. COHN-BENDIT, DANIEL; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, RED HAIR, BORN 4/4/45 AT MONTAUBAN, FRANCE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY (REPORTED 1/24/70). ALIASES: BENDIT-COHN, DANNY; RADATZ, DANIEL; COHN-BENDIT, DANNY; KURON-MODZELEWSKI, DANIEL. CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

G. CONN, RONALD C.; WHITE MALE, BLUE EYES, BROWN HAIR, BORN 10/4/35 AT CINCINNATI, OHIO. LAST KNOWN LOCATION, RATTIS PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 2/17/70). ALIASES: COHEN, DONALD R.; CONN, R. CHRIST CLIFFORD. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP - J1322044.

H. CONWAY, JOHN EARL; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/13/24 AT TANTA, EGYPT BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, 5'5" 165 LBS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRIEDRICHSHOFEN, W. GERMANY (REPORTED 11/28/69). ALIASES: HARTRY, JACOB; HARTRY, JOHN H.; ELHARTRY, YACOB. NO CITIZENSHIP.

I. CORCORAN, THOMAS JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 123 LBS BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 4/23/46 AT BROOKLYN, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUND,

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SWEDEN (REPORTED 2/27/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP G944949.7

J. DAVIDSON, CRAIG; MALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION STUTTGART, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/1/70) (28 HEINRICH-BAUMANN STRASSE, STUTTGART, GERMANY). U.S. CITIZEN.

K. DAVIS, PAUL L.; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 155 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 10/29/26 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/24/69). ALIASES: SOLOMON, SAUL; KING, MILES A.; HEINBER, CLIFF. CITIZEN OF U.S. LIVING IN EUROPE.

L. DAVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL. WHITE MALE, 5'10" BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 8/4/40 AT IRELAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 6/5/69). ALIAS: DEVOREN, EDWARD MICHAEL. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN

M. DUTSCHKE, RUDOLPH ALFRED WILLIE; WHITE MALE, 5'7" 140 LBS, BLACK HAIR; BROWN EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON NW, ENGLAND (REPORTED 10/20/69). ALIAS: DUTSCHKE, RUDI. CIT OF GERMANY. W. GERMAN FENB43826 PP B1582611.

N. FALLET, VERNON ROGER DONALD, WHITE MALE, 5'9", 165 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 3/29/31 AT DEMPRESSON, SWITZERLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION NEUCHÂTEL, SWITZERLAND (REPORTED 11/7/68). SWISS CITIZEN.

O. GETZ, KARL IGOR; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 5/9/46 AT PARIS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH GERMANY (REPORTED 11/7/68).

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11/21/67). ALIAS: GOETZ, KARL. U.S. CITIZEN.

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P. GODDARD, MICHAEL ANTHONY VICTOR; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, BORN 11/29/29 AT HASTINGS SUSSEX ENGLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PORT TALBOT, WALES GB (REPORTED 4/4/68). ALIAS: GODDARD, MA: CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

Q. GONZALEZ-FLECHA, ROSARIO; WHITE FEMALE; BORN 10/28/36 AT SPAIN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/14/68).

R. GRANSAC-SADORI, ARIANE HENRIETTE; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 1/6/42 AT TOULOUSE, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE, (REPORTED 5/14/68). CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

S. GVOJICH, MILE; WHITE MALE, 5'7", 160 LBS, BORN 5/14/28 AT BRNJAVAC, YUGOSLAVIA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION SUBOTICA, YUGOSLAVIA PRISON (REPORTED 2/19/69). CITIZEN OF YUGOSLAVIA.

T. HERRANZ-FERNANDEZ, MARIO; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/28/36 AT SPAIN CITIZEN OF SPAIN. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 5/11/68). /

U. HILTUNEN, VILO ALARIK; WHITE MALE, 5'10", BORN 2/5/09, AT HELSINKI, FINLAND, LAST KNOWN LOCATION HELSINKI, FINLAND (REPORTED 4/22/67). CITIZEN OF FINLAND.

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CITIZEN OF FRANCE; FRENCH PP 231-65.

V. HUMMER, GISELE MARTHE; WHITE FEMALE, 5'0" 90 LBS, BORN 2/7/13, AT TOURS, FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION REPORTED 4/15/69, UNKNOWN. ALIASES: RICHE, GISELE MARTHE; DEHASBOURG, ANNE-MARIE.

W. JONSSON, HORDUR; WHITE MALE, 5'8" 187 LBS, BLACK HAIR, GRAY EYES, BORN 3/2/37 AT AKRANES, ICELAND; LAST KNOWN LOCATION AKRANES, ICELAND (REPORTED 12/15/66). CITIZEN OF ICELAND.

X. JULLIEN, JEAN; WHITE MALE, BORN 2/18/35 AT DELLE, FRANCE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 1/22/70). ALIAS: JULIEN, JEAN. CITIZEN OF FRANCE.

Y. KING, THELMA ESTELLA; LATIN FEMALE, 5'9" 163 LBS, BORN 1/31/21 AT PANAMA CITY, PANAMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 8/3/70). ALIAS: ~~YNLIXY~~ HARRISON, THELMA ESTELLA KING. CITIZEN OF PANAMA.

Z. KUHN, ROBERT; WHITE MALE, 6'4", 180 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 7/4/18 AT SIEGEN W. GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION MUNICH, GERMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). CIT OF GERMANY. GERMAN PP 67443204.

AA. LOCK, WERNER E.; WHITE MALE, BORN 12/3/34 AT BERLIN GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PFLUGERSTRASSE 3, AFG 1, WEST BERLIN,

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GERMANY (REPORTED 4/8/69). ALIAS: BOECK, WERNER. CIT OF GERMANY. 7

BB. LUNDGREN, ASA MONICA; WHITE FEMALE, BORN 11/25/30 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGBERGATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 5/11/66). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

CC. LUNDGREN, TORD ALVAR, WHITE MALE, BORN 7/10/34 AT SWEDEN, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LUDVIGSBERGSATAN 39, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (REPORTED 1/27/67). CITIZEN OF SWEDEN.

DD. MAHLER, HORST; WHITE MALE, BORN 1/23/36 AT HAYNAU SILESIA, BROWN HAIR AND EYES. LAST KNOWN LOCATION BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/10/69). CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

EE. MANCHANDA, ABHIMANYA; WHITE MALE, 5'7", BORN 9/4/19, AT INDIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/18/69). ALIAS: MANCHANDA, MANU. CITIZEN OF BRITAIN OF INDIAN DESCENT.

FF. MARTIN, EDDIE LEE; WHITE MALE, 6'1", 175 LBS, BLOND HAIR, HAZEL EYES, LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANKFURT, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/11/70). U.S. CITIZEN.

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GG. MIHAJI, JOSEPH; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, AT CEGLED, HUNGARY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON, ENGLAND (REPORTED 10/8/69). CITIZEN OF ENGLAND.

HH. PFISTER, RUDOLPH JOHN; WHITE MALE, 5'10", 200 LBS, BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 7/28/27 AT SEATTLE WASHINGTON, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BERLIN, GERMANY (REPORTED 7/29/68). ALIASES: PFISTER, RALPH; SOMERS, WALTER J; SOMERS, ROBERT WALTER; COUNTS, LYLE D. & COUNTS, KYLE. SWISS CITIZEN. U.S. PP 286011, SWISS PP 1197934.

II. RAINBOLT, CLYDE DUANE; WHITE MALE, 5'9" 142 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, BORN 10/19/42 AT LAFAYETTE, INDIANA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON ENGLAND (REPORTED 8/22/69). U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP J1306424

RIVERS, BARBARA
JJ. ~~RIVERS~~ JOYCE; FEMALE, LAST KNOWN LOCATION 20 TOWER RD. STRAWBERRY HILL, TWICKENHAM MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND (REPORTED 3/26/70). ALIAS: HABEOUS, CORPUS. CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN.

KK. ROMBOUTS, RAYMOND PIERRE LEON; WHITE MALE, 6'0", BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/31/29 AT ANDER LECHT BRUSSELS, LAST KNOWN LOCATION BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 2/26/69). CIT OF BELGIUM. BELGIUM PP 491147.

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LL. SALVATORE, MARCEL ALBERT; WHITE MALE, 5'5" 140 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 5/23/29 AT AVIGNON VAUCLUSE FRANCE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION FRANCE (REPORTED 2/20/70) CITIZEN OF FRANCE. FRENCH PP 211.

MM. SCHWARTZ, MOLLY THIA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'2" HAZEL EYES, BORN 2/3/54 AT NEWARK, N.J. LAST KNOWN LOCATION EUROPE (REPORTED 7/24/70) U.S. CITIZEN.

NN. SIMPSON, ALFRED WINSTON; NEGRO MALE, 5'11" 150 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN 1/23/30 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. LAST KNOWN LOCATION LONDON W. ENGLAND (REPORTED 2/14/69). LONGOLD REPORTS SUBJECT LAST H U.S. CITIZENSHIP. SUBJECT CARRIES A BRITISH PP AND CLAIMS BRITISH CITIZENSHIP.

OO. SLOVACEK, LAWRENCE EVERETT; WHITE MALE, 5'10" 245 LBS, BROWN EYES, BORN 4/3/31 AT PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA, LAST KNOWN LOCATION PARIS, FRANCE (REPORTED 5/17/70). ALIAS: EISLOVACK, LAWRENCE E. U.S. CITIZEN.

PP. SUMNER, FREDERICO O. BURNLEY; WHITE MALE, 5'10" BROWN HAIR AND EYES, BORN 2/25/24 AT BOSTON, MASS. LAST KNOWN LOCATION REPORTED 2/24/69 UNKNOWN. U.S. CITIZEN. U.S. PP 2549709.

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QQ. TOBES, NORBERT JACQUES; WHITE MALE, 5'4" 180 LBS, BALD
 BROWN EYES, BORN 2/7/16 AT LUXEMBOURG. LAST KNOWN LOCATION
 LUXEMBOURG (REPORTED 6/9/66). LUXEMBOURG CITIZEN. AND PP 11521.

RR. TOMIATTI, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, 5'8" BLOND HAIR, BLUE
 EYES, BORN 3/11/46 AT GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION - UNKNOWN 2/27/69.
 CITIZEN OF GERMANY.

TONE,
 SS. XEER, THOMAS JACK; WHITE MALE, 6'0" 200 LBS, BLOND HAIR
 BROWN EYES, BORN AT CLEVELAND OHIO, 10/5/17, LAST KNOWN LOCATION
 BAD WURZACH BAVARIA, GERMANY (REPORTED 2/27/69). ALIAS: BAKARICH,
 STATELESS; GERMAN PP 0046223; RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHIP
 THOMAS JACK. IN 1964; U.S. PASSPORT D 672328.

TT. VANPREUSS, RITA; WHITE FEMALE, 5'8" 125 LBS, BLOND HAIR,
 BROWN EYES, BORN 10/15/24 AT HERTE GERMANY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION -
 UNKNOWN (REPORTED 7/24/70) ALIAS: KLEIN, RITA. GERMAN PP 80197011.
 GERMAN CITIZEN;

UU. VATER, JOHN JOSEPH (III); MALE, BORN 7/2/48 AT ENID, OKLA.
 LAST KNOWN LOCATION U.S. ARMY, STUTTGART, GERMANY (REPORTED 6/1/70).
 U.S. CITIZEN.

VV. WALTER, WOLFGANG; WHITE MALE, BLOND HAIR, BROWN EYES, 5'8"
 BORN 8/27/23 AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION-UNKNOWN
 (REPORTED 2/27/69). GERMAN CITIZEN.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[Signature]

GROUP 1

~~SECRET~~

1	6
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SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO _____ BRANCH FILE NO
 FILE IN CS FILE NO. _____

FILE. VR.

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CITE DIRECTOR 070597

WW. WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGNEN MAREK; WHITE MALE, BROWN HAIR AND EYES,
 5'10" 160 LBS, BORN 1/9/41 AT WARSAW, POLAND. LAST KNOWN LOCATION
 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REPORTED 7/10/70). ALIAS: WILCZYNSKI, ZBIGNIEW.
 CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL REFUGEE FROM POLAND HAVING ENTERED U.S.
 AT NEW YORK, N.Y. 09/13/68; LNYUMA STATES HE IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT
 ALIEN.

XX. WOLLNICK, KARI (MRS); WHITE FEMALE, BROWN HAIR, 5'6" BORN
 7/26/36 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED 1/6/69).
 CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

YY. WOLLNICK, PETER; WHITE MALE, 6'4" BLACK HAIR, BLUE EYES,
 BORN 4/21/27 AT NORWAY, LAST KNOWN LOCATION OSLO, NORWAY (REPORTED
 1/6/69). CITIZEN OF NORWAY.

2. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/AS _____ E/BC _____
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 E/IR _____ E/I _____
 E/BNL _____ E/SC _____

JR

CI/OPS _____

E/TF _____

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2006

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Panama REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
SUBJECT Activities of the Family of Former President Jose Ramon GUIZADO DATE DISTR. 24 October 1955
NO. OF PAGES 3
DATE OF INFO. 9 July - 20 September 1955 REQUIREMENT NO. RD (b) (1)
(b) (3)
(C)
PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED] REFERENCES
DATE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. During the past three months the family and supporters of Jose Ramon GUIZADO have become increasingly active in their campaign to clear GUIZADO's name and to effect his release from prison, where he is serving a sentence of six years and eight months. [REDACTED] said that approximately \$200,000 was being spent on this campaign, which will reach a climax in October, when the National Assembly reconvenes. In this campaign members of the families of GUIZADO and Rodolfo ST. MALO, the alleged intermediary between GUIZADO and the assassins, are expected to publish evidence incriminating others. [REDACTED] has a copy of [REDACTED] letter which was written by Ruben O. MIRO, the confessed assassin, in which MIRO proclaims the innocence of GUIZADO and in which MIRO's position in the assassination is clarified. [REDACTED] said that before the trial MIRO's mother, who has the original letter, sent a copy to Harmodio ARIAS, who sent copies to President Ricardo ARIAS Espinosa, Alejandro REMON, Minister of Government and Justice, and the National Assembly. [REDACTED] said that Roberto "Tito" ARIAS, Panamanian Ambassador to Great Britain, was implicated in the assassination because of an illegal international monetary transaction which allegedly took place between him and Irving Martin Lipstein.
2. [REDACTED] said that the GUIZADOS had recently received information, for which they paid \$10,000, which consisted of statements from two witnesses who were present at a meeting [REDACTED] during which Jose Ramon GUIZADO's implication in the assassination was discussed. At an opportune time these witnesses will testify about this meeting.
3. Jose Ramon "Mon" GUIZADO, Jr., the son of the former President, left Panama City on 29 July 1955 for Miami, Florida, en route to Washington, D. C., where he planned to conduct family business. Felipe Juan ESCOBAR, GUIZADO's lawyer, implied that he had been consulted by Mon GUIZADO before his trip to the United States, and he had advised Mon as to whom he should approach while there. ESCOBAR also said that the GUIZADOS believe that the narcotics traffic was involved in the assassination and that GUIZADO will decide whether or not he is released from prison.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

4. [] said that when Mon GUIZADO returned from the United States Mon said that Russell Chatham, the U. S. investigator who was hired by the Panamanian Government to investigate the assassination, had told him that all the members of the Investigating Committee, including the two detectives from New York, had been bribed by the Panamanian Government, and that the only foreign investigators to be trusted were Israel CASTELLANOS, the Cuban, and Hernan MENDEZ, the Venezuelan. When Mon was in Cuba CASTELLANOS told him that Chatham and MENDEZ were the only reliable persons on the committee. [] said that Chatham, who is assisting the GUIZADO family in its campaign, will try to interest a friend of his in the Narcotics Division and will then provide the GUIZADO family with more valuable data.¹
5. [] discussed a recent article about the assassination which appeared in BOHEMIA magazine and certain statements which were published by Gaspar BILO Mendez. [] believes that it is significant that no leading Panamanian Government official has refuted any of BILO Mendez' statements. [] also believes that in BILO Mendez' reference to a diplomat and a top official of the Panama Secret Police (PSP) he meant Roberto ARIAS and Jorge Luis ALFARO, former Chief of the PSP. [] also said that ALFARO lived beyond his means for the position he held and he believed that ALFARO was involved in some illicit activity. With regard to this matter, [] said that Russell Chatham told him that ALFARO had made many inexplicable trips to Peru.
6. []
7. [] said that the GUIZADO family has been offered assistance in the form of arms and ammunition for a coup d'etat at any time that the family wants it. [] also said that the offer came from some high official in the Costa Rican Government, but he denied that it was President Jose FIGUERES. The offer was refused because the GUIZADO family believes that it can accomplish its purpose without recourse to such means.
8. With regard to the pro-GUIZADO propaganda which had been appearing in the Panamanian press, particularly in El Dia, [] said that the Panamanian Government was trying to suppress the violent criticism of its officials. President ARIAS approached one of the shareholders of El Dia who is pro-GUIZADO and threatened to ruin him financially if he did not dispose of his shares of stock in the newspaper. GUIZADO said that his family owns El Dia stock valued at \$10,000, and the family has been [] additional shares valued at \$4,000.
9. [] said that the GUIZADO family was debating whether or not to answer some of the remarks made by President ARIAS in his speech on 24 August. The family decided to publish an article in the New York Times stating that the trial was a travesty, because President ARIAS in his speech had quoted the New York press as commenting that the trial had been a just one.
10. Moises TORRIJOS, brother of Deputy Hugo TORRIJOS and friend of Ernesto DE LA GUARDIA, Jr., said that when DE LA GUARDIA, Jr. accedes to the Presidency he will grant amnesty to GUIZADO, ST. MALO, and Luis Carlos HERNANDEZ, and he will send MIRO to Coiba without a trial.
11. [] said that the GUIZADO family had recently received a letter from DIAMOND (Inu), who verified the fact that Representative Harold Velde had arrived in the Canal Zone as an official representative of President Eisenhower with regard to the narcotics traffic.² [] said that DIAMOND is a wealthy, influential Republican in Washington.

Field Comments

1. The Panamanian press reported that a rally sponsored by the Central Committee for Justice for Jose Ramon GUIZADO was held on 28 September, 1955. ESCOBAR

and Guillermo MARQUEZ, the attorneys for GUIZADO, spoke on the necessity for the revision of the trial, and Russell Chatham was quoted as saying that he would like to return to Panama because he could "get to the bottom of the question".

2. It was reported in the article in Bohemia written by Armando CRUZ Cobos that Representative Harold Velde arrived in the Canal Zone on 2 December 1954 in his position of Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and met with President REMON at the Tivoli Hotel to discuss the narcotics traffic.

SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL SPECIAL CONTROLS, IF ANY

INFORMATION REPORT

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

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COUNTRY
Panama

REPORT NO. []

SUBJECT
Personalities and Factors Affecting the Guizado Trial and the Assassination of Late President Remón

DATE DISTRIBUTED
3 JUNE 55

NO. OF PAGES
4

NO. OF ENCL.
(b) (1)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #
(b) (3)

PLACE ACQUIRED (By source)
Panama

RESPONSIVE TO
(C)

DATE ACQUIRED (By source) [] DATE OF INFORMATION (Date or dates, on or between which events or conditions described in report existed)
To 4 Apr 55

o/c Guide 164

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE []

1. As of 4 Apr 55, three men hold the political power in Panama. They are:

a. Alejandro "Toto" Remón, brother of the slain president; He is now Minister of Government and Justice in the Cabinet; has a reputation as a ruthless racketeer; is money-hungry; and has not the administrative ability and political experience of his slain brother.

b. Col. Bolívar Vallarino, First Commander of the Guardia Nacional, controls the only armed force in the country of Panama. He was a close friend of José Remón and is extremely close to "Toto."

c. Harmodio Arias, ex-president and owner and publisher of the Panama American, in English and Spanish, as well as of the notoriously anti-Gringo daily La Hora, which has the largest circulation in Panama. He owns a couple of radio stations and probably is the richest man in Panama. Now in his 70's, Harmodio Arias is still mad for political power. From all reports he would like to be president again. He also has four sons, of whom he would like to have president of Panama. Reportedly he paid an enormous sum to have his son Roberto appointed Ambassador to Great Britain. Roberto, incidentally, has been mentioned often in connection with narcotics smuggling under diplomatic passport while assigned to the UN. Arias's other sons are Harmodio, Jr., Gilberto and Antonio. The latter was reportedly found at Tocumen Airport on one occasion with a whole planeload of dope. At the time Antonio Arias was Aeronautical Inspector for the Panama government and was flying his own plane so when the discovery was made, he got back into the plane, took off, and no action was taken.

2. "Toto" Remón and Colonel Vallarino are 2/3 of the three-man junta who reportedly would like to take over in Panama. Whether Harmodio Arias would join them or would have someone sit in the junta while he remained in the background is not clear as of this date [4 Apr 55].

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
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STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI					
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DATE: JAN 2006

3. For several weeks it seemed certain that the junta would throw out President Ricardo M. Arias, who is able and honest and will not go along with the junta's rob-the-treasury ideas. The reasons why they have not done so, I hear, are based on the US's reportedly having informally advised Panamanian political leaders that three presidents in 15 days in January 1955 was Panama's full quota for this year. (Apparently another change of government in Panama would be regarded as proof of Panama's instability and the US would be loath to recognize any *de facto* government here in Panama--especially if the removal of able, honest Ricardo Arias were involved.)
4. Panamanian participants realize that non-recognition by the US means that the all-important US-Panama Treaty (called the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty here in Panama, signed in Panama City, 25 Jan 55 and ratified by the Panama National Assembly 10 Mar 55) will not be ratified by the US Senate, as it must be before it becomes effective. There are so many millions of dollars which will come into Panama as a result of the Treaty that even the racketeers hesitate to do anything to delay its ratification. Actually, the Treaty has enormous potentials for Panama, economically and politically, for it promises increased income immediately, offers the basis for obtaining multi-million dollar loans from US private banks, will increase business opportunities for Panama merchants, and reportedly will increase employment opportunities in the Canal Zone for Panama nationals.
5. The political control for disbursement of this income is being sought by the junta but their action must be delayed until after the Treaty is ratified by the US or there will be no ratification. Therefore, right now [early April 1955] although the proposed junta is anxious to get rid of Ricardo Arias, they cannot afford to do without him, for he's like the goose with the golden egg. In fact, it is said that the only way Arias is keeping the cabinet from robbing the country wholesale is by threatening to resign. There are many assailable pigs who want to have more than their fill from the government fiscal trough, and Arias is certainly having trouble with them.
6. Chichi Remon, it will be remembered, was a veritable dictator because he had the police behind him--with which he could back up his orders. Toto Remon, who is Minister of Government and Justice, although the titular head of the law and order forces here, with the commander of the Guardia Nacional, are on the opposite side of the fence from Ricardo Arias. Arias, in other words, does not have the tools to govern with. So much for the facts.
7. As for the rumors, which cannot be evaluated at the moment [4 Apr 55] there are many:
 - a. It is widely stated that Remon was killed for blocking the nefarious drug traffic from Panama to Europe and the US. He is said to have been cognizant of it and did not stop his cohorts from conducting it until the US got busy. It is rumored that the US said that if Remon did not stop the drug traffic, his precious treaty would not be considered by the US.
 - b. To Chichi Remon that treaty was the high spot of his life, his brain child, his pet project; so he capitulated. He issued orders to stop the drug traffic regardless of who got hurt--so many officials were making large sums of money that they are said to have instigated the assassination of Remon.

8. While this sounds melodramatic, there have been assurances of one fact--there is narcotic traffic from Panama to the US, and it is believed that an ex-president is head of the ring and that he has used his sons and political friends to aid in the distribution not only to the US but to Europe. [The foregoing, taken with earlier remarks, indicates that Harmodio Arias is meant.] It is not believed that this is a scheduled weekly or monthly operation with regular couriers, but rather a business of opportunity with the stakes so high that the cupidity of these local politicians is aroused. There is a belief that diplomatic pouches and official courtesies of the post are involved. And the smuggling, of course, includes other items than narcotics.
9. Ex-President Remón never permitted anyone, including himself, to make "treasury raids" on the government. He had made his pile while Chief of Police so that he could afford to appear honest as President. He severely censured his cabinet, officials and others for trying to make "side money" from the government through dishonest contracts, etc. While he cursed them publicly for their criminal activities and so brought hate upon himself, no one dared to stand up against ex-President Remón until 2 Jan 55. However, it has become increasingly clear that this rule did not apply to private industry--the "hands in the till" rule--for various officials were getting cuts from big business in Panama in new ventures opening up, in getting work done free, etc.
10. With Chichi Remón dead, the officials hoped to get some of the government money which was formerly denied them by Remón but Ricardo Arias forbids it. These people cannot bear to think of the millions under the Treaty which would be available for stealing if it were not for an honest president. Their only answer is: Don't have an honest president.
11. In this connection, the Junta will take care of that if it can get in power. And with Colonel Vallarino one of its leaders, who can stop it outside of the US? And its club will be removed if and when the US Senate ratifies the Treaty.
12. As for the Guizado trial, it was certainly unprecedented, with the National Assembly, which proclaimed itself a "court of justice," finding ex-President José Ramón Guizado guilty of being an accessory to the assassination of President José Antonio Remón on 2 Jan 55. Guizado, of course, was sentenced to six years, eight months' imprisonment which will be served at a location to be announced by the government. That the trial was a "farce", a "political frame", a "crooked piece of work", a "disgraceful travesty" can be heard throughout the Isthmus. One of the local newspaper editors in Panama told me "it stinks; the whole trial was crooked." But of course his newspaper did not say so and for the first time the reported freedom of the press in Panama seems to have disappeared, for usually there is at least one paper which will print the second side of a question. In this unusual situation the papers, the radio and all of the propaganda media were anti-Guizado. There was little or no objective reporting and it was a "fixed jury" from the start.
13. Actually there was no jury, for it was the National Assembly, a political organization like the US Congress, which constituted itself a court to hear a criminal case; it was a political body acting as judge and jury in a criminal matter. Normal juridical principles were thrown out the window. There were no witnesses in court; there was no cross-examination because there was no one there but Guizado to be examined. The trial was conducted by having the depositions taken from scores of people read to the Assembly.

There were 53 Assemblymen, of whom 45 voted to convict and eight to acquit. The depositions were taken by the Guardia Nacional or by an Investigating Committee which was out to "get" Guizado. Some of the statements read as "evidence" to the Assembly had already been repudiated by those who made them. Some of the individuals making these statements had been proved liars. But that was the evidence. Hearsay-evidence was the principal item...but in this case it was not even identified as hearsay evidence--it was offered as fact.

14. At the trial the principal purported evidence against Guizado was the confession of Ruben Miró, the alleged murderer of Remón. Miró has changed his story a dozen times already but he does not admit, according to the police or the Guardia Nacional, that he did kill Remón. The main inconsistency of the trial (which Panama's outstanding lawyers have labeled "a disgrace to Panama in the eyes of the world") is this: In addition to Miró, who says he killed Remón, the police are holding 12 other individuals (none of them important figures), each of whom is said to have known of the plan to kill Remón. Yet none of these individuals has been tried nor is slated for trial before July 1955.
15. Why was Guizado singled out for attention? It does seem preposterous to try an accomplice before trying the murderer and to convict the alleged accomplice on the testimony of the accused murderer.
16. Also appalling to those attending the trial were the obvious attempts of the government forces to influence the trial--not those controlled by President Arias, but those controlled by Minister of Governor and Justice Toto Remón and Commander Vallarino. Uniformed Guardia Nacional were observed handing out inflammatory anti-Guizado leaflets and handbills. Aircraft flew low over the Assembly building and dropped lurid handbills which the children and police picked up and distributed within the Assembly meeting while the trial was proceeding.
17. Mrs. Cecelia Pínel de Remón did not attend the trial itself, but one evening she sat outside the Assembly building in the park with a group of poor people. Many wondered if it was by chance that she was "discovered" by the press photographer so that the papers had her picture on the front page, grieving for her husband in public, as his mental assassin was being tried. Actually this was scheduled with the press. The whole performance made a bad impression on any unprejudiced individual who attended the trial or even studied it. All the Spanish radio stations carried the entire proceedings and the whole Panama nation listened to it via radio--there being no TV in Panama.
18. Even the people who were overwhelmingly opposed to Guizado at the start of the trial were so deluged with propaganda that they weakened to it and asked "why"; "who is forcing this propaganda on us?" and "Why?"
19. The most careful observers do not think that Guizado is an innocent man but they think he may be one of several cabinet ministers and prominent officials who planned to remove Remón because the latter was preventing them from racketeering. There is no reason to believe that Guizado contemplated violence, far less assassination, in removing Remón; for there have been many bloodless coups in Panama, where actually no president in 19 years has served a full four-year term. These observers believe that Guizado was implicated but that he is being made the goat for all the rest; and no one can say who, if any, contemplated murder to get rid of Remón. Apparently the Assembly had to convict Guizado to be sure he did not regain the presidency. After all, he was never formally removed until after his trial; previously he had been only suspended. If found not guilty he would have resumed the executive power. The Assembly had to justify its precipitate action of 15 Jan 55 when it impeached Guizado, suspended him and arrested him and held him incommunicado from family or lawyers, all on the flimsiest of circumstantial evidence. While they probably did right, they certainly had no legal basis for doing so at that time.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2006

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COUNTRY	Panama	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Ruben MIRO Repudiates His Confession	DATE DISTR.	17 February 1955
DATE OF INFO.	7 February 1955	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD (b) (1)
		REFERENCES	(b) (3)
			(S)

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

On 7 February 1955 the National Assembly Investigating Committee took Ruben MIRO to the scene of the REMON assassination, where he was asked to reconstruct the crime. At this point MIRO said that he did not murder REMON, and that he was forced to confess by Bolivar VALLARINO, Chief of the Guardia Nacional. On [] February 1955 Francisco ALVARADO, the original prosecuting attorney, said that he originally suggested to VALLARINO that the latter threaten the safety of MIRO's family in order to obtain a confession. VALLARINO did so and MIRO immediately confessed.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

STATE	#X	ARMY	#X	NAVY	#X	AIR	#X	FBI		SEC									
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(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

7-18-58

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

COUNTRY Panama REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT Remonista Attempt to Assassinate Ruben O. MIRO Guardia DATE DISTR. 2 September 1958

NO. PAGES 2 (b)(1)

REFERENCES RD (b)(3)

(S)

DATE OF INFO. 5 August 1958

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[redacted]

1. A group of Remonistas were behind the unsuccessful attempt on 4 August 1958 to assassinate Ruben O. MIRO Guardia, the Panamanian lawyer who was acquitted of the assassination of President Jose Antonio REMON Cantera.
2. The following Remonistas, supporters of Alejandro REMON Cantera, brother of deceased President REMON, were behind the attempt on MIRO's life: Efrain Barnett, a pro-Alejandro REMON deputy in the National Assembly; Henrique de OBARRIO, Alejandro REMON's brother-in-law and president/general manager of the Banco Nacional; Diogenes Alberto PINO, president of the National Assembly; Generoso Simons, a prominent member of the Partido Coalicion Patriotica Nacional (PCPN), as well as a trusted confidant of deceased President REMON; and Victor D'ANELLO, a member of the PCPN.
3. Homero VELASQUEZ received the money from the Remonista group and arranged for Thelma King, a close personal friend of Alejandro REMON, to make final arrangements with and pay the actual gunmen. The persons King hired were William PUIG and Carlos Rowe.
4. MIRO had been warned about a month ago by a personal friend who had learned of certain activities of Alejandro CUELLAR Arosemena and Alberto CUELLAR Arosemena; MIRO's friend told him to avoid frequenting certain places at certain times because his life was in danger.
5. While MIRO feared an attempt on his life would be made at some time, he did not feel that it would occur soon. It was MIRO's belief that there would probably be trouble in Panama if President Ernesto DE LA GUARDIA Jr. were to attend a "summit conference" at the United Nations, and that any attempt on his life would probably be made at that time.
6. MIRO had applied for permission to leave the country, but had been requested to rephrase his petition and to show his brother's acknowledgment as a sponsor. MIRO had prepared the petition and had gone to his brother's home for his signature. He had just left his brother Ricardo's home.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

STATE	EV	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "W". Field distribution by "F".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

7-18-59
SECRET [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

- 2 -

and had entered his car and was seated behind the wheel when the shooting began. MIRO saw neither the other car nor the gunmen, but recalls having heard the voices of two men as the other car drove away. As soon as the other car had driven away, MIRO sat up and drove away, not realizing where or how seriously he had been wounded. He did not try to follow the other car but thought only of getting to a hospital.

7. MIRO has made no statements for the Guardia Nacional (GN) or for the Policia Secreta Nacional (PSN). He did, however, give the names of PUIO and Rowe to Hermogenes DE LA ROSA, Attorney General of Panama.
8. MIRO [REDACTED] feels his request to leave the country will be granted, and he plans to leave as soon as possible, although he has as yet not decided where to go. He believes that another attempt on his life will be made if he is in Panama when there is any kind of trouble.

[REDACTED] Comments

1. All of these men have traceable close relationships with each other and with Alejandro REMON, who is a sworn mortal enemy of MIRO. MIRO originally confessed to the assassination of President REMON but later retracted his confession and was ultimately acquitted of the crime.
2. Homero VELASQUEZ has a record of involvement in anti-government plotting, illicit arms deals, and acts of violence. Rowe was once (December 1949 to August 1950) head of the Colon division of the Policia Secreta Nacional (PSN), during which time one William PUIO was listed as a PSN Colon division investigator. [REDACTED] that Rowe and his management of the PSN's Colon division were greatly influenced by Thelma King, a political opportunist of long standing. The Panama City press has reported the arrest, interrogation, and detention of Rowe and PUIO.
3. The Panama City press has reported the arrest and detention of Alberto CUELLAR Arosemena, one of the men who shared in the government's \$50,000 reward for the assassin of President REMON. CUELLAR supplied information which led to the arrest of MIRO and he later testified against MIRO at the latter's trial.

SECRET [REDACTED]

Re: Caribbean Political and Revolutionary Activities
Involving Cuba, Panama, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua

On the evening of May 11, 1959, MM T-2^X who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported as follows:

On May 11, 1959, JOSEPH R. MEROLA of Miami Beach, accompanied by two unidentified men suspected by MM T-2^X of being hoodlums, contacted ROLANDO MASFERRER, former Cuban Senator and newspaper publisher, now living in exile in Miami.

MEROLA disclosed to MASFERRER that he had just returned to Miami from Cuba where he had been in close contact with CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, exiled former president of Cuba, and also with both FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO and their sisters.

MEROLA told MASFERRER that RAUL CASTRO, who is commander in chief of the armed forces, CESAR VEGA and RUBEN MIRO, were in on every meeting held concerning the recent expedition of Cubans against Panama. MEROLA stated that RAUL CASTRO conceived the plan to invade Panama. MEROLA said that MIRO, a Panamanian instrumental in planning the expedition, had subsequently been taken into a "sort of custody" by the Cuban government in order to prevent him from directing and disclosing to the public the real facts concerning Cuban participation in this planned invasion.

MEROLA told MASFERRER that RAUL CASTRO plans to "kick out" Major PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, Chief of the Cuban Air Force, and his brother MARCOS DIAZ, his assistant, along with Captain ANTONIO SANSON, also a member of the Cuban Air Force. MEROLA stated that RAUL CASTRO is accusing these three men of accepting commissions unlawfully in connection with the purchase of some airplanes by the Cuban government. SANSON will allegedly be executed on RAUL CASTRO's orders to prove to the Cuban public that the CASTRO government punishes its own people as well as others for their crimes.

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RUFFO ESCORTED BY AGENT TO " RESTLESS II " AND POINTED OUT TO AGENT GAS TANK HE " PRESUMED " WAS INSTALLED MARCH NINETEEN FIFTYNINE. RUFFO DID NOT SEE ACTUAL INSTALLATION BUT SAW MEN WORKING ON GAS LINES LEADING THERETO. U. S. CUSTOMS, MIAMI, OF BELIEF THIS TANK WAS ABOARD VESSEL AT TIME OF SEIZURE DEC., FIFTYEIGHT. RUFFO ~~QUA~~IMED MET TWO WHITE MALES, SPANISH SPEAKING INDIVIDUALS, NEAR " RESTLESS II " EVENING APRIL THIRTEEN, LAST. ONE OF THEM ALLEGEDLY NAMED ~~QUOTE~~ MAZOLA ~~END QUOTE~~ - (PHONETIC) CONVERSED WITH RUFFO AND AMONG OTHER THINGS MENTIONED RUBEN MIRO AND OTHER PANAMANIAN. THIS PERSON CLAIMED HE WAS GOING TO JACKSONVILLE, FLA., APRIL FIFTEEN, FOR MEETING, NATURE UNKNOWN TO RUFFO, AND INVITED RUFFO TO GO ALONG. RUFFO UNABLE TO GO BECAUSE OF WORK COMMITMENT. RUFFO CLAIMS THERE WAS NO CONVERSATION RE ARMS, REVOLUTIONS, OR POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION " RESTLESS II " ON PART THESE INDIVIDUALS, BUT RUFFO STATED THESE PERSONS ~~QUOTE~~ " CAPABLE " ~~END QUOTE~~ OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. RUFFO ADMITTED DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR. RUFFO ADMITTED HEARING REPORTS IN PANAMA IN FEB. NINETEEN FIFTYNINE, THAT ROBERTO SAMUDIO, PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY, WAS IN MIAMI, ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS. RUFFO CLAIMS HE HAS NO FIRST HAND INFO THAT ROBERTO SAMUDIO IS, OR WAS, IN MIAMI, ALTHOUGH RUFFO ADMITTED DISCUSSING THIS INDIVIDUAL WITH PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR.

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AMMUG-1 thinks that Turner has a radio operator, but does not discount the possibility that Turner himself operates the radio. The DGI considers Turner capable and apt for the armed struggle in Panama. AMMUG-1 knows nothing of Turner's brothers (David of VAN and another in Mexico). (Other than Turner and Thelma King AMMUG-1 does not know of any other DGI contacts of VAN.

1. "Case Sonia" - Concerns Thelma King, who has been a CIS singleton agent for more than two years and is considered by CIS to be an excellent agent. Her FI coverage of the Panamanian Congress and the Canal Zone (she is considered to have excellent sources within the Zone) has been lengthy and detailed; during the January 1964 crisis she sent many reports back to Habana, including a large number of photographs. The majority of her reports are sent to her accommodation address in Mexico City. She uses radio communication for urgent matters only. While she was a member of Congress, the DGI also considered her as a political action agent. When Thelma King wants a personal meeting in Mexico with Rogelio Rodriguez, the Cuban Case Officer in the Embassy, she writes in S/W to her accommodation address in Mexico City indicating date and time of the proposed meeting. All the meetings are held at the Fondo de la Cultura, (see 1611 info (v)). These personal meetings according to AMMUG-1, are for the purpose of Thelma receiving funds for VAN, not for herself. Turner may also have a funding channel independent of Thelma. AMMUG-1 does not know if Thelma has ever had courier communication with Rogelio; he believes that she has not. AMMUG-1 thinks that her letter communication is one-way (to Mexico); that her radio communication is infrequent via the Turner radio (to and from Habana). AMMUG-1 knows of three letters containing S/W that Thelma has written to Mexico. The "Case Sonia" is handled by the Departamento Illegal, but Thelma also has close relations with the LN (AMMUG-1's department), as does Jorge Turner. She has a good code and good S/W system. She does not know how to operate a radio. She and Jorge Turner use the same radio code and her messages are transmitted via his radio. Thelma and Turner have been trained by the DGI in operational techniques (e.g. s/w, etc.) only. She has not received substantive political action or agent training.
2. The DGI supports VAN because it is a militant group and is for the "lucha armada." AMMUG-1 believes that the DGI has contacts within the Partido del Pueblo (PDP) but does not know identities.
3. AMMUG-1 stated that he believes that arms had been spirited into Guatemala and Venezuela (as well as funds, of course) for use by the 13 November guerrilla group and the FALN respectively, but that the Cubans had furnished funds to VAN in Panama, the FLN in Nicaragua and FRAM in El Salvador, for the local purchase of arms and ammunition. AMMUG-1 was not able to elaborate on this.

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instigated the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were quick to exploit the situation once it arose. CIA succeeded in photographing 13 Castro-ites who were engaged in fomenting the incident after it started. Of a total of 45 Communist Castro-ites involved, 13 had been trained in Cuba, and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio. CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians in the streets. Dr. Langer wondered if Panamanians and the world at large are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists. General Carter replied that one could not say that precisely, but it can be said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were inflammatory broadcasts on the air. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one sniper had been identified as a known Communist.

With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the bloodless coup which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals who are pro-American and anti-neutralist. General Khanh is the leader. General Khin, 3rd Corps Commander, will be chief of staff. The coup group had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong, and the new leaders will take stronger action. General Khanh has said that he will look to U. S. Ambassador Lodge for guidance on political matters in the immediate Saigon area.

General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from General Khanh that he was worried about French moves with respect to Vietnam. (In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial

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