

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS



OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

MARCH 31, 2016

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs) coordinates with the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the United States Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)

FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This is our fourth quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Two complementary missions constitute OFS: 1) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and 2) the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan. The objective of the NATO mission is the achievement of self-sustaining Afghan National Army and Police forces that are capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible Afghan ministries.

This report provides information on the progress of and key events involving OFS from January 1 to March 31, 2016. It also highlights oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and partner oversight agencies for the six-month period from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016, and ongoing and planned oversight work, as of March 31, 2016. Going forward, the Lead IG report will provide oversight information every quarter instead of on a biannual basis.

We remain committed to providing effective oversight and timely reporting on OFS to the United States Congress, U.S. Government agencies, and U.S. taxpayers. Our collective oversight work, and its summation in this report, demonstrates our collaborative approach to providing oversight regarding the OFS contingency operation and to promoting efficiency and effectiveness.



Glenn A. Fine
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense



Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors



Ann Calvaresi Barr
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On the cover: (clockwise from top left) Women serving in the Afghan National Police (U.S. military photo); An Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucano flies over Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force photo); An Afghan National Army soldier assigned to the Military Police Guard Command during qualification training (USFOR-A Public Affairs photo); NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (NATO photo); An Afghan National Army soldier provides security in Kandahar province (Stars and Stripes photo); Afghan security members walk alongside U.S. Army soldiers during a base protection patrol (U.S. Air Force photo).

MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL



Glenn A. Fine

I am pleased to present the fourth Lead IG report on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes key events this quarter relating to OFS, and it describes recently completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agency oversight work relating to this operation.

The mandate for the Lead IG agencies is to provide interagency oversight for this overseas contingency operation. To perform this function, we coordinate oversight activities among the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of State (DoS) OIG, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG, and other partner agencies, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

This report describes our view of developments affecting OFS, as well as the reports issued by the oversight partners over the last 6 months. The Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other oversight partners released 7 reports from October 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016, and had 24 ongoing oversight projects as of March 31, 2016. For example, ongoing projects are examining issues such as DoD contract management and support; efforts to train, advise and equip the Afghan forces; DoD progress toward meeting intelligence training objectives; and DoS support of counterterrorism activities. In addition, the criminal investigative components of the Lead IG agencies had 15 ongoing investigations as of March 31, 2016. These investigations relate primarily to procurement fraud, theft, and corruption.

Over the last 6 months, the Lead IG agencies have continued to staff their organizations with individuals who have the knowledge and skills needed to contribute to OFS oversight efforts. We have also continued our outreach efforts by interacting with U.S. government officials, conducting investigative briefings, and maintaining a Lead IG Hotline.

In this and future quarterly reports, we intend to report on our oversight work relating to OFS, rather than including descriptions of our oversight work only in a biannual report, as we have in the past. We believe this approach will provide a more useful, timely, and comprehensive document each quarter.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to conducting effective oversight of OFS. We especially thank the teams from across the OIG community who conduct this oversight.

Glenn A. Fine
Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense





Afghan security members walk alongside U.S. Army soldiers during a base protection patrol. (U.S. Air Force photo)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires that the designated Lead IG submit to the United States Congress a quarterly report on the contingency operation. This report provides the quarterly update on Operation Freedom's Sentinel. It includes an examination of the threat posed by Taliban and terrorist organizations, summarizes the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, and describes efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict during the second quarter of FY 2016. Additionally, the report describes efforts of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission to build the capacity and sustainability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Information concerning U.S. counterterrorism operations is classified. The OFS aspects of this report cover the period from January 1, 2016, to March 31, 2016; the Lead IG oversight activities cover the 6-month period from October 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016.

The overall security situation in Afghanistan remained unsettled this quarter, as Taliban suicide bombers struck several locations in Kabul in early January, and insurgents continued attacks throughout Afghanistan. Insurgents focused on Helmand province, the traditional Taliban stronghold, briefly capturing a district in the province. The ANDSF, which include the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), recaptured the province and prevailed in most other areas, preventing the Taliban from holding significant territorial gains. Although some in-fighting among Taliban factions and insurgent groups continued, the quarter ended with apparent consolidation of most Taliban forces under the leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, who announced the start of the Taliban's summer campaign on April 12, 2016. The Afghan-led effort to achieve a political settlement stalled this quarter when the Taliban refused to engage in peace talks.

At the beginning of the quarter, the United States considered the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) an emerging threat, particularly in Afghanistan's eastern provinces. However, in mid-January, President Barack Obama granted increased targeting authority against IS-K, and the ensuing U.S. airstrikes combined with offensive operations by the ANDSF degraded IS-K capabilities and slowed its growth.

The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission reported progress in building the capacity of the ANDSF through its train, advise, and assist efforts. Much of the NATO-led effort focused on the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of

Members of the Afghan National Police prepare for their graduation from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal course at Central Training Center-Kabul. (U.S. military photo)



Interior (MoI), where Coalition advisors have long exerted significant effort to strengthen critical managerial functions, such as budgeting, procurement, personnel administration, and logistics. Commitment letters, whereby Afghan officials agree to achieve certain conditions in order to avoid withholding of U.S. security assistance funds provided directly to the Afghan government, continued to be used and refined as an inducement to improve performance. Afghan implementation of automated systems to manage warehouse inventories, payroll, and personnel made incremental progress with advisor assistance. Some advances were made in expanding the role of women in the ANDSF, but U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) acknowledged that “there is still a very long way to go.”

USFOR-A assessed the performance of the ANDSF as “inconsistent,” with progress stymied by the challenge of building force capabilities while engaged in combat. Although ANP strength stabilized recently, the number of troops has been trending downward. Troop strength reduced to about 146,800 in February 2016, down from 155,000 in January 2015. Authorized strength level is 157,000.

AT A GLANCE

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

MISSION: U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS): counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and IS-K in Afghanistan; and support for NATO's Resolute Support capacity-building effort, which seeks to strengthen the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). OFS commenced on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan.

HISTORY: U.S. combat in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, in an effort to remove the Taliban government, which harbored the al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the U.S. and its Coalition of international partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, NATO-led forces retained the responsibility for national security, but encountered persistent efforts by the Taliban forces to recapture lost territory. The deteriorating security situation ultimately necessitated an increase in U.S. troop strength from 30,000 in 2006 to 39,000 by April 2009, with an additional 39,000 contributed by over 40 partner countries. However, Taliban combat success continued. In response, U.S. troop strength surged to 100,000 by July 2011, reversing Taliban momentum and enabling a gradual reduction of U.S. forces to 9,800 by December 31, 2014, when the NATO-led combat mission ended and OFS began.




Cost of Afghanistan Contingency Operations Since Surge of 2009
(\$ Billions)

2009	\$47
2010	\$96
2011	\$114
2012	\$105
2013	\$87
2014	\$84
2015	\$56
2016 (Requested)	\$43

CURRENT U.S./COALITION DEPLOYMENT

NATO forces are deployed to five ANDSF corps-level locations throughout Afghanistan under train, advise, and assist commands (TAACs) led by countries indicated below. This capacity-building effort focuses on eight essential functions that NATO advisors evaluate to measure progress.



Sources: DoD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2015; Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, 2/17/2016; DoD Budget Request Overview FY2006-FY2016, *Cost of War*, December 2015; NATO-Resolute Support, <http://www.rs.nato.int/>.

This quarter a major focus of Resolute Support was in Helmand province, where the deployment of additional Coalition advisors guided re-equipping and re-training of several battalions of the ANA 215th Corps. The Afghan government replaced the corps commander along with numerous brigade and battalion commanders and, with Coalition assistance, completed a rebuild of two battalions.

Coalition advisors also managed the distribution of 3,000 pallets of supplies to prepare the ANDSF for the spring/summer campaign, worked with counterparts to improve financial controls, and continued to refine the Afghan procurement process. Additionally, the United States delivered 4 A-29 light attack aircraft of 20 planned for delivery to bolster Afghan air-to-surface combat capability. The additional planes brought the total number fielded to eight. The United States also established ScanEagle drone sites to improve Afghan intelligence operations.

In a change of command ceremony on March 2, General John W. Nicholson, Jr. took command of USFOR-A and the Resolute Support Mission, relieving General John Campbell. During his Senate confirmation hearing, General Nicholson advised that he would perform an on-the-ground assessment during his first 90 days in Afghanistan to guide decisions regarding future troop levels.

LEAD IG REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT

The Lead IG is responsible for reporting on the oversight activities of the Lead IG agencies, including the status and results of our investigations, inspections, and audits, and future plans for those activities. During the

Selected Key Events, Jan. 1, 2016–Mar. 31, 2016

Early January	January 11	January 18	End-January	February 6
Taliban suicide bombers target several locations in Kabul	First meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) in Islamabad, Pakistan	Second meeting of the QCG in Kabul	U.S. initiates airstrikes targeting IS-K fighters in Nangarhar province	Third meeting of the QCG in Islamabad
January 5	January 14	January 26	Early February	
A U.S. soldier dies of wounds suffered during a fire fight in Helmand province	The Department of State designates IS-K as a Foreign Terrorist Organization	Taliban begin series of attacks that disrupt electrical power transmission from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Kabul	U.S. increases advisory footprint in Helmand province	

period from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners completed 7 oversight projects and were continuing work on 24 ongoing projects. An additional 15 projects are expected to be started in 2016. This report provides a summary of Lead IG oversight work completed during the last six months and oversight projects that are ongoing or planned.

The Lead IG is responsible for developing a joint strategic plan for comprehensive oversight of the contingency operation. In October 2015, the Lead IG issued the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan and a compendium of ongoing and planned oversight projects conducted in support of OFS. This document continues to be updated as additional projects are identified and the Lead IG refines its oversight strategy. On January 28, 2016, Glenn A. Fine, Acting DoD IG, led the 33rd quarterly meeting of the Joint Planning Group, where representatives of 10 oversight agencies discussed oversight projects and planning initiatives.

On February 12, 2016, Michael S. Child, Sr., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, DoD Office of Inspector General, testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, on the topic, “Assessing the Development of Afghanistan National Security Forces.” Mr. Child and four other witnesses testified on existing threats in Afghanistan, the strengths and weaknesses of Afghan forces, the sufficiency of DoD support to those forces, and DoD oversight of resources provided to the ANDSF. Based on past oversight work, Mr. Child provided a summary of capability challenges affecting the ANDSF and efforts taken to respond to those challenges, as well as a summary of the Lead IG role in Afghanistan.

February 22

Repairs completed to restore electrical service to Kabul

March 2

Change of Command: General John Nicholson relieves General John Campbell as Commander, USFOR-A and NATO Resolute Support

Mid-March

Taliban capture the Khan Neshin district center in Helmand province

February 12

The Deputy Inspector General for OCO, DoD OIG, testifies before a House Subcommittee on the capability of the ANDSF

February 23

Fourth meeting of the QCG in Kabul

March 5

Taliban announces its refusal to join the peace process

March 27

Afghan forces recapture Khan Neshin district, leaving the Taliban in control of the four districts in Helmand that it controlled at the beginning of the quarter





An Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucano flies over Afghanistan during a training mission with Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air. (U.S. Air Force photo)

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OVERVIEW

The Taliban-led insurgency continued attacks throughout the country this quarter, starting with a series of deadly bombings in Kabul and subsequently focusing on Helmand province. In this province, the Taliban retained control of four districts and briefly captured control of a fifth district until the ANDSF retook control of it later in the quarter. Taliban insurgents repeatedly challenged the ANDSF in efforts to achieve further territorial gains. Although unclassified sources vary in gauging the extent of Taliban control in Helmand, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, at the time serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO Resolute Support Mission, reported that Afghan military leadership successfully repositioned its forces in Helmand and held firm in defending key areas.¹

General John F. Campbell, outgoing Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan and NATO Resolute Support Mission, General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander of U.S. Central Command, and General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stand with Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah at Change of Command Ceremony, March 2, 2016. (DoD photo)

Although reports of infighting among Taliban factions surfaced periodically in media accounts, the extent of internal rivalries and their impact on insurgent capability remained unclear.² According to General Campbell, the threat posed by two major terrorist groups, al Qaeda and IS-K, diminished during this quarter as a result of successful offensive operations conducted by the ANDSF assisted by U.S. forces.³



U.S. and Afghan government officials continue to pursue a political settlement to end hostilities, but the prospects for a settlement dimmed this quarter as the Taliban refused to participate in direct talks with the Afghan government.⁴ The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), comprised of delegates from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States, met four times this quarter to devise a roadmap to peace, but postponed further deliberations until the Taliban is willing to engage in direct talks.⁵

New U.S. Commander of Coalition Forces

On March 2, General John W. Nicholson Jr. relieved General John F. Campbell as Commander, USFOR-A and NATO's Resolute Support Mission. The ceremony was held in Kabul before hundreds of NATO and Afghan partners, including Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah; General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Lloyd J. Austin, III, Commander, United States Central Command.⁶

In an interview with Reuters on April 4, 2016, General Nicholson emphasized that unrelenting combat during 2015 had a dual impact on the ANDSF—the army and police incurred extensive casualties and “had to stop training and fight all year.” As a result, General Nicholson explained, “this put us behind on our projections” for growing and increasing the proficiency of the ANDSF.⁷ During his confirmation hearing on January 28, 2016, General Nicholson



"So this is Afghanistan. There will always be some level of violence in Afghanistan...We're looking at [achieving] an adequate level of security to prevent the re-emergence of transnational terrorist threats."

—General Nicholson comment at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2016

committed to performing an on-the-ground assessment during his first 90 days in Afghanistan to enable recommendations regarding troop levels in 2017 and beyond.⁸

Scope of this Lead IG Report

In order to describe the environment prevailing during OFS, this report first examines evolving threats faced by the ANDSF, describes significant combat developments, and summarizes Afghan-led efforts to reach a peace accord with insurgent groups during the second quarter of FY 2016. This leads into a discussion of U.S. support for the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, an assessment of ANDSF capabilities based on information provided by commanders in Afghanistan, and an analysis of U.S. funding for OFS and related missions that totaled \$55 billion for FY 2015 and \$42 billion for FY 2016.

Some of the narrative in the first section of the report is based on information obtained from credible media sources because they offer timely accounts of events in Afghanistan during the quarter and supplement material available from government sources. The second section describes Lead IG activities and oversight projects completed during the first half of FY 2016, while the third section summarizes ongoing and planned projects.

THE EVOLVING THREAT

The Taliban pressed country-wide attacks while simultaneously confronting infighting among rival factions and competing with IS-K for resources.⁹ Despite the apparent unrest among insurgent groups, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Taliban is relatively cohesive under the leadership of Mullah Mansoor and predicted that fighting against the Afghan government would be more intense in 2016 than in 2015.¹⁰ Although the United Nations (UN) reported that the number of security-related incidents decreased in the first 45 days of 2016 compared to 2015, the intensity of insurgent attacks is expected to accelerate in April 2016 as the spring/summer campaign begins.¹¹

Taliban-led Insurgents Dominate

The Taliban-led insurgency continues to demonstrate that it remains an enduring threat to Coalition and Afghan forces. The Taliban now holds more territory in Afghanistan than it has held since 2001.¹² This quarter its focus has been in Helmand province where it retained control of four districts, captured but quickly lost a fifth, and threatened several other districts. As the ANDSF withdrew from certain locations in order to bolster defenses of key urban areas, the Taliban gained freedom of movement around the provincial capital, Lashkar Gar, a prime military objective.¹³ According to media sources,

An ANA soldier provides security along a highway during a patrol in Kandahar province which borders Helmand province. (Stars and Stripes photo)



large-scale Taliban ground assaults in Helmand are expected to become more frequent and intense during 2016.¹⁴ The media sources reported that General Campbell recommended that U.S. forces be granted expanded authority to target Taliban insurgents as one tactic to encourage Taliban leaders to engage in peace negotiations with the Afghan government.¹⁵

In his confirmation hearing on January 28, 2016, General Nicholson identified the Haqqani Network, a Taliban-affiliated insurgent group, as the “number one threat to our forces in Afghanistan.”¹⁶ Days later, General Campbell echoed that assessment, stating, “Haqqani Network remains the most capable threat to the U.S. and Coalition forces.” General Campbell called the Haqqani Network a “persistent” threat that was responsible for “the most vile, high-profile attacks in Kabul.”¹⁷ Additionally, DoD considers the Haqqani Network the most critical enabler of al Qaeda.¹⁸

The July 2015 appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani, operational commander of the Haqqani Network, as one of two deputies to Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor strengthened the network’s role in the Taliban-led insurgency. As a Taliban affiliate, the Haqqani Network continues to operate autonomously in Afghanistan and is capable of carrying out high-profile attacks across the country and in the Kabul area.¹⁹ According to the Congressional Research Service, the Haqqani Network has, in the past, acted on behalf of Pakistan

by targeting several Indian interests in Afghanistan – two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009 and the 2013 attack on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad.²⁰ Although more recent Pakistan military operations have sought to disrupt the Haqqani Network, it continues to obtain sanctuary in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where it represents a security threat to both countries.²¹

Al Qaeda, IS-K Weakened in Afghanistan

During his confirmation hearing, General Nicholson described al Qaeda and IS-K as transnational terrorist organizations that continued to seek sanctuary inside Afghanistan.²² In that way they are differentiated from the Taliban, a predominately Pashtun group that originated in Afghanistan, which has traditionally confined its operations to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and enjoys some degree of public support in Afghanistan.²³

According to the Director of National Intelligence, al Qaeda remains a global threat, but U.S. counterterrorism operations have degraded its leadership in Afghanistan.²⁴ In his congressional testimony on February 2, 2016, General Campbell noted that, although not extinct in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has been significantly weakened there.²⁵ According to DoD, al Qaeda remains focused on survival, regeneration, and future attacks, maintaining a presence in Afghanistan where it represents a threat to the United States and its interests.²⁶ However, more recent media reports indicate that U.S. officials are revising their estimates of al Qaeda strength. While earlier reports indicated that al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan numbered between 50 and 100, U.S. officials, quoted by media sources, recently estimated that the number could be as high as 300.²⁷

At the beginning of this quarter, DoD considered IS-K an operationally emergent threat and reported that the Afghan government considered it a “serious looming threat,” particularly in the eastern province of Nangarhar.²⁸ However, the Department of State (DoS) designation of IS-K as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 14, 2016, led to increased targeting authority for U.S. counterterrorism forces.²⁹ According to General Campbell, U.S. airstrikes combined with ANDSF offensive operations in January 2016 degraded IS-K’s operational capabilities and slowed its growth.³⁰ In February, Afghanistan became the 66th member of the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).³¹ In March 2016, President Ghani declared that IS-K was “on the run” after a series of military operations drove terrorist fighters out of remote districts on the border with Pakistan.³² However, General Shoffner described IS-K as “contained in Nangarhar province,” and the Director of National Intelligence declared that IS-K will remain a “low level threat to Afghan stability” in 2016.³³

General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meets with Lieutenant General Qadam Shah Shaheem, Chief of the Afghan Armed Forces, at the Ministry of Defense in Kabul, Afghanistan, Mar. 2, 2016. (DoD photo)



THE CONFLICT CONTINUES WITH LITTLE CHANGE

According to military commanders, security in Afghanistan remained tenuous but largely unchanged this quarter, as Taliban and other anti-government forces pressed attacks throughout the country but failed to destabilize the Afghan government or achieve significant territorial gains. General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Afghanistan in early March 2016 and described the conflict between Taliban and ANDSF as a stalemate, with the ANDSF having “some successes, some setbacks,” but overall proving “resilient; they stayed in the fight.”³⁴ In his congressional testimony in February 2016, General Campbell emphasized the limited success of Taliban forces. He reported that only 8 of 407 district centers were under insurgent control, while 18 were under insurgent influence. The main focus of the ANDSF, he stated, was to ensure that the key district centers did not fall under insurgent influence or control.³⁵

A survey conducted by TOLONews, an Afghanistan national news outlet, reported that insurgent attacks during the first 2 months of 2016 had dropped 25 percent compared to the same period in 2015 (from 1,438 to 1,084), while the ANDSF increased counterinsurgency operations by 15 percent.³⁶ This information is consistent with a UN review of civilian casualties in Afghanistan that found an 8.3 percent decrease in security-related incidents across the country between December 1, 2015, and February 15, 2016. Security-related

incidents, as tracked by the UN, consist of incidents related to armed conflict that cause injury or death to civilians. Armed clashes accounted for over 57 percent of the incidents, followed by improvised explosive devices at 19 percent, with targeted assassinations, suicide attacks, explosive remnants of war, and airstrikes accounting for the remainder.³⁷

The Fight for Helmand Province

According to General Shoffner, control of Helmand province, the traditional Taliban support base, currently constitutes the main effort of the ANDSF and the primary focus of Coalition train, advise, and assist efforts. Characterizing the security situation in the east, west, and north of Afghanistan as “manageable,” General Shoffner emphasized that the Taliban’s goal remains controlling the south, particularly the central Helmand region, which saw the highest incidence of combat activity this quarter. He noted that Taliban leaders have attempted to draw the ANDSF away from Helmand by staging attacks in “unexpected areas” of Afghanistan, primarily the north.³⁸

Helmand has long been one of the most contested parts of the country. The Helmand opium fields are among the most productive in the world and provide a significant revenue source—up to \$3 billion annually—for insurgents, criminal gangs, and corrupt government officials.³⁹ The province shares a porous border with Pakistan, where Taliban leaders are reportedly based, adding to its strategic value.⁴⁰

The Taliban accelerated offensive operations in Helmand province in October 2015, after attempting to divert the ANDSF by attacking and temporarily capturing Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan in late September.⁴¹ The increased level of Taliban activity in Helmand drew additional Afghan Special Operations Forces supported by their U.S. Special Operations Forces advisors to provide assistance to conventional ANDSF operations in the area.⁴² On January 5, 2016, in a major operation aimed at reclaiming territory held by the Taliban, a U.S. Service member was killed and two other U.S. Service members were injured when the Afghan Special Operations Force they were advising came under attack. At the time, Afghan forces were attempting to open the road between Marjah, an agricultural city in central Helmand, and the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.⁴³

Although the operation successfully opened the road, the city of Marjah fell under Taliban control by mid-January.⁴⁴ According to General Shoffner, the ANA 215th Corps responsible for security in Helmand suffered from several problems that limited its effectiveness, including poor equipment maintenance, unit attrition, and weak leadership.⁴⁵ A contingent of American troops was deployed to Helmand province in early February 2016 to provide base protection for the Coalition effort to rebuild several battalions of the ANA 215th Corps.⁴⁶ To

WHY HELMAND MATTERS


The Taliban and Afghan government are locked in an intense struggle for control of Helmand Province. Here is a look at Afghanistan's largest province.

Three Things to Know About Helmand

FIGHTING Helmand province always has been a Taliban stronghold with anti-government sentiment among some rural tribes. It is adjacent to Kandahar province where Mullah Omar founded the Taliban in the early 1990s. It was the scene of intense fighting by U.S. Marines and British troops against the Taliban during the surge in 2010-2012. After Coalition forces withdrew in October 2014, the ANA 215th Corps performed poorly. The 215th Corps is now being rebuilt as Afghan reinforcements, along with U.S. and British advisors and trainers, arrived in the area starting in late 2015.

STRATEGIC LOCATION Helmand contains an east-west route toward Iran and Pakistan, as well as smuggling routes to the south into Pakistan.

OPIUM The fertile Helmand River basin is one of the largest opium-growing areas in the world. Control of the area would give the militants supremacy in the illegal narcotics trade.





LASHKAR GAH The provincial capital remained under pressure from the Taliban but under Afghan government control as of April 2016. The Afghans once called the city “Little America,” because the Afghan government brought in the U.S. firm that built the Hoover Dam to undertake a major development project. The project, which began in the 1950s, involved construction of the Kajaki Dam and an extensive canal system that would turn the Helmand River area into the nation’s agricultural center. U.S. workers lived in Lashkar Gah in white-stucco houses with green front lawns resembling sub-divisions in the American Southwest. The project failed, with poor soil for crops among its problems. However, the province is now one of the world’s largest growers of opium-producing poppies, which thrive in poor soil.

MARJAH AND SANGIN The current Taliban offensive targeted the ANA and ANP in the towns of Marjah and Sangin and around the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah starting last fall. The town of Marjah was under Taliban control until a U.S.-led operation retook it from the insurgent group in 2010 at a steep cost to the Marines who spearheaded the assault. The mission was the first major operation following a 30,000-strong troop surge authorized by President Obama in late 2009. A U.S. Special Operation Forces soldier was killed, and two wounded, near Marjah in early January after they came under fire while accompanying Afghan Special Operations Forces in an advisory capacity.

TRIBES There are an estimated 60 Pashtun tribes and 400 sub-tribes in Afghanistan, many at odds with each other. (The Pashtuns comprise an estimated 40% of the national population; Tajiks, 30%; and the rest spread among Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkman.) At least four major tribal groups in Helmand are allied or are in conflict regarding supporting the government, supporting the Taliban, and/or controlling areas of poppy production and smuggling.

Sources: Lead IG;(DoD and USACE photos)





KAJAKI DAM The dam was built with U.S. funds in the 1950s, and the U.S. Agency for International Development installed two turbines in the 1970s to provide electrical power as far away as Kandahar City. After 2001, there was a plan to install a third turbine but it did not occur. The area was the scene of heavy fighting in 2007, and over the years Coalition personnel and contractors had difficulty getting to the site because of Taliban attacks, with travel largely limited to military convoy or helicopters.



strengthen ANDSF leadership, the Afghan government replaced the ANA 215th Corps commander and all brigade commanders in Helmand.⁴⁷

Shortly after the redeployment of U.S. troops, the ANDSF withdrew from two contested districts in Helmand—Naw Zad and Musa Qala—as part of a plan to strengthen defense at other locations, including the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Additionally, the withdrawal enabled more offensive operations and the evacuation of troops from outposts that were vulnerable to insurgent attack. The ANDSF troops were relocated to Gereshk, a town that straddles the strategically important Highway 1.⁴⁸

The ANDSF pulled back from some checkpoints in neighboring Uruzgan province in early March, reportedly in order to consolidate forces that had been depleted by combat losses and desertions.⁴⁹ General Shoffner noted that reducing the number of soldiers at checkpoints makes forces more maneuverable and emphasized that the ANDSF did not abandon cities because ANP units remained.⁵⁰

Those moves were followed by a series of Taliban attacks against several districts in Helmand province, where ANDSF and Coalition forces successfully repelled the insurgents, employing close-air support from the Afghan Air Force and Coalition.⁵¹ However, Taliban forces captured the government center of Khan Neshin district in mid-March, making it the fifth Helmand district to fall under insurgent control. Four other districts—Baghran, Musa Qala, and Naw Zad in the north and Dishu in the southwest—had been held by the Taliban since the beginning of the year.⁵² Although some sources indicated that the Taliban controlled over 50 percent of Helmand province by the end of March, Afghan authorities disputed that figure and promised a spring offensive to recapture lost territory.⁵³ A joint ANA/ANP operation reportedly regained full control of the Khan Neshin district on March 27.⁵⁴

According to General Shoffner, Taliban maneuvers at the end of this quarter were related to the poppy harvest which begins in late March. Because the poppy crop accounts for over half of the Taliban's income, the insurgents were positioning themselves to control the roadways, the networks, and other means needed to process the poppy crop.⁵⁵

Insurgent Activity Continues throughout Afghanistan

Although focused on Helmand province, the Taliban pressed random attacks throughout Afghanistan this quarter, beginning with a series of suicide bombings in Kabul. On December 28, a suicide car bomb on the Kabul airport road targeted a foreign military convoy, killing one civilian and injuring 30 others.⁵⁶ On January 1, a suicide car bomb was detonated at the security

Reducing the number of soldiers at checkpoints makes forces more maneuverable



Insurgent attacks are also focused on non-military targets, including power transmission lines. (USACE photo)

gate of La Jardin, a French restaurant owned by the governor of Kabul province. The restaurant is situated in an area that has several guest houses accommodating foreign workers. A 12-year old boy and a security guard were killed; 18 others were injured.⁵⁷ Three days later, on January 4, suicide bombers attacked in two locations near the entrance to a military base adjacent to Kabul's international airport. The first bomb appeared to have detonated prematurely, killing only the bomber. The second went off at the gate of a fortified compound that houses foreign contractors.

Sporadic insurgent attacks continued throughout the country, including several attacks focused on non-military targets: journalists, power transmission facilities serving Kabul, and Indian consulates.

On January 20, a Taliban suicide car bomber targeted a minibus in Kabul carrying journalists working for TOLONews, killing seven employees and wounding at least 25. TOLONews officials said the Taliban had openly threatened the media company, because it had reported on atrocities committed by Taliban fighters after they temporarily captured Kunduz City in late September 2015.⁵⁸ IS-K also threatened journalists in Nangarhar province, its main base of operations, and was reportedly responsible for a fatal attack of a local journalist in Nangarhar on January 29.⁵⁹ Five days later, two journalists employed by a radio station in Baghlan province were wounded by gunmen outside their home in the provincial capital.⁶⁰

The violence against journalists prompted public outrage over the dangerous working conditions of Afghan reporters, which led to calls not only to improve their safety but also to allow greater press freedoms. Days later, President Ghani issued a decree that had been in the work for months prohibiting arbitrary interrogations of journalists and prosecution of journalists without consulting the newly created Media Commission comprised of media and government representatives. Additionally, President Ghani directed police authorities to reopen cold cases involving the murder of journalists.⁶¹ According to International Media Support, a non-governmental organization that assists local media worldwide, the attacks in January 2016 followed an abrupt change in Taliban strategy toward the media evident in the months prior to those attacks. While in earlier years the Taliban had developed relationships with the media, the Taliban began to actively target journalists after the two largest Afghan broadcasters reported widespread criminal behavior by Taliban fighters during their temporary capture of Kunduz City.⁶²

Although disrupting electrical service has been a common insurgent tactic throughout the country, the first insurgent attack targeting Kabul's electrical supply occurred in January 2016. On January 26, Taliban forces destroyed one electricity transmission tower and damaged two others in Baghlan province, cutting the supply of electricity from Uzbekistan to Kabul.⁶³ Two weeks later, Taliban fighters destroyed a pylon and electrical circuits in Baghlan and Kunduz provinces, disrupting energy transmission from Tajikistan to Kabul.⁶⁴ Repairs were made and power was restored to Kabul on February 22.⁶⁵ According to a 2014 report by the USAID, over 77 percent of Afghanistan's electrical supply is imported.⁶⁶ That statistic is consistent with a more recent media source report that nearly 75 percent is obtained from Uzbekistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan via long transmission lines that are vulnerable to sabotage.⁶⁷

During this quarter, attacks were directed at Indian diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan, but these attacks could not be attributed to any one insurgent organization. On January 3, up to six gunmen launched an attack on the Indian consulate in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh province but were repelled by the ANP.⁶⁸ A second attack occurred on March 3, when a massive bomb blast was followed by a gun battle outside the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, a city in eastern Nangarhar province.⁶⁹ According to media sources, at least four previous attacks focused on the Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan, two involving the Indian embassy in Kabul (2008 and 2009), and others involving consulates in Jalalabad (2013) and Herat (2014).⁷⁰

On January 26, Taliban forces destroyed one electricity transmission tower and damaged two others, cutting the supply of electricity from Uzbekistan to Kabul.

VP Dostum Leads Aggressive Attacks against Taliban in North



Vice President Abdurrashid Dostum, an Uzbek former warlord who supported U.S forces in the post 9/11 overthrow of the Taliban, emerged this quarter as an aggressive counterinsurgency leader in the northern provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, and Balkh, where he reportedly is leading a 10,000-strong militia—outside the authorized force structure—against the Taliban.⁷¹ Sometimes referred to as “General Dostum” because of the rank he held while serving in the ANA,⁷² Vice President Dostum was active over the past years in leading local militias in Jowzjan, his home province, against insurgents without official sanction from the Afghan government. Because the government hesitated to defend the neighboring province of Faryab, Vice President Dostum mustered a militia numbering as many as 20,000 in summer 2015, independent of the government, to strengthen local security.⁷³ He joined the political process in 2014 by becoming President Ghani’s running mate, reportedly to strengthen Ghani’s appeal to Uzbek voters.⁷⁴

After taking office, Vice President Dostum tried to strengthen the Afghan government’s response to Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan. When those efforts failed, he reportedly activated a collection of private militias, in addition to some ANP and ANA units, in summer 2015 to fight the Taliban in the northern provinces. Although Vice President Dostum claimed that President Ghani was restraining his efforts to attack the Taliban using militia fighters, he proceeded to engage the Taliban in Faryab province in the following months.⁷⁵ Media sources subsequently placed him in northern Jowzjan province during October 2015 where he cleared a district of Taliban forces in cooperation with the ANDSF and expressed intent to conduct further offensive operations if ordered to do so by President Ghani.⁷⁶

Vice President Dostum attracted media attention again in February 2016 when he vowed to “finish the enemy [Taliban]” with his militia, even though President Ghani and foreign diplomats were encouraging Taliban leaders to participate in the peace process.⁷⁷ In late February, Vice President Dostum spearheaded an offensive operation in Faryab province, claiming to have killed 28 Taliban fighters, including several known Taliban commanders, and captured 120.⁷⁸ According to a Congressional Research Service report, the Afghan government has been allowing local factional militias to regroup in order to help compensate for ANDSF weaknesses.⁷⁹ The UN reported that, despite the official government position that militias will not be formed under any circumstance, branches of the Afghan government have been arming pro-government groups and supporting “national uprising movements,” as local militias are known.⁸⁰

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VP Dostrum Leads Aggressive Attacks against Taliban in North

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In late March 2016, according to media sources, a long-standing rivalry between Vice President Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, the acting governor of northern Balkh province and a member of Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah's opposition party, appeared to intensify as supporters of both Vice President Dostum and Governor Noor staged street demonstrations in the capital of Balkh to address perceived political insults. Although the two leaders had previously formed an alliance to fight Taliban in the northern provinces, the conflict between their supporters reportedly exposed political strains that could impact cohesiveness of the Afghan government.⁸¹ The rift between the two groups was short-lived, however, when supporters reconciled at the end of March and agreed to support the ANDSF.⁸²

Vice President Dostum is a controversial figure in Afghanistan. He supported U.S. forces ousting the Taliban regime in 2001. However, during that time between 200 and 1,000 Taliban prisoners allegedly died in his custody when they were sealed into shipping containers and left to suffocate. A UN-sponsored investigation team found evidence supporting these allegations.⁸³ In 2004, Dostum's forces seized control of Faryab province from ANDSF forces and ousted then-President Hamid Karzai's appointed governor. Vice President Dostum eventually backed down under pressure from the U.S. Ambassador, accompanied by threatening fly-overs of Dostum's home by U.S. B-1 bombers.⁸⁴

Unrest within the Taliban

Leadership struggles within the Taliban have surfaced repeatedly since July 2015 when the Taliban belatedly announced the death of Mullah Muhammad Omar, who led the group from 1996 until his death in 2013. In August 2015, in a selection process disputed by some high ranking Taliban officials, Omar was succeeded by Mullah Mansoor and two deputies, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the Haqqani Network, and Haibatullah Akhunzadeh, a cleric.⁸⁵ According to DoD, disputes persisted among senior Taliban leaders during this quarter, but did not appear to immediately threaten the Taliban's operational capability.⁸⁶ Mullah Mansoor's position was reportedly strengthened when the Taliban temporarily captured Kunduz City.⁸⁷

However, Taliban infighting escalated in October when dissident commanders expressed their intent to choose a new leader.⁸⁸ The selection of Mullah Mohammad Rasool as leader of the rival factions led to open warfare with forces loyal to Mullah Mansoor. According to media sources, gun battles in early November between the two groups in Zabul province in southern Afghanistan resulted in over 100 Taliban deaths.⁸⁹ Another conflict between the two rival factions reportedly occurred one month later in western Herat province and resulted in the deaths of more than 50 insurgents.⁹⁰

According to media sources, a ceasefire between the two factions was declared in January 2016, but by mid-February clashes between rival groups resumed.⁹¹ In an interview with Army Times, General Campbell stated, “We’re seeing a lot of infighting among the Taliban,” noting, “The Taliban have their issues...They can be defeated.”⁹²

Although the Taliban website claimed that reports of infighting were fabricated,⁹³ media reports disclosed heavy Taliban infighting during March 2016 in western Herat province, during which up to 200 insurgents were killed or wounded.⁹⁴ Additionally, in his March press conference, General Shoffner stated that three separate Taliban groups had emerged in northern Helmand province that may challenge Mansoor for revenue generated by the spring poppy harvest. General Shoffner stated that the splintering of the Taliban, “may provide opportunities for reconciliation, but the Afghan government has got to figure that out.”⁹⁵

However, the extent of internal rivalries and their impact on insurgent capability were unclear as this quarter ended. At least one rival faction reportedly reconciled with Mansoor’s group at the end of March. Although observers noted apparent consolidation of other Taliban forces under Mansoor’s leadership, the animosity between the Rasool and Mansoor factions continued.⁹⁶

ANDSF and Coalition Roll Back IS-K in Nangarhar

In April 2015, IS-K launched a series of attacks in Nangarhar province in an attempt to establish a base of operations.⁹⁷ In early January 2016, Afghan Acting Defense Minister Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai announced the formation of a special 750-person battalion, comprised largely by recruiting former Afghan soldiers, to counter militant groups in Nangarhar and other eastern provinces. According to Stanekzai, the new battalion would be based with the ANA 201st Corps in Laghman province and complement ongoing airstrikes by the Afghan Air Force against targets in eastern Afghanistan.⁹⁸ This battalion is not, however, within the authorized force structure that DoD and the international community agreed to fund.⁹⁹ Commanders of the Resolute Support Mission estimated that IS-K fighters in Afghanistan number between 1,000 and 3,000.¹⁰⁰

On January 13, 2016, IS-K staged a suicide attack on the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, Nangarhar, killing 7 security personnel and wounding 10 others. The next day, DoS designated IS-K as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and President Obama granted broader authority to target the group.¹⁰¹

Based on the new authority for use of force, U.S. military commanders launched a series of airstrikes against IS-K beginning in late January and

Figure 1.

Achin District in the Southern Part of Nangarhar Province

continuing into February. In combination with operations conducted by the ANDSF, these airstrikes successfully contained IS-K to the southern part of Nangarhar province.¹⁰² Enabled by continuing U.S. airstrikes in late February, Afghan forces conducted clearing operations in Nangarhar districts occupied by IS-K fighters, destroying the main military base of the group in Achin district.¹⁰³ By early March, according to General Shoffner, IS-K was contained to one district in Nangarhar, compared to four or five districts before U.S. airstrikes were authorized.¹⁰⁴ Speaking at the opening of Afghanistan's parliament on March 6, President Ghani said that IS-K had essentially been defeated in the eastern border regions near Pakistan, declaring "Afghanistan will be their (IS-K's) graveyard."¹⁰⁵

In an April 2016 media interview, Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, who recently assumed duties as Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO Resolute Support, stated that U.S. forces and NATO allies conducted nearly 100 counterterrorism strikes in Afghanistan this quarter, primarily targeting IS-K and al Qaeda fighters. As a result of those strikes, he estimated that the number of IS-K terrorists were now at "the lower end" of the 1,000–3,000 range.¹⁰⁶

UN Reports Highest Number of Civilian Casualties Since 2009


According to a UN report issued this quarter, 2015 was the deadliest year for Afghan civilians since the UN began recording civilian casualties in 2009. More than 11,000 civilians were killed or injured during 2015. The increase in civilian casualties coincided with an uptick in fighting between the ANDSF and insurgents, which resulted in 12,000 ANDSF casualties—a 20 percent increase over 2014. Highlights from the UN report include:

- Civilian deaths and injuries totaled 11,002 in 2015, compared to 10,584 in 2014. The UN attributed 62 percent of the casualties to the Taliban and other anti-government forces and 17 percent to pro-government forces. The remainder, most of which occurred during the ANDSF offensive operation to recapture Kunduz City, could not be attributed to either side
- The number of casualties attributed to Afghan security and other pro-government forces increased 28 percent in 2015 compared to 2014
- Conflict-related violence continued to harm women and children. Women accounted for 11 percent of civilian casualties in 2015 (up from 9 percent in 2014), while children accounted for 26 percent of casualties (up from 24 percent in 2014)
- Insurgents increasingly targeted hospitals, clinics, and health personnel—63 incidents in 2015, a 47 percent increase over 2014
- A sharp increase occurred in the number of attacks against government officials and facilities, resulting in 962 civilian casualties, twice the 2014 total
- There was a 112 percent increase in casualties that occurred during abduction incidents. The number of abductions totaled 410, a 39 percent increase over 2014, with 172 casualties.

The UN report concluded by making several recommendations to all parties involved in the Afghanistan conflict. The recommendations

Figure 2.

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Tactic and Incident Type, 1/1/2015-12/31/2015



Source: UNAMA Report, "Afghanistan Annual Report 2015, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," 2/2016.

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UN Reports Highest Number of Civilian Casualties Since 2009

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called for eliminating the use of indirect weapons in civilian-populated areas, ceasing the use of and clearing areas of improvised explosive devices, and ensuring that fighters do not use schools, hospitals, and other protected sites for military purposes.¹⁰⁷ A subsequent UN report covering the period from January 1 to March 31, 2016, reflected the continuing upward trend in civilian casualties, documenting an increase of 2 percent compared to the same period in 2015.¹⁰⁸


The increasing number of casualties has contributed to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, according to Mr. Peter Maurer, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Based on his visit to Afghanistan in March 2016, Mr. Maurer said that civilians were bearing the brunt of the violence and that “every indicator shows that the humanitarian situation is in a downward spiral.”

Because attacks against health facilities and personnel have increased 50 percent over the past year, according to Mr. Maurer, thousands of people cannot get medical treatment when necessary. The fact that Afghans are the second-largest migrant group arriving in Europe today demonstrates that chronic violence and insecurity have “pushed people beyond their limits,” he stated.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has had a permanent presence in Afghanistan since 1987. In terms of staff numbers, it is the organization’s largest operation in the world.¹⁰⁹

Figure 3.

UN Reports Highest Number of Afghan Civilian Casualties Since 2009



Source: UNAMA Report, “Afghanistan Annual Report 2015, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” 2/2016.

The Peace Process Stalls

In a March 2016 press conference, General Shoffner emphasized that the solution to ending the violence in Afghanistan required a political settlement among warring parties. He noted that a regional, Afghanistan-Pakistan approach was needed because insurgents operating in the area did not respect international boundaries. He stated that the United States had been engaged with Pakistan to achieve a political settlement and was pleased with Pakistan's efforts to pressure the Taliban to join the peace process.¹¹⁰ According to a report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pakistan plays a significant role in Afghanistan's stability.¹¹¹

The Ghani administration has shown a willingness to work with the Pakistani government on coordinated reconciliation objectives, which marks a departure from previous attempts at reconciliation.¹¹² This regional approach began in December 2015, with the formation of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), consisting of delegates from Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and China, to support an Afghan-led peace process.¹¹³ On January 11, 2016, QCG held its first official meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan. Delegates from the four countries emphasized the importance of ending the conflict in Afghanistan and called for direct talks between Taliban groups and the Afghan government.¹¹⁴

Three meetings were held in February 2016. At each meeting, the delegates reiterated their commitment to the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and refined a roadmap that stipulated steps in the process. On February 23, QCG announced that:¹¹⁵

- Pakistan would host direct talks between Taliban groups and the Afghan government expected to occur in early March 2016
- Pakistan and Afghanistan would form a bilateral working group to engage ulema (Muslim scholars) from both countries in the peace process
- Group delegates would meet again following the first direct peace talks

In March, the largest Taliban faction announced that it would not join the peace process.

During the ensuing weeks, the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States attempted to induce Taliban groups to engage in face-to-face discussions with representatives of the Afghan government.¹¹⁶ However, on March 5, 2016, the website representing the largest Taliban faction, which is headed by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, announced that no representatives of its group would join the peace process and that any rumors of Taliban participation were false. In the website post, which was confirmed by media sources, the Taliban reiterated three preconditions for any negotiations: 1) departure of foreign fighters (i.e., Coalition forces) from Afghanistan; 2) UN permission for unrestricted travel of Taliban officials; and 3) release of Taliban prisoners.¹¹⁷

Shortly after the Taliban web post, the United States renewed its appeal to the Taliban to join peace talks. The United States also noted that Coalition

and the ANDSF would prepare themselves for increased violence in the spring and summer months if the Taliban were unwilling to discuss reconciliation. Additionally, the United States urged the Taliban to “become a legitimate part of the political system of a sovereign, united Afghanistan.”¹¹⁸

A complicating factor in arranging peace talks with insurgents has been the fracturing within Taliban ranks. During a press conference in Kabul, the chief peace negotiator for the Afghan government, Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai, explained that the Taliban were not “a monolithic entity anymore” and that negotiations involved “several different elements under different back-and-forth ways of engaging them.”¹¹⁹ In one example of Taliban in-fighting, Mullah Mohammad Rasool, the leader of a breakaway Taliban faction, refused to participate in any negotiations that included Mullah Mansoor’s faction and alleged, through media outlets, that Pakistan was attempting to dictate peace process by dealing only with Mansoor.¹²⁰

Despite an apparent stand-off with Taliban organizations, the Afghan government reportedly held preliminary talks with representatives of the insurgent group Hezb-e-Islami in mid-March 2016, hoping that a negotiated settlement with the group could convince the Taliban to join the peace process.¹²¹ Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e-Islami, is a virulently anti-Western insurgent who has been responsible for deadly attacks against Coalition forces since the removal of the Taliban in 2001.¹²² However, Hekmatyar had reportedly offered to reconcile with the Afghan government in exchange for obtaining positions for his members in civil and security institutions.¹²³

"We're not going to kill our way out of this. There has to be some form of political settlement, reconciliation. The Afghans want to go that way."

—General John Campbell, U.S. Army, then Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, February 2, 2016.





Left to right: U.S. General John Nicholson, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Petr Pavel, Command Sergeant Major Delbert Byers. (Resolute Support Media photo)

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Beginning on January 1, 2015, NATO-led forces ended a dual combat/training role in Afghanistan and focused exclusively on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF. The objective is the development of a capable and independent Afghan security force that can protect the Afghan people and contribute to regional and international security.¹²⁴ According to DoD, the NATO Resolute Support Mission is carried out by over 13,000 personnel from 40 nations, with the United States the largest force contributor with 6,800 personnel.¹²⁵ Resolute Support personnel operate at five regional train, advise, and assist commands (“TAACs” that are aligned with the ANA) and a central hub in Kabul that includes a Resolute Support headquarters staff, ministerial advisors, and a small advise and assist cell that can deploy to assist the ANA that do not have a co-located TAAC.¹²⁶



Mission Focus: Eight Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EFs) to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces. Within the Resolute Support organization, a U.S. or Coalition general officer or member of the Senior Executive Service is assigned as the lead for each EF, with all Coalition advisors, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, aligned under their respective EF lead. Assessments of progress are conducted using Indicators of Effectiveness developed jointly by lead EF officials and their Afghan counterparts. (A list of EFs and their indicators of effectiveness is provided in Appendix A.)¹²⁷ Additionally, Resolute Support advisors assist the Afghan government in implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal rights to women. According to command EF briefs and information provided by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), gradual progress continues to be made in those efforts. The following are examples of activities this quarter.

An F-16 Fighting Falcon lands at Bagram Airfield after a sortie supporting ground operations in Helmand province. (U.S. Air Force photo)

EF 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute. Advisors provided assistance to both the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) on year-end financial closeouts. (The Afghan fiscal year begins and ends in December; fiscal year 1394 ended on December 21, 2015.) This assistance enabled the ministries to identify unexecuted resources that could be carried forward and applied to existing requirements. Additionally, Coalition advisors obtained signatures on MoD and MoI commitment letters that will enable CSTC-A to withhold DoD funds if the ministries do not achieve certain performance outcomes. In that regard, a portion of U.S. security assistance funding for Afghanistan—approximately \$1.2 billion of the \$3.65 billion appropriated in fiscal year 2016—is provided directly to the Afghan government, primarily to pay soldiers. About one-third of the \$1.2 billion funds Afghan government contracts, primarily for fuel and facilities maintenance. This quarter, Coalition advisors assisted in preparing prioritized procurement plans for the relatively small portion of overall requirements that are procured by the Afghan ministries using U.S. funds.¹²⁸

In March 2016, the DoD OIG initiated an audit to determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan government have implemented effective controls over the contract management process that obligates U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government. This project is one in a series of audits involving “direct funding” to the Afghan government for support of the ANDSF.¹²⁹

EF 2: Transparency, Accountability and Oversight. Coalition advisors continued to press for stronger ministerial inspection and internal control programs, but reported that progress was slow despite an improved commitment by MoD and MoI officials to fight corruption. Of note, EF advisors participated in an MoD asset declaration event, chaired by the Acting Minister of Defense on March 13, where senior leaders initiated the distribution of asset declarations (similar to financial disclosure forms) to over 900 high-ranking ANA officers.¹³⁰

Next quarter the DoD OIG will begin an oversight project to assess Coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist the MoD and its subordinate organizations in the development of their transparency, accountability, and oversight capabilities.¹³¹

EF 3: Rule of Law and Governance. Under this EF, Coalition advisors work to ensure that MoD and MoI have the processes in place to prevent, investigate, and prosecute human rights violations and corruption. Following this strategy, advisors promoted the establishment of a Counter Corruption Justice Center that is intended to pursue corruption on the part of senior government officials without being subjected to external or political interference. The Center is expected to begin operations in July 2016.¹³²

EF 4: Force Generation. ANA personnel strength decreased by 1,200 to 171,000 in February 2016. The MoD's attrition working group, composed of ANA officials and chaired by the Director of the General Staff, made 21 recommendations to improve retention and recruiting. Noting that the ANA suffers from weak leadership at all levels, Coalition advisors reported significant progress in establishing a variety of new, pre-command leadership training courses, three of which instruct commanders at the battalion, brigade, and corps levels.¹³³ ANP personnel strength increased by 1,800 to 146,800 in February. However, advisors found that MoI input of personnel data to the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) fell from 88 percent to 85 percent of personnel on the payroll and recommended a commitment letter penalty.¹³⁴

EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance. To prepare for the spring/summer 2016 campaign, EF 5 advisors helped Afghan forces distribute 3,000 pallets of supplies, 1,100 pieces of rolling stock, and 950 weapons to ANDSF units. EF 5 advisors sought to improve support operations by training 120 Afghan logistics specialists for assignment to warehouses in all regions and arranging a contractor-performed inventory of 4,400 shipping containers to reconcile on-hand quantities with data in the automated inventory control system known as the Core Information Management System.¹³⁵ Additionally, advisors assisted the ministries in assembling procurement packages for \$5 million worth of medical equipment.¹³⁶

EF 6: Effective Security Campaigns and Operations. USFOR-A reported that advisory efforts this quarter have led their ANA and ANP counterparts to better coordinate joint operations in all regions, particularly during the spring/summer 2016 campaign.¹³⁷ However, USFOR-A cautioned that sustaining those operations over an extended period was problematic. Potential leadership failures at lower army and police levels coupled with the unreliable resupply system pose significant challenges.¹³⁸ Additionally, USFOR-A observed that ANA/ANP implementation of Coalition recommendations often required significant time because the Afghans did not agree with them, frequently because of local and provincial political dynamics.¹³⁹ In response to the Lead IG request, USFOR-A stated it was too early to present a timeline showing when the ANDSF would be fully capable of conducting joint operations.¹⁴⁰

EF 7: Intelligence. Coalition advisors prepared the ANDSF for the spring/summer 2016 campaign by assisting in the deployment of intelligence gathering systems. For example, advisors trained Afghan soldiers to employ the ScanEagle drone system, including maintenance, launch, recovery, and ground control operations. The first ScanEagle site became operational in Helmand province on April 18, 2016.¹⁴¹ Additionally, advisors provided a network analysis course to 12 ANA corps-level personnel that enabled



A ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle prepares for launch in Helmand. (U.S. military photo)

students to identify insurgent support areas and operating routes using Afghan-derived intelligence reporting.¹⁴²

To evaluate the adequacy of Coalition intelligence training, the DoD OIG is conducting an evaluation to identify USFOR-A's specific measures of performance for determining whether the MoD collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence effectively and integrates intelligence into combat operations.¹⁴³

EF 8: Strategic Communications. Coalition advisors are providing assistance to information operations carried out by Afghan counterparts that is designed to improve public confidence in the Afghan government and the ANDSF.¹⁴⁴

Resolute Support Gender Office. Coalition advisors reported progress in MoD and Mol efforts to incorporate a gender perspective into planning for all policies and strategies. Accomplishments included the MoD appointment of an expert human rights and gender advisor, increasing the number of women in both the MoD and Mol, the approval of 57 women recruiting positions in the ANA Recruiting Command, and the recruitment of 150 women for overseas ANA training initiatives.¹⁴⁵

BUILDING MINISTERIAL CAPACITY

During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2016, General Nicholson emphasized the requirement to strengthen Afghan institutions. He observed that “Afghans fight extremely well at the tactical level. . . they are born fighters,” but stated that supporting those fighters required improvement of systems to recruit, train, equip, and pay them. He explained that U.S. and Coalition partners, with their Afghan counterparts, had built institutions—such as MoD and MoI—from the ground up over the last decade and that the U.S. and Coalition partners were continuing with significant effort to strengthen those institutions.¹⁴⁶

In a report to the United States Congress entitled, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” DoD reported progress in developing MoD/MoI personnel management, budgeting, and sustainment systems, but this report acknowledged that significant capability gaps continue to exist.¹⁴⁷

MoD MOVES INTO NEW HEADQUARTERS

The MoD staff moved into a new five-story headquarters building in Kabul that CSTC-A transferred to the Afghan government on December 28, 2015, 6 years after construction started and more than three times the cost. An inspection report by SIGAR completed in February 2016 found the building, with some exceptions, generally met contract requirements and appeared well-built. However, SIGAR was concerned there may have been some construction deficiencies that may have safety implications in the event of an earthquake and recommended that the Air Force Civil Engineering Center, which managed the building’s construction contract, determine whether these were risks.¹⁴⁸ The Center did an extensive evaluation and determined the building was structurally sound. In testimony to Congress on March 16, 2016, the Director of the Center said,

“...the structural design was performed in accordance with American codes and standards, meeting the code performance requirements to resist the high seismic demands at the site, both for the design of the structure itself and the bracing of the components in and on the structure. To date, the MoD HQ building systems have performed as designed for 12 documented earthquakes of varying magnitude and proximity, including a 7.5 magnitude earthquake in the Kabul region.”¹⁴⁹

USFOR-A reported that the occupation of the new building resulted in some improvement in staff operations and increased sharing of information among the functional elements of the MoD, such as intelligence and operations.



New MoD Headquarters in Kabul. (AFCEC photo)

Further, the establishment of the special operations coordination center in the new building has improved coordination and utilization of Afghan Special Forces.¹⁵⁰

THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE

One of the most significant challenges facing Coalition advisors is improving the quality of leadership at ministerial headquarters and at command levels throughout the ANDSF. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee this quarter, General Campbell repeatedly emphasized the key role that leadership plays in strengthening the ANDSF, stating that “at least 70 percent of the problems facing the ANDSF result from poor leadership.”¹⁵¹

According to General Campbell, Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, who has served as Acting MoD (without legislative confirmation) since May 2015, recognizes the leadership challenge and has taken aggressive action to address it.¹⁵² With full authority granted by presidential decree,¹⁵³ Acting Minister Stanekzai replaced over 100 general officers in the ANA, including the 215th Corps commander and all battalion commanders in Helmand.¹⁵⁴ He was recently cited by Secretary of Defense Carter for his steadfast MoD leadership.¹⁵⁵

However, General Campbell acknowledged that implementing stronger leadership takes time.¹⁵⁶ USFOR-A reported that as of March 1, 2016, there was no information available regarding specifics of general officer replacements or the impact of those leadership changes on units affected.¹⁵⁷ Although USFOR-A reported positive gains in replacing ineffective leaders throughout the ANDSF, it also cautioned that “the number of leaders to choose from is limited.”¹⁵⁸

General Campbell noted that leadership changes in the MoI were lagging, but some progress was evident this quarter with the February nomination of Lieutenant General Taj Mohammad Jahid, Commander of the ANA 207th Corps in western Afghanistan, as Minister of Interior.¹⁵⁹ He was confirmed by the Afghan Parliament on April 9, 2016.¹⁶⁰

To improve leadership capabilities, the MoD has sponsored three new, short training courses for senior leaders with Coalition support. Twenty-four prospective *kandak* (battalion) commanders completed the first offering of a 2-week pre-command course in December 2015. USFOR-A assessed the course as well-taught by Afghan instructors and considers it valuable and self-sustaining. A parallel course for prospective brigade commanders and their sergeants major was conducted in February and assessed as similarly effective by USFOR-A. The third component of the MoD training initiative is the capstone course for very senior leaders, comprised of one week in Kabul and one week at the National Defense University in the United States.¹⁶¹

AFGHAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL

DoD continues to emphasize the Afghan government's relationship with Pakistan as a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan.¹⁶² This quarter USFOR-A reported that, although the Afghan military-to-military relationship with Pakistan has been "tense and mistrustful," it is slowly improving, particularly at the strategic level. However, recent cross-border incidents have resulted in accusations by both countries in public forums. USFOR-A stated that the incidents have not yet significantly affected the military-to-military relations, which have progressed this quarter.¹⁶³

In that regard, negotiations on the new Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedure agreement were nearly completed this quarter, and USFOR-A stated there is a possibility the agreement may be signed in the next few months. The agreement provides a variety of methods for resolving conflict and replaces a previous agreement that became obsolete with the commencement of OFS. In the interim, the Coalition established a neutral venue, known as the Tripartite Joint Operations Center, where permanently assigned Afghan and Pakistani officers meet to exchange information and coordinate near-border activities. This quarter there was a series of conferences at the general-officer level to strengthen border communications and resolve local border issues. Although a "hotline" was established between senior Afghan and Pakistani military officials, USFOR-A reported that it was used only twice in January and has since gone unmanned and unused, because the responsible Afghan official

The Afghan military-to-military relationship with Pakistan has been "tense and mistrustful," but it is slowly improving.

deployed to manage operations in Helmand province. USFOR-A is awaiting a response from the ANDSF regarding its intended use of the hotline.¹⁶⁴

The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., continues to support engagements between Afghan and Pakistani military and civilian leaders designed to foster relationships, improve understanding, and build governmental capacity in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Confidence-building seminars that bring together Afghan and Pakistani leaders have been particularly effective in creating situations where both Afghan and Pakistani leaders are working together to develop implementable plans and procedures to improve border coordination.¹⁶⁵

GAINING LEVERAGE: COMMITMENT LETTERS

Commitment letters, jointly signed by the relevant Afghan minister and CSTC-A commander, establish performance expectations, set forth internal controls over funds authorized, and stipulate penalties or incentives that CSTC-A may apply based on MoD/MoI performance. CSTC-A uses commitment letters as one way to encourage Afghan leaders to demonstrate accountability and transparency in the use of U.S. funds. The objective is to ensure that MoD and MoI make steady, demonstrable improvement in personnel management, financial management, procurement, supply operations, and maintenance.¹⁶⁶

CSTC-A reported that the use of commitment letters with the MoD and MoI has met with mixed success. In some cases, the failure to meet performance expectations may be beyond the control of ministerial leadership, so the assessment of a penalty may be inappropriate. In other cases, enforcement might be overly detrimental to key capabilities required to maintain combat operations.¹⁶⁷ Based on lessons learned in executing commitment letters, CSTC-A has refined its commitment letters for Afghan fiscal year 1395 (which began December 22, 2015).¹⁶⁸ Examples of the application of enforcement mechanisms over the past year include the following:¹⁶⁹

- A CSTC-A audit recommended a reduction of \$680,363 in DoD funding provided to MoD when it was determined that MoD made improper purchases
- CSTC-A withheld \$1.7 million in DoD funding provided to MoI for failure to comply with commitment letter requirements pertaining to purchases of propane gas

The DoD OIG continues to audit direct funding to the Afghan ministries to determine the extent of commitment letter enforcement.¹⁷⁰ In the latest audit in that series, completed in January 2016, the DoD OIG found that CSTC-A did not have a strategy for providing oversight on MoI fuel contracts. Because security concerns limited CSTC-A's ability to perform on-site inspections,

oversight to ensure that fuel was used for its intended purpose was based on a review of consumption data provided by MoI. Although MoI did not accurately and consistently provide consumption data as required by the commitment letter, CSTC-A did not impose the specified penalty—a 25 percent reduction in the fuel allocation for deficiently reporting fuel use by ANP units. As a result, CSTC-A did not have reasonable assurance that fuel valued at nearly \$260 million supported actual ANP requirements and was used for its intended purpose.

The DoD OIG audit report recommended that CSTC-A: 1) assign specific oversight responsibilities to Coalition advisors for the MoI fuel contracts; 2) enforce commitment letter penalties for failure to report fuel consumption data; 3) develop reliable methods to verify MoI fuel consumption data; and 4) strengthen fuel reporting requirements in the MoI commitment letter. CSTC-A concurred with three recommendations, but noted that the verification of MoI consumption data would necessitate on-site inspections of MoI vehicles. It stated that such inspections by Coalition advisors were not possible because of personnel shortages and the unsafe operating environment.¹⁷¹

However, CSTC-A subsequently reported that the MoI Inspector General is scheduling routine inspections of fuel delivery sites and independently verifying monthly fuel consumption reporting.¹⁷²

SUSTAINMENT: SOME PROGRESS; GAPS REMAIN

Coalition advisors continued to work with their ministerial counterparts to implement logistics and maintenance systems needed to sustain the ANDSF. CSTC-A reported progress in various areas, but cautioned that sustainment gaps continue to exist because Afghan officials have struggled to institutionalize fundamental logistics processes. Coalition advisors observed that their Afghan counterparts are reluctant to adopt automated inventory tools, have limited familiarity with standard demand-based supply systems, and tend to hoard assets.¹⁷³

PROCUREMENT DELAYS CONTINUE

Procurement remains a challenge in both ministries, where the number of contracts awarded remains low and prioritized procurement plans were submitted months late.¹⁷⁴ The inability to award contracts in a timely manner resulted in MoD having over 150 contracts approved but not awarded by the end of Afghan fiscal year 1394 (December 21, 2015).¹⁷⁵ As a result, fiscal year 1395 funds will be needed to cover those contracts, but no contracts were awarded through the first two months of fiscal year 1395. CSTC-A reported that the impact of the slow procurement on ANDSF warfighting capability, however, was minimal because procurement of fuel, food, and critical

CSTC-A did not have reasonable assurance that fuel valued at nearly \$260 million supported actual ANP requirements and was used for its intended purpose.



An Afghan National Army soldier provides security. (U.S. Air Force photo)

supplies was accomplished on a sole source basis that met established commitment letter requirements.¹⁷⁶

These challenges did not affect fulfillment of the vast majority of requirements for the ANDSF—mainly for military equipment, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, maintenance, and spare parts—because those items are obtained through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system using DoD contracts. The DoD strategy for Afghanistan includes assisting the MoD and MoI in developing their ability to use the FMS system as one of their primary sources of supply, with the funding provided by DoD to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for procurement.¹⁷⁷

CSTC-A reported that procurement output was slower in the MoI, which has not fully adapted to procurement reforms initiated by the Afghan government in response to a fuel procurement scandal that resulted in the firing in early 2015 of senior MoD procurement officials. Additionally, CSTC-A stated that MoI staff lacks knowledge of procurement regulations, that personnel hesitate to sign documents for fear of being removed or reprimanded, and that the procurement directorate is unable to track requirements or report on execution.¹⁷⁸ The MoI did not submit a fiscal year 1395 prioritized procurement plan until February 2016 (4 months late) and only 24 of 597 requirements had been approved (compared to 237 of 326 at MoD). Coalition advisors are working with ministerial counterparts to prepare an initial plan for fiscal year 1396 requirements.¹⁷⁹

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT EVOLVING

Building the ability of the ANDSF to obtain supplies for and repair their own equipment has been a long-standing challenge for Coalition forces. CSTC-A attributes long-time gaps in sustaining equipment to a variety of systemic factors—failure to establish a life-cycle management program for equipment as the ANDSF was being built, little attention to materiel management, and difficulties in gaining acceptance at top management levels for the type of institutional change needed to achieve self-perpetuating systems.¹⁸⁰ Past DoD OIG assessments observed that, for many years, ANDSF units were able to obtain supplies, equipment maintenance, and other types of support from Coalition partners or Coalition-funded contractors. As a result, the establishment of Afghan-owned and-operated logistics systems received insufficient attention.¹⁸¹

USFOR-A reported that substantial systemic deficiencies continue to inhibit ANDSF readiness, sustainment maturity, and combat effectiveness. Although Coalition efforts have produced incremental progress in sustainment this quarter, USFOR-A assesses ANDSF logistics systems as lacking the level of timeliness, mission focus, and a sense of urgency needed to provide responsive customer support. In short, USFOR-A stated that the Afghan sustainment systems contain prevalent weaknesses including the failure to maintain accurate inventory records and track unit consumption, as well as the improper prioritization of maintenance operations by ANDSF leadership.¹⁸²

Because maintaining accurate equipment inventories is a critical sustainment requirement, Coalition advisors have worked with their ministerial counterparts to develop a life-cycle management program known as the Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool. This product is designed to identify authorized, on-hand, fully/non-mission-capable, and beyond-repair vehicles on a monthly basis. However, CSTC-A reported that the report is often late, sometimes not received, and of questionable accuracy.¹⁸³

According to CSTC-A, the ANA performs basic vehicle maintenance in-house, but continues to struggle with the systems and processes needed to improve ANA equipment readiness. The MoD relies on a contractor to perform more advanced maintenance and repair.¹⁸⁴ Over the past year, Coalition advisors identified a shortage of approximately 600 mechanics within the MoD. In order to alleviate this shortage, the MoD maintenance contractor developed an 8-week program to train personnel in performing basic maintenance. Over the past six months, over 250 MoD mechanics have been trained. Additionally, the contractor is training three to five soldiers in each corps on supply, technical, cataloging, and requisitioning procedures.¹⁸⁵

USFOR-A reported that substantial systemic deficiencies continue to inhibit ANDSF readiness, sustainment maturity, and combat effectiveness.



ANA troops move out from headquarters in Laghman province. (U.S. Army photo)

There have been some reports that Afghan maintenance units are removing parts from vehicles before turning the vehicles in to the contractor for major repairs. These parts are being used to repair other vehicles at the unit level, reflecting the shortcomings in development of the ANA supply system from which ANA units should be receiving needed parts. Because the MoI maintenance contractor performs 100 percent of vehicle maintenance, ANP units do not struggle to the same extent as the ANA to sustain sufficient vehicle operational readiness.¹⁸⁶

A key element of sustainment involves supply chain management—identifying, ordering, shipping, receiving, issuing, and inventorying consumables and repair parts. Coalition advisors have focused on enhancements to the basic automated system known as Core-IMS that has been the MoD and MoI warehouse inventory management system for the past 6 years.¹⁸⁷ Although Afghan authorities have been reluctant to embrace this system in the past, CSTC-A reported increasing acceptance of Core-IMS this quarter as its functionality improved. In addition, this quarter the MoD enhanced

warehouse facilities by assembling shelving units in several warehouses and installing fiber and ethernet to provide connectivity for Core-IMS. Additionally over 120 Afghan- contracted logistics specialists who were hired in 2015 have been assigned to numerous MoD locations to assist in managing supply chain operations.¹⁸⁸

The U.S. Department of the Army and CSTC-A continued to develop a single, new national maintenance contract to replace the gradually reducing contracted maintenance for both the MoD and MoI while increasing in-house capability through training efforts.¹⁸⁹ Improvement in Afghan maintenance capability will require development of MoD and MoI institutional capability to train maintainers at all levels to include officers responsible for directing and managing maintenance efforts. The ability to transition to MoD- and MoI-performed maintenance will require a significant investment in the development of Afghan maintenance schools as a critical component of long-term security cooperation efforts.¹⁹⁰

PROGRESS SEEN IN MOD/MOI MEDICAL CAPABILITY

According to USFOR-A, the MoD's air medical evacuation capability continues to improve. In 2015, the Afghan Air Force flew more than double the number of medical evacuation missions than it did in 2014 (3,169 vs. 1,243). In the first two months of 2016, the Afghan Air Force flew three times as many missions as it did in the first two months of 2015 (476 vs. 152). The missions were conducted by aircraft positioned throughout the country and continue to be a high MoD priority.¹⁹¹

Increasing the number of trained MoD/MoI medical personnel remains a significant challenge. As of January 20, 2016, the MoD reported that 85 percent of medical positions were filled, with the MoI reporting 74 percent filled.¹⁹² With the assistance of Coalition advisors, the ministries have implemented several initiatives to address staffing deficiencies. The MoI is strengthening recruiting efforts and offering sign-on bonuses for new doctors and nurses.

The MoD has increased the age limit for medical personnel (from 27 to 40) and increased incentive pay at regional hospitals and in units where vacancies have been difficult to fill. Additionally, the MoD is hiring civilian personnel to work in Army medical facilities.¹⁹³ Finally, CSTC-A will assist the ANDSF in procuring \$5 million of U.S. funded medical equipment next quarter, while the NATO Trust Fund will provide \$5 million for regional health facilities in Helmand province and for the national rehabilitation center.¹⁹⁴

"Ghost," or non-existent, soldiers on personnel rolls permitted bogus payments, while cash salary disbursements to lower ranking personnel through "trusted agents" have allowed senior officials to siphon those payments.

AUTOMATED PAYROLL BY MID-2017

CSTC-A continues to focus advisory efforts on two automated systems to achieve accuracy in accounting for personnel and integrity in managing ministerial payrolls – the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) and the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). These systems will replace fragmented and paper-based accounting methods that have enabled wide-spread corruption. "Ghost," or non-existent, soldiers on personnel rolls permitted bogus payments, while cash salary disbursements to lower ranking personnel through "trusted agents" have allowed senior officials to siphon those payments. By ensuring that payments are electronically made to the authenticated accounts of bona fide ANDSF members, the ability of individuals to siphon off payments or redirect them to ghost soldiers is reduced.¹⁹⁵

According to USFOR-A, MoD relies heavily on contractors to update personnel and billet information in AHRIMS. However, current efforts to ensure all MoD personnel are reflected in AHRIMS has been delayed because of software problems. USFOR-A anticipates that efforts to repair the data base should be completed by June 2016.¹⁹⁶

The APPS is designed to ensure pay accountability by linking AHRIMS to compensation and payroll modules, thereby establishing a single integrated system to process personnel authorizations, personal data, salary information, and payroll disbursements at the ministerial level.¹⁹⁷ However, for pay to be disbursed in APPS, an MoD or MoI employee must be slotted against an approved position in AHRIMS, hold an identification card with biometric data, and have a bank account capable of electronic funds transfer. The APPS is currently scheduled to come on-line for MoI in January 2017, and for MoD in July 2017.¹⁹⁸

INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL

With Coalition advisor assistance, MoD and MoI have each launched a program to employ Afghan civilians with requisite education levels and develop them into functional experts in specific management areas as part of a strategy to strengthen the civilian work force. The MoD program, known as Function Area Support Teams (FAST), will recruit over 300 young, college-educated Afghans, provide them specialized training in finance, procurement, logistics, information technology, or human resource management, and place them in positions at the headquarters or corps level. Phase 1 of the program, which began in November 2015, seeks to hire 64 employees. Through March 2016, 31 have been hired, with most designated to serve in the MoD procurement directorate, the ANA Materiel Management Center, or the finance directorate.¹⁹⁹

The MoI launched a similar program, known as the Subject Matter Expert program, in mid-2015. The MoI has since hired 254 Afghan civilians who are serving in a variety of areas, primarily in finance, procurement, and facilities management. According to CSTC-A, 60 finance subject matter experts have recently been deployed and have already made improvements in payroll accuracy and internal controls. CSTC-A reported that 10,000 applications for the program were received in January 2016, 2,000 candidates were tested, and 800 interviewed for the approximately 100 remaining positions.²⁰⁰

GENDER INTEGRATION – “STILL A VERY LONG WAY TO GO”

According to DoD, a range of historical, institution, cultural, and religious barriers continue to hinder female representation and influence within the ANDSF. Mitigating these challenges and finding innovative ways to increase the representation of women in the ANDSF and improve their promotional opportunities are key objectives for the Resolute Support mission.²⁰¹ For that reason, a gender office was established in Resolute Support headquarters. Coalition advisors assigned to the gender office work to ensure that advisors for essential functions consider the integration of women into all ANDSF activities as they carry out their train, advise, and assist mission.²⁰²

According to USFOR-A, it takes a great deal of unified effort and collaboration across multiple essential functions to implement initiatives undertaken by the gender office to expand the role of women in the ANDSF.

USFOR-A provided the following examples of initiatives that have been carried out by the gender office this quarter, including:

- Provided guidance and financial support for International Women’s Day events in March 2016
- Ensured that 5,200 gender-coded positions were included in the 2016 ANA personnel authorization document
- Provided assistance and financial advice to enable the Acting Minister of Defense to hire a well-known Afghan human rights and gender expert as his strategic gender advisor
- Pursued the establishment of 57 women’s recruiter positions for the ANA, developed recruiting campaigns for ANDSF women, and produced a training video for new recruits on respectful treatment of women

USFOR-A reported increased efforts by ministerial and deputy-level officials to expand opportunities for women in their organizations this quarter. However, USFOR-A cautions that achieving equal opportunity for women



A member of the ANP provides opening remarks during the MoD International Women's Day celebration in Kabul, Afghanistan. (U.S. military photo)

is a challenge in Afghanistan because of historical, institutional, cultural, religious, and geographical barriers. Societal attitudes in MoD and MoI currently limit women's opportunities for promotion and prohibit women from carrying out routine military functions (such as driving vehicles and carrying weapons). Although senior Afghan leaders and Coalition partners are attempting to mitigate some of these barriers, USFOR-A reported that "there is still a very long way to go" before Afghan attitudes regarding the role of women change sufficiently to enable full integration.²⁰³

A recent assessment of public perceptions in Afghanistan, issued in March 2016 under NATO sponsorship, concludes that the outlook for female recruitment into the ANP remains poor, as the overwhelming opinion (71 percent) is that such jobs are not appropriate for Afghan women. Most responders (75 percent) said they would never approve of their wife or daughter joining the ANP, and the majority of women (61 percent) said they would never consider a job with the ANP. Respondents who objected to women in the ANDSF cited a variety of cultural and religious factors. Another factor limiting the recruitment of women is the low literacy rate. The assessment found that 70 percent of women have no formal education and that 71 percent self-identified as illiterate.²⁰⁴

BUILDING ANDSF CAPACITY

USFOR-A reported that ANDSF performance remained inconsistent in early 2016, with improvements limited during the winter campaign due in significant part to the challenge of building professional, self-sustaining security forces while combating insurgents and terrorists.²⁰⁵ The ANDSF has significant capability gaps in areas such as aviation, intelligence, logistics, sustainment, and route clearing. Closing the gaps will require several years of intensive advisory efforts, human capital development, and considerable investments.²⁰⁶ Despite these capability gaps and developmental shortfalls, USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF does possess important combat resources that the insurgents do not possess, such as mortars, howitzers, armed helicopters, and armored vehicles.²⁰⁷

A key focus of the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission during the winter was to improve readiness reporting of the ANDSF so that its leaders would be better informed of unit status and can better target deficiencies.²⁰⁸ Rebuilding units will require recruiting at the corps level, improving readiness reporting, supply chain management, and potential unit consolidation.²⁰⁹ USFOR-A stated that senior Afghan leaders are only beginning to understand the necessity of readiness reporting and how these reports can be used to make decisions on resource and unit utilization.²¹⁰

USFOR-A stated that ANDSF leadership has accepted Coalition recommendations to reduce checkpoints (lightly manned security outposts) and consolidate forces in larger combat units.²¹¹ Checkpoints are a politically sensitive issue for the Afghan government because many local politicians and police commanders see them as a demonstration to the populace that the ANDSF are present in the area. However, a large number of checkpoints reduces the number of security personnel available for offensive operations, and leaves the Afghan soldiers and police at the checkpoints vulnerable to massed insurgent attacks, which leads to increased ANDSF casualties.²¹²

The ANDSF has significant capability gaps in areas such as aviation, intelligence, logistics, and sustainment. Closing the gaps will require several years of intensive advisory efforts, human capital development, and considerable investments.


AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)

The ANP is comprised of five main elements—the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti-Corruption Police (AACP), and the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). The Afghan Local Police (ALP), the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are part of the ANP, but are not counted as part of the authorized strength of 157,000. A breakdown of the ANP units is as follows:²¹³

- The AUP is the largest national police agency, at 86,000 authorized personnel, and provides basic police service, traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in all 34 provinces
- The ANCOP, with approximately 15,000 personnel, provides the primary offensive capability within the ANP, and reacts to insurgent attacks in remote and high-threat areas
- The ABP, authorized at the 22,000 level, is tasked with securing and safeguarding national borders—extending 50 kilometers into Afghanistan—and protecting Afghanistan’s international airports
- The AACP, at nearly 2,000 officers, provides specialist services like criminal investigations, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security details
- The GCPSU, with 6,000 personnel, is responsible for all MoI special police units and responds to critical situations, such as emergencies and hostage situations
- The APPF is a state-owned enterprise providing contract-based facility and convoy security services
- The CNPA, with approximately 2,800 personnel, leads the ANDSF’s counter-narcotics efforts nationally and in all 34 provinces
- The ALP, with 30,000 authorized personnel, provides security within villages and rural areas to protect the population and protect facilities, as well as conduct local counterinsurgency missions. In mid-2015, the ALP was placed under the command and control of the AUP

The ANP, with support from the Coalition, continued to confront a series of significant challenges, including a disproportionately higher number of casualties than the ANA, due to inadequate training and equipment, poor planning processes, and a sub-optimal force posture that left ANP forces vulnerable at static checkpoints.²¹⁴ In addition, the ANP was often influenced by local power brokers or misemployed as personal bodyguards.²¹⁵ The current focus of the ANP is to combine its capabilities with the ANA to fight

Figure 4.

Afghan Uniformed Police Zones by Region

the insurgency, but the long-term ANP goal remains the transition to a more traditional community police force.

Currently, ANP forces are often on the front lines with ANA soldiers during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations. However, ANP forces are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics. They have limited, if any, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, route clearance capabilities, heavy direct fire weapons, or substantial intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capability.²¹⁶ Other problems include corruption, desertions, substantial illiteracy, and use of drugs. Additionally, because ANP members serve the same communities in which they were raised, they often become improperly involved in local factional or ethnic disputes.²¹⁷

In its December 2015 report, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” the DoD rated the AUP, ANCOP, and ABP generally as capable, but not fully operational or effective. The report also stated that the AACP has developed highly technical and skilled capabilities, particularly in criminal investigations and anti-terrorism operations.²¹⁸ The Congressional Research Service stated that the ANCOP force is considered effective because it deploys nationally and is less susceptible to local power brokers than are other ANP units.²¹⁹

USFOR-A stated that a lack of an operational readiness cycle for the MoI's commando and specialized units—including a training phase, an operational (combat) phase, and a “reset phase” when unit troops take time off and their equipment is maintained—has degraded their effectiveness.²²⁰ The ANCOP and GCPSU often deployed multiple units at an unsustainable rate without a training or reset phase. As a result, Resolute Support efforts have focused on rebuilding ANCOP and GCPSU readiness and personnel.²²¹ As part of that effort, ANCOP is implementing a readiness cycle and building a new provisional brigade.²²²

In the MoI General Recruiting Command, leadership changes have occurred in the last few months, but USFOR-A stated that it was unknown as of mid-March what effects these leadership changes may have on long-term recruiting.²²³ Attrition levels for the ANP remained fairly stable at 3,000 per month, although USFOR-A reported a decrease in February 2016 to about 2,500. Additional human resource management advisors to MoI are expected to start in April 2016.²²⁴

ANP RESTRUCTURED FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY

The MoI continued to establish ANP zone headquarters in seven regions plus the Kabul area to better coordinate the activity of the different police organizations. Implementation of the decision to establish zone headquarters for the ANP began in 2015 in order to synchronize all policing activities within each area and to better coordinate with the ANA, which was already organized into regional corps. In the previous system, all 34 provincial police chiefs reported directly to MoI headquarters.²²⁵

According to USFOR-A, the reorganization of ANP units under seven regional commanders will improve coordination of policing activities and enable improved reporting of unit readiness.²²⁶ In January, USFOR-A assessed all of the police regional headquarters as “not rated” or “in development”—the two lowest rankings on a five point scale. (The remaining rankings are “partially capable,” “capable,” and “sustainable.”) The January assessment indicated that the zone headquarters were not yet capable of carrying out envisioned capabilities. USFOR-A estimated that all of the zone headquarters would be assessed as “partially capable” or “capable” by October 2016.²²⁷

WINTER SURGE IN ANP TRAINING

The ANP pursued a winter training surge to reduce the number of untrained personnel. The Police Institutional Advisory Team advised the ANP to send its new recruits to training after recruitment to reduce the number of ANP or ALP untrained police personnel that were being immediately assigned to units and conducting day-to-day operations.²²⁸ The winter police training consisted of

Women serving in the Afghan National Police wait to be recognized during the MoI International Women's Day celebration in Kabul, Afghanistan. The women were among the 389 graduates of Basic Police Officer Training in Sivas, Turkey. (U.S. military photo)



the initial training course (30 days), the initial police training course (8 weeks), and the noncommissioned officer course (6 months). All courses are conducted by ANP instructors at regional training centers. The 8-week basic course was designed to give an entry-level police recruit the necessary skills to perform the job, ranging from using a radio and an AK-47 assault rifle to preliminary medic training and lawful use of force. However, the ANP did not establish any measures to assess the competence of the trainers or the competence of the instruction provided in each respective course.²²⁹

The MoI reported that the winter surge resulted in approximately 22,000 personnel completing training since October 1, 2015. As of March 6, 2016, the MoI reported that 14,118 ANP personnel still require training. ALP and AUP had the largest untrained numbers, at 5,817 and 4,672 respectively.²³⁰

REFORMING OF AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE CONTINUES

ALP reform proceeded with slow but steady enrollment of ALP personnel into the personnel management system AHRIMS, the ongoing reduction of unassessed ALP districts, and a verification of all ALP personnel within those districts by mobile ALP assessment teams from MoI headquarters. According to USFOR-A, the assessments will be concluded by early spring, provided there is access to some of the more remote and hostile districts.²³¹

Initiatives to improve support to the ALP began in 2015, spurred by an internal MoI assessment and an October 2015 audit by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).²³² The SIGAR audit found that despite

DoD efforts since 2010 to train and equip the ALP, the force lacked adequate logistics support and oversight. In addition, the audit found that while the ALP was the first line of defense in many villages, its supplies were often diverted, delayed, of inferior quality, or heavily pilfered. Furthermore, SIGAR found that some ALP personnel were inappropriately used as bodyguards for Afghan government officials, a direct violation of regulations. The U.S. commands concurred with all seven of SIGAR's recommendations to improve ALP operations.

In November 2015, the MoI approved the results of an internal assessment of ALP districts that resulted in eight initiatives to address deficiencies found. USFOR-A provided the following unclassified summary of those initiatives:²³³

1. ALP Command and Control Change. The command and control has been reorganized and realigned as the ALP staff directorate
2. Self-Assessment and Reform
3. ALP Logistical Reform. A memorandum of understanding between MoD and MoI was signed to allow MoD central supply to support ALP
4. Ghost ALP and ALP Working for Powerbrokers. Verification of this reallocation was to be in subsequent ALP personnel strength reports
5. Mobile Money and Electronic Funds Transfer. The first mobile money pilot was successfully implemented in Kapisa Province. Current efforts are focused on registering ALP Guardians in Paktiya province
6. ALP Leadership Training. Two logistical *shuras* ("counsel of elders") were held with focus on ALP logistical supplies accountability and distribution
7. ALP Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS). 100 percent of the ALP *tashkil* (the official list of personnel and equipment requirements) was loaded in database
8. ALP training. Winter training surge workshops planned

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

In March 2016, USFOR-A reported that ANA performance continues to be inconsistent and that improvements in fighting capability were limited during the winter campaign. However, USFOR-A stated that the ANA is capable of retaining and retaking key terrain and denying insurgent forces their strategic objectives.²³⁴

On June 1, 2015, the MoD Chief of General Staff signed a new ANA manpower plan. The plan's stated objective was to grow the Army to approximately 187,000 by March 2016, compared to a total authorized strength of 195,000.²³⁵ However, as of February 2016, force strength was at 171,000. USFOR-A explained that ANA manpower problems can be traced back to a significant attrition problem, which has multiple causes, including poor leadership, continual combat operations, shortages of individual equipment, and difficulty in traveling to and from home during leave.²³⁶ In its response to a Lead IG request for information concerning ANP staffing, USFOR-A cited, without providing specifics, that there have been significant improvements in ANP recruiting, but less so with the ANA.²³⁷

ANA STRUCTURE

The ANA is divided into one division and six regional corps that cover the entire country: 111th Capital Division (Kabul city), 201st Corps (east), 203rd Corps (central-east), 205th Corps (southeast), 207th Corps (west), 209th Corps (north), and 215th Corps (southwest).²³⁸ Each corps is comprised of a headquarters *kandak* (battalion), three or four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*.²³⁹ These corps vary in size, and the number of soldiers on duty at any given time is likely lower than official figures because of absenteeism and the persistent problem of “ghost soldiers” who exist only on paper.²⁴⁰ In addition, there are two Mobile Strike Force brigades that have medium armored vehicles and are designed for rapid expeditionary employment in offensive operations.²⁴¹

ANA LEADERSHIP

A recurrent theme in USFOR-A assessments of the ANA is that leadership weaknesses exist at every command level — from strategic (MoD), to the operational (corps and brigade), and tactical levels (*kandaks*).²⁴² In October 2015, President Ghani nominated 61 new general officers and senior ranking officials for MoD positions. In addition, the corps commander and brigade commanders of the ANA 215th Corps were replaced.²⁴³ DoD officials reported that these and other leadership changes throughout 2015 have been mostly positive, though the lack of depth in the ANA leadership cadre has at times led to ineffective officers being transitioned from one position to another.²⁴⁴

ANA manpower problems can be traced back to a significant attrition problem, which has multiple causes, including poor leadership, continual combat operations, shortages of individual equipment, and difficulty in traveling to and from home during leave.



ANA soldiers fire the M-16 rifle during qualification training at Bagram Air Field's Maholic Range. (USFOR-A photo)

During an interview with the Army Times on February 16, 2016, General Campbell stated:

I'm encouraged that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the army have made some good changes over the last couple months in their general officers. They've changed out 102 or 103 in the last couple months. Everywhere they've made those changes, I've seen a difference. Leadership makes a difference. Where they're putting the right leadership in place, it's making a difference in attrition, taking care of soldiers, readiness of equipment, readiness of vehicles, [and] readiness of their people.²⁴⁵

AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES (ASSF)

The three MoD components of the ASSF—the ANA Special Operations Command, a light infantry battalion known as the *Ktah Khas*, and the Special Mission Wing—continue to demonstrate that they are the most capable fighting force within the ANDSF and, as a result, are in the greatest demand by commanders and have the highest operational tempo.²⁴⁶ The ASSF demonstrated throughout the summer campaign in 2015 and winter campaign in 2015-16 the potential to promote regional stability through counterterrorism capabilities.²⁴⁷

USFOR-A stated that the ASSF continues to face substantial challenges with logistics, aviation, intelligence fusion, and mission command.²⁴⁸ USFOR-A also stated that the ASSF is effective as a tactical force and has the ability to achieve operational success where other Afghan security units have failed. In addition, the ASSF was successful in neutralizing high-profile attacks and denying terrorists safe-haven, thereby preventing the enemy from achieving its operational objectives.²⁴⁹

Furthermore, DoD expressed concerns that the ASSF is being over-used in conventional combat roles and that its high operational tempo risks combat weariness and resultant degraded effectiveness. ASSF forces are frequently deployed to emerging threat areas to conduct clearing operations and bolster struggling conventional forces. Additionally, ASSF commandos are often used as holding forces after successful operations, because ANP and ANA forces provided limited security after areas are cleared of insurgents.²⁵⁰

In March 2016, the DoD OIG conducted in-country fieldwork as part of an oversight project to determine whether Coalition and MoD plans and resources used to train the ASSF are sufficient, operative, and relevant.²⁵¹

AFGHAN AIR FORCE (AAF)

The AAF capabilities are increasing, with over 95 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft that conduct combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. The AAF aircraft inventory consists of A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, MD-530 close air attack helicopters, Mi-35 multi-role helicopters, Mi-17 multi-role helicopters, C-208 light-lift transport aircraft, and C-130 medium-lift transport aircraft. In order to provide combat and combat service support to the Afghan soldiers, the three major AAF aircraft wings are located in the Shindand district of western Herat province, southern Kandahar province, and Kabul province where the AAF headquarters is located. In addition, five major detachments supporting the ANA are located in Herat province; Mazar-a-Sharif, the provincial capital of northern Balkh province; Jalalabad, the provincial capital of eastern Nangarhar province; Gardez, the provincial capital of eastern Paktiya province; and Shorab ANA base in southern Helmand province.²⁵²

The MD-530 and newly fielded A-29 are used primarily for attacking enemy ground forces but can be employed to execute reconnaissance and escort missions. The C-208 and C-130 mission set consists of casualty evacuation, cargo, and passenger transport.²⁵³ The 63 Mi-17s that DoD procured from Russia for the AAF and SMW were modified so that they could be armed with rockets and cannons. These weapons have been installed on some of these aircraft to provide aerial fire capabilities, but most Mi-17s are used to transport personnel or cargo.²⁵⁴



Two A-29 Super Tucanos taxi down a runway. (U.S. Air Force photo)

The Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter is considered the workhorse of the ANDSF. It is capable of conducting day and night personnel transport, casualty evacuation, resupply, close combat attack, aerial escort, and aerial assault missions, but is used primarily for combat support operations. USFOR-A reported that as of February 29, 2016, the ANDSF had 89 Mi-17s divided between the AAF (50) and the Special Mission Wing (39).²⁵⁵ The high operational tempo has resulted in an increase in the demand and utilization of the Mi-17 helicopters.

The increased use of aircraft requires additional maintenance support (scheduled or unscheduled) and reduces the operational readiness rate. The reduction in the operational readiness rate directly impacts aircraft availability to support combat missions.

USFOR-A reported that there were 239 airstrikes from January 1 through February 29, 2016, with the AAF conducting 103 and U.S. or Coalition forces conducting 136. The largest number of airstrikes were conducted over Nangarhar (71), Helmand (67), and Baghlan (28) provinces.²⁵⁶

UPDATE ON THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ANA 215TH CORPS IN HELMAND

In an April 2016 presentation to oversight agencies represented at a meeting of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, Major General Gordon B. Davis, Commander, CSTC-A, stated that a major change in the ANA 215th Corps leadership was necessary because of mismanagement and corruption.²⁵⁷ In December 2015, the MoD changed out the ANA 215th Corps Commander and Command Sergeant Major along with two Brigade Commanders and their Sergeant Majors. The ANA 215th Corps has six *kandaks* (battalions) that have gone through or are going through the reconstitution process, which involves training, personnel improvements, and equipment maintenance. General Davis reported that two of the *kandaks* from the ANA 215th Corps were reconstituted and are back in the fight. He noted that these *kandaks* are performing well and have not lost territory to insurgent forces.

Currently, two more *kandaks* are being reconstituted. In addition, one of these two *kandaks* will be a test *kandak* and receive second generation night observation devices.²⁵⁸ The final two *kandaks* are scheduled to complete their reconstitution process in August 2016. USFOR-A reported that *kandak* reconstitution was progressing largely as planned, but acknowledged that the success of that effort has not yet been demonstrated in combat. Accordingly, the success of the *kandak* reconstitution effort will not be known until after the ANA 215th Corps performance during the spring/summer campaign is evaluated.²⁵⁹

To fill the gap left by pulling *kandaks* off the front lines for reconstitution, the MoD moved additional combat forces into Helmand. In addition, U.S. Special Operations Forces continue to advise and assist the ASSF as part of the counter-offensive against the Taliban in Helmand province.²⁶⁰ During his presentation to the Joint Planning Group, General Davis observed that the change in corps leadership is making a difference in the operational effectiveness of the ANA 215th Corps.²⁶¹



NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani. (NATO photo)

ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

Corruption in Afghanistan affects all aspects of governance, including security services and the financial sector.²⁶² During an interview earlier this year with Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan organization focused on corruption, Sardar Mohammed Roshan, Senior Advisor to the President for Transparency in Development Programs, emphasized that President Ghani has the political will to fight corruption but faces significant obstacles. Senior Advisor Roshan cited the ongoing war against the Taliban and resistance within the Afghan government as the two main factors inhibiting efforts to reduce public corruption. With donor pressure intensifying before the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw—where future alliance assistance to Afghanistan will be one of the main topics of discussion—Senior Advisor Roshan’s comments highlight the difficulties faced by the Afghan government in tackling this persistent problem.²⁶³ In a March 2016 joint press conference with President Ghani in Afghanistan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized

that reforms to address corruption would be a major consideration for donor nations at the Warsaw summit. He stated:

The more reform we see, the more we see that Afghanistan is able to fight corruption, the easier it will be for me and other political leaders to mobilize the necessary political support in NATO parliaments, in NATO nations, but also in partner nations to mobilize the troops we have to send into the Resolute Support Mission, but not least the financial support which is so crucial for the strength of the Afghan Forces. So reform, continued implementation of reform, is the key deliverable we would like to see by the Warsaw summit.²⁶⁴

Establishment of New Anti-Corruption Body

In March 2016, President Ghani signed a long-discussed Presidential Decree establishing the “Higher Council of Governance, Justice and [the] Fight against Corruption.” Afghanistan has previously established the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, and various ministries have implemented anti-corruption initiatives, including Ministerial Internal Control Programs and the Transparency Accountability and Law Enforcement Committee. Additionally, President Ghani has repeatedly pledged to uproot corruption, but concerns about fraud, nepotism, and petty bribery remained.²⁶⁵

The decree establishing this new council defines its main mission as working to eliminate corruption in Afghanistan. The council members will include the Chief Executive Officer; the Vice-Presidents; the Chief Justice; the Presidential Advisors on Justice and Transparency Affairs; the Minister of Justice; and the Directors of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), Supreme Audit Office, High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, and Independent Directorate of Local Government.²⁶⁶

"Reform...
is the key
deliverable
we would
like to see by
the Warsaw
summit
(in July)."

—NATO Secretary
General Jens
Stoltenberg

The council's legal authorities will include:

- Drafting a national anti-corruption policy
- Taking measures to support the government's anti-corruption agenda
- Approving ministry anti-corruption plans
- Obtaining reports on the anti-corruption activities of government agencies
- Establishing a website to provide information on a wide array of corruption-related matters
- Issuing directives for the preparation of draft anti-corruption legislation
- Providing reports on its activities to senior government officials

The council will engage in unspecified activities focused on preventing corruption, raising public awareness of the problem of corruption, and enhancing governmental accountability.

The decree gives the council power to refer for prosecution anyone accused of corruption, but does not define how this will work in practice.

According to Senior Advisor Roshan, one of the council's first tasks will be to review corruption case files that have not been acted on by the AGO. He further stated that the AGO needs to become more effective, as does the National Directorate of Security (NDS), which reportedly has about 1,200 pending corruption cases in its files, and the Supreme Audit Office, which has a few dozen cases. Senior Advisor Roshan stated that all of these agencies require additional training and an improved means of coordinating and deconflicting their activities—something he hopes the council will accomplish.²⁶⁷

Corruption within the Security Ministries

In March 2016, CSTC-A reported that “[w]hile there is much talk of fighting corruption at all levels, aside from some individual cases that are pursued primarily by Coalition prompting ... corruption involving senior level personnel (at MoD) are rarely prosecuted and often those involved are allowed to retire.” However, CSTC-A noted that the MoD Inspector General's office possesses some technical capacity in the anti-corruption field.²⁶⁸

CSTC-A characterized MoI anti-corruption efforts in the provinces as ineffective, but stated that security officials in Kabul are beginning to prioritize provincial outreach, and that the political will exists within the MoI Inspector General's office to expand its reach into the provinces.

CSTC-A indicated that, while it is impossible to measure the level of corruption in the Afghan government, both the MoD and MoI are making efforts to improve their internal controls, as well as the quality of their audits and inspections. But CSTC-A does not have sufficient personnel to monitor the disposition of corruption cases that are submitted by the MoD and MoI to the AGO for trial in a civilian court. Moreover, CSTC-A noted that neither security ministry "does a good job of putting cases into the Case Management System ... a database that would allow for the tracking of cases at the Attorney General's Office ... and judiciary."²⁶⁹

In late 2015, Transparency International, a non-government organization founded in 1993 to fight corruption world-wide, published its annual assessment of corruption in the Afghan security sector. The report concluded that ineffective audits and weak prosecutorial authority, as well as a lack of civilian oversight of the security sector and an insecure environment for civil society, enabled organized crime and abuses of power by the military. It also cited the need for merit-based ANDSF recruitment systems to mitigate the problem of unqualified commanders leading troops in the field or collecting salaries for performing ill-defined tasks at headquarters. (See sidebar on page 62 for additional details on this assessment.) The report's recommendations echoed the Coalition's increasing emphasis on condition-based assistance, stating that by tying the funding of programs to well-defined benchmarks, the ANDSF would have tangible incentives to reduce corruption.²⁷⁰

MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE

CSTC-A personnel advise the MoI component of Afghanistan's Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) on corruption issues. The MCTF is composed of two distinct units—one at the MoI and one at the NDS. Based on a comparison of CSTC-A's responses to Lead IG queries in December 2015 and March 2016, it can reasonably be concluded that the MCTF has shown limited improvement in its technical and administrative capacities, but continues to struggle with the corruption problems endemic to most Afghan agencies.²⁷¹

In March 2016, CSTC-A reported that the MCTF rarely builds cases against high-level officials, and the MoI component of the MCTF struggles to operate outside of Kabul. With regard to the ongoing investigations by the MCTF into the misappropriation of fuel intended for ANP vehicles, CSTC-A commented that the MCTF's inability to track supplies adversely affected the MoI's ability

Ineffective audits and weak prosecutorial authority, as well as a lack of civilian oversight of the security sector and an insecure environment for civil society, enabled organized crime and abuses of power by the Afghan military.

to transition to “on budget procurement” (where MoI awards contracts that are funded by the United States). CSTC-A also stated that:²⁷²

- The AGO still lacks the transparency necessary for the MCTF to track its cases through to the prosecution stage
- The AGO released several defendants in mid-level corruption cases during the first two months of 2016
- Cases developed by the MCTF must pass through two separate prosecution offices prior to reaching the anti-corruption office within the AGO
- Several MCTF detectives have received death threats because of the work
- The jurisdiction of the MCTF is unclear
- The MCTF lacks investigative autonomy, with senior officials having to approve every case
- MoI did not provide the MCTF with any operational funding in 2015, forcing investigators to request funds on a case-by-case basis. (This apparently changed in early 2016, with new MoI leadership providing operational funds in January and February)

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, CSTC-A advisors report that MCTF personnel are beginning to regard themselves as members of an elite unit. Additionally, CSTC-A anticipates an increase in the prosecution rate for MCTF cases with the appointment of a permanent attorney general.²⁷³ On April 9, 2016, the Afghan parliament confirmed Mohammad Farid Hamidi, formerly a member of the Afghan Human Rights Commission, as the new Afghan attorney general.²⁷⁴

NATIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

President Ghani established the National Procurement Authority (NPA) in December 2014 to centralize the vetting and approval of high-dollar-value contracts. As of March 31, 2016, the NPA had debarred more than 50 companies from doing business with the Afghan government. Most of these debarments range from 1 to 3 years in length. Among the reasons most often cited for a company’s debarment are providing false documents, colluding with government officials, offering false bank statements as proof of their solvency, colluding with nominal competitors on the bid, and lying on the bidding documents. As of the end of March 6, Afghan government entities (such as ministries or the Kabul mayor’s office) have submitted 11 new requests for debarment based on information about these entities uncovered in the initial phases of the contract-award process.²⁷⁵

Transparency International Issues Critical Assessment of Afghan Anti-Corruption Efforts

On February 16, 2016, Transparency International, in partnership with Integrity Watch Afghanistan, issued its National Integrity System Assessment for 2015, evaluating Afghan institutions' ability and willingness to implement effective anti-corruption reforms. Afghanistan ranks 166th out of 168 countries on Transparency International's 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, and the assessment was the first of its kind conducted in the country.²⁷⁶

The assessment was highly critical of most Afghan institutions, summarizing in its key finding that "corruption enjoys impunity thanks to a dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial system." This impunity is enabled by the ability of those holding office—or those related to or allied with officeholders—to influence law-enforcement and judicial agencies, an ability unchecked by Afghanistan's anti-corruption agency, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption. According to the assessment, Afghan citizens perceive the judiciary as the most corrupt institution in the country, viewing it as easily manipulated to produce outcomes favorable to powerful parties.²⁷⁷

According to Transparency International, the consequences of corruption for the Afghan state are both clear and dire. The assessment concluded that widespread corruption:²⁷⁸

- Undermines the ability of the public sector to deliver basic services
- Erodes public confidence in state institutions, such as parliament
- Hinders economic development
- Dissuades foreign investment
- Promotes nepotism and discriminatory hiring practices in the public sector
- Reduces confidence in political parties and the electoral process and renders property rights almost meaningless
- Limits cooperation between civil-society organizations and the government
- Prevents Afghanistan from effectively exploiting its mostly untapped mineral wealth
- Contributes to a widespread sense of alienation on the part of the people from their government, causing some to shift their allegiance to anti-government groups

The assessment did identify certain entities and practices that have had a positive, albeit highly circumscribed, effect on reducing corruption. These include aggressive media outlets that track corruption issues closely and, while they may lack the technical capacity to conduct investigations, regularly report on government misdeeds. The assessment gave limited and highly qualified praise to the Supreme Audit Office, noting that it rarely succumbs to external influences.

The assessment also concluded that law-enforcement agencies have sufficient resources to execute their mandate and that the National Assembly “in many cases” has been able to withstand pressure by outside actors.²⁷⁹

The assessment also ranked the most corrupt sectors of Afghan government in society, finding the worst offenders to be the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, most political parties, private-sector businesses, ministries and other government agencies, the judiciary, the more sensationalist elements of the media, and civil-society organizations.²⁸⁰

The assessment issued dozens of sector-specific recommendations, which primarily focused on enhancing the independence of government agencies, improving the technical capacity of public servants to perform their jobs, passing anti-corruption and business legislation that meets international norms, and increasing the transparency with which public funds are disbursed.

In sum, the assessment concluded that Afghan institutions “are either not able or not willing to translate ... laws into practice [causing] a huge gap between law and practice [that] affects the efficiency, integrity, and transparency of almost all institutions.”²⁸¹


FUNDING FOR OFS

The U.S. government has appropriated nearly \$102 billion for OFS to conduct U.S. military counterterrorism operations and DoD programs to continue building the capacity of the ANDSF in support of Resolute Support.²⁸² This funding includes \$3.7 billion in FY 2014 appropriations obligated after the designation of OFS in January 2015, \$55.1 billion from FY 2015, and \$42.9 billion

Figure 5.

FY 2014/FY 2015/FY 2016 OFS and Related Missions by DoD Account, as of 3/31/2016

(\$Billion)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. "Other" includes Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund (\$0.4 billion) and Research, Development, Technology & Evaluation (\$0.2 billion). Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) includes appropriations of 3.7B from FY 2014, \$3.7 billion from FY 2015 (\$4.1B enacted reduced by a \$400 million rescission in 2015), and \$3.6 billion for FY 2016 totaling \$11 billion.

a Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds are used for transport of troops and their equipment, military operations, in-country support for bases, medical services for deployed troops, and repair and return of war-worn equipment.

b Congress created the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.

c Military personnel funds cover special pay for deployed personnel (such as imminent danger and separation pay) and the additional cost of activating reservists to full-time status.


d Procurement funds provide for the purchase of new weapons systems to replace war losses.

Sources: OUSD(C), *Cost of War*, 12/2015

appropriated for FY 2016. Funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts for 67 percent or \$68.2 billion of total appropriations. O&M funds are used for the transportation of troops and their equipment to Afghanistan, military operations, in-country support for bases, medical services for deployed troops, and repair and return of war-worn equipment.

As of December 31, 2015, \$35.0 billion in FY 2015 funds and \$4.9 billion in FY 2016 funds had been obligated for OFS expenditures. A total of \$24 billion of those obligations had been disbursed to cover U.S. military personnel; O&M; procurement; research, development, technology, and evaluations; and support for the ANDSF.

Figure 6.
Status of Funds for OFS and Related Missions, by Fiscal Year, as of 12/31/2015
 (\$ Billions)



Note: Numbers affected by rounding. FY 2015 appropriated amount includes \$55.5 billion enacted in P.L. 113-235 and \$2.95 billion in FY 2014 ASFF funds obligated during FY 2015 (reported under the OFS category in the *Cost of War* report). The \$2.95 billion amount is incorporated into the cumulative obligations total. Cumulative disbursed total includes \$2.39 billion in FY 2014 ASFF funds disbursed during FY 2015.

Sources: P.L. 113-235; P.L. 114-113; OUSD(C), *Cost of War*, 9/30/2015, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/14/2016, and "United States Department of Defense Fiscal year 2016 Budget Request Overview," 2/2015.

Status of OFS Funds

The *Cost of War* report is issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). It is the only aggregate source for OFS funding status by service and account; however, it covers the period ending one quarter before the current Lead IG reporting period. In May 2016, the DoD OIG plans to initiate an audit to determine the accuracy of obligations and disbursements, as reported in the *Cost of War* report, for select Navy appropriations.²⁸³

As of December, 2015, obligations for OFS and related missions totaled \$39.9 billion, including \$6.6 billion of ASFF. Nearly 39 percent of all OFS funds had been obligated.²⁸⁴ Approximately \$23.8 billion of OFS funds had been disbursed as of December 31, 2015, including \$3.4 billion from FY 2014 funds, \$18.5 billion from FY 2015 funds and \$1.9 billion from FY 2016 funds.

Table 1.

OFS Obligations and Disbursements, by Account, as of 12/31/2015

(\$ Millions)

Account	Obligations	% Obligated	Disbursements	% Disbursed
O&M ^a	\$29,091	43%	\$14,878	22%
ASFF ^b	\$6,634	60%	\$5.776	52%
MILPERS ^c	\$2,835	37%	\$2.793	36%
Procurement ^d	\$964	7%	\$207	2%
JIEDDF ^e	\$396	50%	\$189	24%
RDT&E ^f	\$22	11%	0	0%
Total	\$39,943	39%	23,843	23

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

a Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds transport of troops and their equipment to Afghanistan, military operations, in-country support for bases, medical services for deployed troops, and repair and return of war-worn equipment.

b Congress created the **Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)** to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.

c Military personnel funds cover special pay for deployed personal (such as imminent danger and separation pay) and the additional cost of activating reservists to full-time status.

d Procurement funds provide for the purchase of new weapons systems to replace war losses.

e The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund supports the development and purchase of new devices to improve force protection for soldiers against roadside bombs or IEDs.

f Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Appropriations funds the efforts performed by contractors and government entities required for the research and development of equipment, material, or computer application software, and associated test and evaluation.

Source: FY 2016 DoD Budget Request and Component Justification Books. *Cost of War*, December 2015

Nearly 23 percent of all OFS-appropriated funding had been disbursed by the end of the first quarter of FY 2016, including 52 percent of the ASFF. For an overview of OFS funding, as of December 31, 2015, (see Figure 2). For a breakout of cumulative OFS obligations and disbursements by account and as a percentage of total amount appropriated (see Table 1).²⁸⁵

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

Since the inception of OFS in January 2015, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) has been used to support the building and sustainment of the ANDSF. The FY 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), passed on December 18, 2015, continued funding for OFS activities, including \$3.65 billion authorized for the ASFF. Since the ASFF inception in FY 2005, more than \$67 billion has been appropriated to build, train, and equip the ANDSF. As of December 2015, approximately \$58.3 billion has been obligated and \$56.8 billion has been disbursed to support and sustain the ANDSF (see Table 2).²⁸⁶

The table below lists the cost of the Administration's decision to surge U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan in 2009. At that time, U.S. funding to support the capacity of the ANDSF peaked at \$11.6 billion in FY 2011.²⁸⁷

Table 2.

ASFF Appropriations, Obligations, and Disbursements

(\$ Millions)

	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013	FY2014	FY2015	FY2016	Total
Appropriation Amount	995	1,908	7,406	2,750	5,607	9,167	11,619	10,200	5,124	4,727	3,709	3,652	66,865
Total Obligations	995	1,895	7,144	2,735	5,588	9,024	10,220	8,923	4,807	3,960	2,840	136	58,267
Total Disbursements	995	1,895	7,144	2,735	5,588	8,980	9,984	8,932	4,653	3,537	2,401	—	56,842
Obligations-Disbursements	—	—	—	—	—	44	236	(9)	154	423	440	136	Average thru 2014
Unused Obligations	—	13	262	15	19	143	1,399	1,277	317	767	869	3,517	
% of Obligations/Appropriations	—	99%	96%	99%	100%	98%	88%	87%	94%	84%	77%	4%	94%
% of Disbursements/Appropriations	—	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	97%	89%	85%	0%	98%

Note: ASFF is 2-year appropriation funding. According to Appropriation Law, during a 5-year period, the expired account balance may be used to liquidate obligations properly chargeable to the account prior to its expiration. The expired account balance also remains available to make legitimate obligation adjustments, that is, to record previously unrecorded obligations and to make upward adjustments in previously under recorded obligations.

Source: DoD Budget Request Overview FY2006-FY2016. *Cost of War*, December 2015.

During FY 2012, the U.S. transitioned from an active combat role to an advisory role focused on building capability of Afghan security institutions. The Afghan government at that time had taken the lead for security of 40 percent of its population.²⁸⁸ The ASFF appropriation was reduced significantly in FY 2013. However, funds for U.S. combat operations of \$81.4 billion and the ANDSF sustainment support of \$5.1 billion still supported the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al Qaeda and eliminating their safe havens in Afghanistan.

Through FY 2014, ASFF appropriations had been obligated at an average rate of 94 percent and disbursements compared to obligations had an average spend rate of 98 percent. Approximately 77 percent of FY 2015 funding had been obligated as of December 31, 2015. Since ASFF is 2-year funding, average spend rates for FY 2015 and FY 2016 appropriations will not be available until FY 2017 and FY 2018, respectively.

Approximately \$1.2 billion of the FY 2015 ASFF was provided directly to the Afghan government (\$800 million for the MoD and \$400 million for the MoI) to fund salaries and incentive pay, equipment, facilities maintenance, and fuel costs.²⁸⁹ About one-third of those funds is obligated under contracts awarded by the Afghan government.²⁹⁰ To ensure that direct assistance funds are adequately controlled, the DoD OIG has initiated an audit to determine whether CSTC-A, in coordination with the MoD and MoI, has implemented effective controls over the contract management process.²⁹¹ The other \$2.5 billion of the FY 2015 ASFF is used to fund DoD contracts to support foreign military sales to provide equipment, supplies, maintenance, training, and other support to the MoD and MoI and their forces.²⁹²

Other ANDSF Funding

The “*Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan*,” issued in May 2012 by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, mandated that the Afghan government begin sharing the responsibility of supporting the ANDSF in FY 2015. It stated that “as the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least US \$500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.”²⁹³ However, in 2015 the Afghan exchange rate had depreciated by 30 percent since FY 2012, which made the Afghan contribution equivalent to approximately \$400 million.²⁹⁴

Consequently, the Afghan commitment is now measured in Afghani terms (“Afghanis”) rather than dollar terms; the 2012 equivalent of \$500 million—Afghanis 25 billion—is now used as the benchmark against which Afghan progress in meeting its funding commitment is measured. On this basis, the Afghan government is meeting its commitment as it appropriated more than Afghanis 25 billion in 2015 and 2016 for the MoD and MoI.²⁹⁵

Since the inception of OFS in January 2015, international donors provided 18 percent of the \$9.9 billion total cost of the MoD and MoI, with the Afghan government providing 8 percent, and the United States providing 74 percent (see Table 3).²⁹⁶

Table 3.

Total ANDSF Requirements by Funding Source, as of 12/31/2015

(\$ Billions)

	International Community	GIRoA	ASFF	Total Funding
FY2015	\$.80	\$0.50	\$3.71	\$5.01
FY2016	\$1.00	\$0.25	\$3.65	\$4.90
Total	\$1.80	\$0.75	\$7.36	\$9.91
% of Total	18%	8%	74%	

Source: FY2015 and FY2016 OUSD DoD Justification for Overseas Contingency Operations ASFF

DoS Counterterrorism Efforts Funded by the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs

While most of the counterterrorism aspects of OFS are classified, the Congressional Budget Justification submitted by DoS for Fiscal Year 2017 contains some public information about its Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). DoS's Bureau of Counterterrorism manages NADR-funded programs to help partner nations deal effectively with terrorist challenges within a rule-of-law framework. In weak states, terrorists can cultivate safe havens and operate across borders, thereby threatening national and regional stability.

These DoS programs build the capacity of civilian actors to detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist activities, as well as prosecute and incarcerate terrorist suspects while respecting human rights and engaging vulnerable communities affiliated with such groups.²⁹⁷ Major efforts include the Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies program, the Counterterrorism Financing program, the Countering Violent Extremism program, the Regional Strategic Initiative, and the Terrorist Interdiction Program.²⁹⁸

For FY 2017, DoS has requested \$16.6 million to support NADR counterterrorism programs in Afghanistan. U.S. assistance goals in Afghanistan are to build Afghan security capacity in counterterrorism crisis response; improve ANDSF leadership, management, and coordination capabilities; and build Afghan land border control and transit interdiction capacity, particularly with regard to regional cooperation and shared interoperability.²⁹⁹ U.S. assistance provides specialized training in counterterrorism skills to the Afghan Department of Protection for High-Level Persons (D10, under the office of the Afghan President). Increasingly, training resources are being shifted to the MoI's primary tactical counterterrorism response units. Their training includes courses in crisis response, explosive ordnance disposal and explosive incident countermeasures, management of special/public events, border controls and fraudulent document recognition, and protection of soft targets.³⁰⁰





A Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle utilized by the 455th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron flightline security team sits on the flightline at Bagram Air Field. (U.S. Air Force photo)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

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COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended, established the Lead IG model and created a structure for planning, conducting, and reporting on oversight of overseas contingency operations (OCOs) by several OIGs. This section of the report provides information on Lead IG staffing to perform these functions; Lead IG agencies' outreach efforts; and completed oversight work related to audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations, as well as hotline activity by Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other oversight partners. Ongoing and planned oversight activities are discussed in the next section.

For this report, we are focusing on completed oversight activity or results realized during the six-month period from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016. In future reports, oversight activities will be discussed on a quarterly basis, with information covering a three-month period.

Appendix C provides a description of the Lead IG Model.

STAFFING AND OUTREACH

Over the last six months, the Lead IG agencies have continued to staff their respective organizations with individuals who have the knowledge and skills needed to immediately contribute to OFS oversight efforts. The Lead IG staffing strategy includes assigning permanent staff for overseas contingency operations (OCO) oversight, as well as hiring new staff, through the special hiring authorities cited within Section 8L of the IG Act of 1978, as amended. Each Lead IG agency has assigned current permanent staff as well as newly hired staff to the oversight projects identified in this report and in support of the strategic oversight planning and reporting responsibilities.

The Lead IG agencies have adopted an expeditionary workforce model to support audit, evaluation, and inspection efforts throughout the region. For example, DoD OIG has a field office in Afghanistan to support its regional activity with a small contingent of oversight staff assigned to that office on 6-month rotations. In addition, oversight teams from the Lead IG agencies travel to Afghanistan and other locations in the region on a temporary basis to conduct the field work for their respective oversight projects.

For their investigative work, the Lead IG agencies have hired and deployed investigators to the region. Since October 2015, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the DoD OIG investigative component, has deployed several Special Agents to Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Djibouti.

These DCIS agents have been assigned to detect and investigate fraud and corruption relating to DoD's role in supporting OCOs. They regularly travel to various locations within the region to conduct investigations and meet with key officials at various contracting and support commands. In addition, during the reporting period, DCIS hired a senior Special Agent to serve as the program manager for investigative activity relating to OFS.

DoS OIG also hired a senior Special Agent to serve as investigative program director for Lead IG operations to conduct OCO-related investigations affecting DoS programs and operations. The program director coordinates and provides oversight of OCO-related investigations conducted by DoS Special Agents based in the United States and overseas, including the recently established DoS OIG office in Frankfurt, Germany. DoS OIG is hiring another senior Special Agent who will focus exclusively on OCO-related investigations.

Outreach is a critical component of our Lead IG work. It allows the Lead IG agencies to be knowledgeable on OCO activities and to share information on the Lead IG efforts. To stay current on OFS activities and initiatives, senior Lead IG officials routinely meet with U.S government policy officials, collect information, and conduct research related to the OFS essential functions and the counterterrorism mission. Senior Lead IG officials also meet with congressional staff to discuss OFS activities and completed, ongoing, and planned oversight.

In addition, during the reporting period, the DoD Deputy IG for Overseas Contingency Operations testified before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on "Assessing the Development of Afghanistan National Security Forces." At the hearing, which was held on February 12, 2016, the Deputy IG provided a summary, based on past oversight work, of capability challenges affecting Afghan forces and efforts taken to respond to those challenges

Investigative briefings and the Lead IG Hotline are other avenues for outreach and are discussed in more detail at the end of this section.

AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

Lead IG agencies and SIGAR released 7 reports relating to OFS from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016. The DoD OIG also completed one research project during this timeframe related to the allegations of child sexual abuse by Afghan officials and DoD's response to those allegations. The DoD OIG did not issue a report on this research project, but used the information collected to plan an ongoing project.

Lead IG agencies and SIGAR released 7 reports relating to OFS from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016.

Final Reports

The following reports completed during this reporting period addressed oversight of OFS-related matters:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Controls Over Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts Could Be Improved

DoDIG-2016-040, January 20, 2016

In a February 2011 policy memorandum, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer authorized the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to provide Afghanistan Security Forces Fund resources directly to the Afghanistan ministries to sustain the ANDSF. The goal of this support was to develop ministerial capability and capacity in the areas of budget development and execution, payment of salaries, acquisition planning, and procurement. The objective of this DoD OIG audit was to determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had established effective controls for oversight of MoI fuel contracts.

The audit determined that the CSTC-A and MoI oversight of the fuel contracts was not effective. Although some CSTC-A officials performed limited oversight of MoI fuel activities, those officials did not coordinate their efforts. In addition, MoI did not consistently provide fuel consumption data to the ANP, and CSTC-A did not determine which ANP units were not reporting consumption data as required by the FY 1394 Commitment Letter. As a result of the lack of contract oversight and insufficient reporting data, CSTC-A did not have reasonable assurance that the fuel ordered and delivered to the ANP on the three MoI contracts, valued at \$437.6 million, supported actual requirements, or that it was used for its intended purpose. The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, CSTC-A, issue guidance that establishes specific oversight responsibilities for fuel contracts, develop reliable methods to determine whether the reported fuel consumption data has been accurately documented, and ensure that the next commitment letter addresses improved reporting requirements. Management generally agreed with the recommendations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL***Management Assistance Report: Fuel Storage at Embassy Kabul and Camp Sullivan, Afghanistan***

AUD-MERO-16-04, October 2, 2015

This classified report discusses DoS controls put in place to account for fuel. It is a part of the more comprehensive ongoing audit looking at vehicle-fueling controls and a contract at Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION***Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property***

SIGAR-16-23-SP, March 14, 2016

SIGAR found that between January 2010 and October 2015, DoD disposed of about \$907 million worth of Foreign Excess Real Property in Afghanistan. Of that amount, approximately \$858 million worth was donated to the Afghan government, which constitutes additional resources that the United States has made available in connection with the reconstruction of Afghanistan. SIGAR also determined that DoD disposed of the property mainly by transferring it to the ANDSF and other entities within the Afghan government. SIGAR also determined that DoD has now closed more than 200 bases that it formerly operated.

Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 to September 2015

SIGAR 16-22-IP, March 11, 2016

SIGAR found that 16 of the 44 DoD reconstruction projects it inspected from July 2009 to September 2015 met contract requirements and technical specifications. These projects show that when contractors adhere to requirements and there is adequate oversight, project goals can be achieved. The 28 remaining projects included work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. SIGAR determined that as of September 30, 2015, DoD had implemented the majority of recommendations made in its 36 inspection reports. In these reports, SIGAR made 95 recommendations to DoD, and of the 90 recommendations closed, DoD implemented 76, or 84 percent, of them. The large percentage of recommendations closed shows that in response to SIGAR's inspection reports, DoD generally took action to improve efficiency and effectiveness in its reconstruction activities, and to correct construction deficiencies.

Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters: \$154.7 Million Building Appears Well Built, but Has Several Construction Issues that Should Be Assessed

SIGAR 16-16-IP, February 11, 2016

SIGAR's inspection found that the MoD headquarters was constructed as a five-story building in Kabul, which, with some exceptions, generally met contract requirements and appears well built. Originally, the cost of the headquarters building was \$48.7 million, and it was to be completed in about 18 months. However, there were problems with the contract from the outset. Not only did the ANA refuse the contractor, ITSI, a U.S. company, access to the site for about a year, but other delays, such as weather, security, and funding issues, emerged. As a result, the cost to complete the building rose to \$154.7 million, or more than three times the original estimated cost. Similarly, although the headquarters building is now essentially complete, it took almost 5 years longer to complete than originally anticipated. The CSTC-A transferred the building to the MoD on December 28, 2015. As of January 7, 2016, the building was not fully occupied. SIGAR made six recommendations, five of which are enumerated in the report that related to structural and design issues.

Afghan National Engineer Brigade: Despite U.S. Training Efforts, the Brigade is Incapable of Operating Independently

SIGAR 16-15-AR, January 22, 2016

USFOR-A was unable to achieve its goal of training the ANA's National Engineer Brigade to a "partially capable" level by December 31, 2014. The inability to achieve this goal was largely due to delays in basic soldier training and in providing engineering equipment needed for training.

Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support, Oversight, and Direction

SIGAR 16-3-AR, October 16, 2015

Since 2010, DoD has supported the creation, training, equipping, and sustainment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). However, despite \$470 million invested in the program over the last 5 years, the ALP lack adequate logistics support, oversight, and a plan for either disbanding the force or incorporating it into the Afghan National Police.

SIGAR found that the ALP's effectiveness is hindered by inadequate logistics support and misuse of some ALP personnel. The ALP is the first line of defense for many villages across Afghanistan, but supplies ordered for the ALP are often diverted, delayed, of inferior quality, or heavily pilfered. Furthermore, Coalition and ALP personnel whom SIGAR interviewed stated


that unreliable logistics and lack of supplies also increase the likelihood of attrition. Several internal reviews conducted by ALP leadership, which SIGAR reviewed, reported supply shortages for ALP units across many districts and provinces. Additionally, SIGAR found that some ALP personnel have been used inappropriately as bodyguards for Afghan government officials, which is in direct violation of the regulations laid out in the AFP Procedures of Establishment, Management, and Activity. To ensure that the ALP program is responsibly managed and sustained, and oversight of U.S. funds is improved, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General of CSTC-A consider making future funding for the ALP conditioned on the Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) and the MoI taking steps to 1) develop and enact measures to ensure that ALP units, across all districts in which they are located, can reliably receive necessary supplies; 2) stop the misuse of the ALP as bodyguards for provincial and district officials; 3) create a comprehensive plan for the future transition, sustainment, or dissolution of the ALP; and 4) provide the ALP headquarters the authorities necessary to enact recommendations included in its field visit reports. Additionally, to improve the oversight of U.S. funds, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General of CSTC-A 5) assist the MoI in taking steps to improve internal controls over ALP time and attendance recording and collection; 6) incentivize the MoI to maximize the use of electronic payment of ALP salaries, and reduce the use of the trusted agent method for paying salaries to the ALP; and 7) re-initiate its financial audit of the ALP program.

U.S. Forces–Afghanistan provided comments from SOJTF-A and CSTC-A. In comments on a draft of this report, SOJTF-A concurred with the first six recommendations and deferred to CSTC-A on the seventh. In response to that recommendation, CSTC-A stated that it has undertaken a comprehensive audit of the multiple aspects of the ALP payroll process. CSTC-A indicated that this audit will address issues in SIGAR's report.

INVESTIGATIONS

The criminal investigative components of the DoD and DoS OIGs conducted investigations related to OFS and coordinated their investigative efforts. They also participated in the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for OFS, which includes the Lead IG agency components and representatives from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The group met regularly during the reporting period to share and deconflict information regarding ongoing investigations and to coordinate investigative operations. While USAID OIG conducts investigations in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with other law enforcement agencies, USAID has no OFS programs or activities and USAID OIG does not have investigations specific to OFS as a result.

Figure 7.

Breakdown of Investigations, by type

As of March 31, 2016, the Lead IG agencies have 15 on-going OFS-related investigations.

During the period, the Working Group member agencies, along with SIGAR and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, coordinated 39 OFS-related investigations. This coordination improved criminal intelligence, enhanced synchronization of investigative activities, and reduced duplication of effort.

Results of Investigative Efforts

As of March 31, 2016, the Lead IG agencies have 15 ongoing OFS-related investigations. Described below are the completed and ongoing investigative efforts by DCIS and DoS OIG. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of types of investigations.

DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

During this period, DCIS was conducting nine criminal investigations and four investigative projects relating to OFS. Five of the investigations focused on theft, including larceny, embezzlement of funds, and negotiable instruments, as well as misappropriation of property and equipment; three related to procurement fraud, including false claims or statements and product substitution; three involved corruption, including bribery of public officials; and two focused on other offenses, including counter-proliferation of export-controlled U.S. defense technology and program irregularities. Because these investigations are ongoing, the details regarding them cannot be disclosed in this report.

As a result of one of these nine ongoing investigations, DCIS, working jointly with SIGAR, achieved significant results:

- **\$1.4 Million in Stolen Government Property Recovered.** An Afghan subcontractor allegedly held 10-12 truckloads of U.S. government property valued at approximately \$1.5 million and refused to make delivery until the U.S. government paid the subcontractor \$500,000. The Afghan subcontractor alleged it had not been paid by the prime contractor for services relative to the shipment of the items. On February 16, 2016, one of the containers holding approximately \$199,000 worth of U.S. government property was recovered at Bagram Air Field. On March 1, 2016, an Afghan national and representative of the subcontractor was taken into custody by Afghan authorities. On March 8, 2016, 10 shipping containers holding more than \$1.2 million worth of U.S. government property were recovered at Kandahar Air Field.

In addition, DCIS completed 14 information reports, 11 of which were closed without substantive investigative action after DCIS determined that the allegations did not merit further investigation. Three information reports resulted in referrals to other agencies, including SIGAR and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

As of March 31, 2016, DCIS continued to investigate 68 “legacy cases” pertaining to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, the offensive combat mission in Afghanistan that concluded in December 2014. These ongoing investigations involve U.S. military operations in Afghanistan prior to the start of OFS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OIG

DoS OIG has opened six OFS-related investigations since October 1, 2015. Four investigations involved allegations of procurement fraud, including grantees billing for services not performed or partially performed, a grantee selling items procured through a DoS grant, a contractor submitting false documents to the U.S. government in order to receive a contract, and a grantee submitting false claims to DoS. The remaining two investigations involved allegations of theft/embezzlement by a grantee employee, and public corruption by an employee soliciting bribes.

DoS OIG also identified opportunities to strengthen reporting requirements related to allegations of improprieties in the administration of U.S. government grants, cooperative agreements, and other assistance awards to implementing partners for DoS or the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) assistance programs. Since October 1, 2015, DoS OIG issued Management Assistance Reports to DoS and the BBG. These reports recommended incorporating language that included notice of the legal requirement to make a timely and written disclosure to the awarding agency or pass-through entity of all suspected violations of federal criminal law potentially affecting the award. The recommended language also suggested requiring disclosure to DoS OIG, with a copy to the responsible grants officer.

DoS and the BBG both agreed with these DoS OIG recommendations. Following through on this analysis, DoS also issued guidance to amend accordingly all active grants, cooperative agreements, and other assistance awards at or above \$1 million that have at least four months remaining in the period of performance. As of mid-April, DoS OIG had not received a response to these recommendations from the BBG.

DoS OIG has 10 remaining Operation Enduring Freedom investigations. Nine of these investigations involve procurement fraud and the other involves allegations of public corruption.

Investigative Briefings

Each Lead IG investigative component provided fraud awareness briefings during this reporting period. In total, during the reporting period, Lead IG

agency investigators conducted 116 briefings and connected with more than 1,000 individuals.

- DCIS personnel provided 110 fraud awareness briefings to 966 DoD employees and contractors supporting OFS at various installations worldwide. The objective of such meetings was to collect information about programs and operations supporting OFS missions, educate DoD personnel and contractors about potential fraud risks that may exist, and provide guidance on how to report suspected fraud and corruption to DCIS.
- DoS OIG investigators conducted six fraud awareness briefings for approximately 90 individuals, including both U.S. government employees and contractors.

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Education on the Lead IG Hotline is an important aspect of the Lead IG outreach efforts. The DoD OIG has a Lead IG Hotline investigator to proactively discuss the functions of the hotline, and to coordinate the contacts received through the hotline, among the Lead IG agencies and others. The investigator, who deploys periodically to Afghanistan, educates government employees and contractors on preventing, detecting, and reporting fraud, waste, and abuse as it relates to OFS activities.

During the reporting period, the Lead IG Hotline investigator received and coordinated 140 contacts related to OFS and opened 95 cases

In addition to the investigative briefings described above, the Lead IG Hotline investigator conducts in-theater fraud awareness briefings and training events for commanders, service members, DoD civilians, contractors, and facility directors at military installations throughout Afghanistan. In addition, this representative works closely with Joint Staff and CENTCOM IGs in those areas on hotline matters and conducts outreach with the Services IG hotline coordinators to educate them on Lead IG matters. Through these periodic visits, the Lead IG Hotline investigator maintains open lines of communication with rotating commanders and staff and communicates the presence and accessibility of the DoD OIG hotline for deployed military, civilian, and contractor personnel.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline, processes complaints or contacts received, and refers these complaints or contacts to the appropriate entity to handle the complaint. The DoD Lead IG Hotline investigator coordinates the hotline activities among the Lead IG agencies and other OFS-related organizations.

During the reporting period, the Lead IG Hotline investigator received and coordinated 140 contacts related to OFS and opened 95 cases. These contacts were referred within DoD OIG, the Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, or other investigative organizations for review and, as appropriate, investigation.





An Airman marshals a truck out of a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III in Afghanistan, in support of Operation Resolute Support. (U.S. Air Force photo)

ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

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ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT

This section of the report discusses ongoing and planned oversight work by the Lead IG agencies, in addition to the strategic planning process. The ongoing and planned audit, inspection, and evaluation projects are listed in separate tables. Information contained in this section is as of March 31, 2016.

AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

Strategic Planning

The Fiscal Year 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan was effective October 1, 2015. This plan includes the oversight of U.S. military and counterterrorism activities regarding OFS and the continuing U.S. reconstruction activities geared to empower the government of Afghanistan's economic and social development.

The Plan categorizes Afghan-related oversight projects into eight strategic oversight issue areas. These areas include:

- Building Capacity and Capabilities of the ANDSF and Administering and Maintaining Accountability of the ASFF
- Building Afghan Government Capacity and Sustaining U.S. Investment in Afghan Institutions and Infrastructure
- Implementing and Executing Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics Program
- Awarding and Administering Reconstruction Contracts
- Retrograde and Property Management
- Contract Management and Oversight
- Resolute Support Mission and Transition to Security Cooperation
- Intelligence and Counterterrorism

The plan is divided into three sections: OFS Resolute Support, OFS Counterterrorism, and Reconstruction/All Other Afghanistan. All FY 2016 oversight projects related to Afghanistan are listed in one of the three sections. The strategic oversight issue areas are consistent categories for aligning the projects and analyzing opportunities for future projects.

Representatives from Lead IG agencies, as well as from other federal oversight entities such as SIGAR, will continue to work to update the FY 2017 plan for Afghanistan. The updated plan will be published later this year.

The Lead IG planning representatives are undertaking a strategic planning and analysis process to identify and scope oversight projects that examine the economy, efficiency, or effectiveness of federal agency programs and operations support of OFS. The strategic planning process identifies broad national and/or Coalition objectives, highlights strategic oversight priorities, balances oversight resources across those priorities, and identifies oversight gaps and where to assume risk. The OFS strategic objectives and annual appropriations, with feedback from departmental and congressional stakeholders, are among the considerations that inform this strategic planning process. USAID OIG has reported that its agency has no programs or operations related to OFS.

Separate from the annual plan for Afghanistan, the Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other oversight partners of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group meet quarterly to discuss dynamic policy or OCO operational changes that require adjustments to ongoing or planned oversight activities, and seek further opportunities to reduce redundancy in oversight or identify new efficiencies. On January 28, the Acting DoD IG led the 33rd quarterly meeting of the Joint Planning Group, where representatives of 10 oversight agencies discussed oversight projects and planning initiatives.

ONGOING AND PLANNED PROJECTS

Ongoing Projects

As of March 31, 2016, the oversight community has 24 ongoing projects related to OFS. Table 4 provides the project title and objective for each of these projects. A summary of selected projects by strategic oversight issue area follows.

Six oversight projects are ongoing that involve ANDSF and the ASFF. SIGAR has five such projects and DoD OIG has one. Two of the projects relate to the train, advise, assist, and equip mission, one deals with operation and maintenance of U.S. government-provided aircraft, and another relates to vehicle maintenance and capacity building.

Nine oversight projects involve contract management or specific contracts. DoD OIG is conducting two contract oversight projects looking at controls. DoS OIG is conducting two projects, one looking at controls and the other looking at contract compliance. SIGAR has five ongoing projects related to reconstruction contracts.

Lead IG Planning Responsibilities

To develop and carry out, in coordination with the Lead IG agencies, a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspection, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.

Source: Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended

SIGAR has two ongoing oversight projects that focus specifically on the Resolute Support Mission and transition to security cooperation. One project is reviewing DoD's efforts to advise the MoI and MoD and the other is looking at DoD's oversight of the infrastructure projects being transferred to the Afghan government.

Two ongoing oversight projects involve intelligence and counterterrorism. DoD OIG is evaluating intelligence training for MoD forces. DoS OIG is looking at counterterrorism coordination as part of a U.S. embassy inspection.

Outside of the OFS mission, three oversight agencies are examining aspects of the sexual abuse allegations referred to above. DoD OIG and SIGAR received congressional requests to assess aspects of the allegations of child sexual abuse by members of the ANDSF. The Army Audit Agency is doing a project related to the Army's sexual assault hotline.

Table 4:

Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of 3/31/2016

Project Title	Objective
Army Audit Agency	
<i>Testing of Sexual Assault-Related Phone Numbers-Round Six</i>	To verify that sexual assault victims could successfully contact a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator or a Victim Advocate for immediate assistance using the Army's 24X7 sexual assault helpline phone numbers posted on the DoD Safe Helpline.
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General	
<i>Audit of Oversight of Contracts in Afghanistan</i>	To determine whether DoD controls for monitoring contractor performance were effective for contracts in support of enduring functions in Afghanistan. Specifically, to determine whether contracting officer's representatives were properly assigned, appointed, and trained.
<i>Evaluation of USFOR-A Intelligence Training for Afghan Ministry of Defense Forces</i>	To assess USFOR-A's progress towards meeting intelligence training objectives for Afghan MoD forces as identified in OFS NATO-led Resolute Support Mission essential function seven. Identify USFOR-A's specific measures of performance for determining whether the Afghan MoD collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence effectively and integrates intelligence into combat operations.
<i>Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF)</i>	To determine whether U.S. Government and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, and resources to train the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces are sufficient, operative, and relevant.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</i>	To focus on answering a number of specific questions raised by various Members of Congress and Congressional staff, including DoD implementation of Title 10 Leahy Laws regarding human rights violations
<i>Audit of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funded Contracts</i>	To determine whether the CSTC-A and the government of Afghanistan's MoD and MoI have established and implemented effective controls over the contract management process. This project is part of a series of audits related to United States direct assistance for the ANDSF.
Department of State Office of Inspector General	
<i>Inspection of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts</i>	As part of the inspection of Embassy Islamabad, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan. This project will include a classified component.
<i>Audit of the DoS's Compliance with Critical Environment Contracting Policies</i>	To determine the extent to which DoS is complying with Public Law 112-239 and 14 FAM 240 requirements for DoS to, among other things, perform comprehensive risk assessments and develop risk-mitigation plans for operational risk associated with contractor performance of critical functions. The audit will also look at the DoS's role in carrying-out the P.L. 112-239, Section 853 requirement for a database on contractor performance that can be used for source selection decisions.
<i>Audit of the Vehicle-Fueling Controls and Operations and Maintenance Contract at Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan</i>	To determine whether U.S. Embassy Kabul has implemented adequate controls to safeguard and account for purchased fuel and whether the embassy's operations and maintenance contractor performed its fuel-monitoring duties in accordance with the statement of work.
Government Accountability Office	
<i>DOD's Use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds</i>	To determine 1) the amount of obligated war funds DoD has authorized or appropriated with the OCO/Global War on Terror or emergency designation and the extent to which DoD has identified and reported these obligations; 2) the extent to which Congress has appropriated war funds for non-war purposes; 3) the extent to which DoD has applied the Office of Management and Budget or other criteria in identifying costs for inclusion in its war funding requests; and 4) the extent to which DoD has established and implemented guidance and a plan with milestones for transitioning enduring OCO costs to its base budget.

Project Title	Objective
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction	
<i>Assessment of Afghan Air Forces' Operations and Maintenance of Light Air Support Aircraft Provided by the U.S. Government and Training of Afghan Pilots in the U.S.</i>	To assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force is operating and maintaining the light air support as intended.
<i>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</i>	To assess 1) The extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) The challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.
<i>Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program for ANA Vehicle Maintenance and Capacity Building</i>	To review DoD's support to the ANA's Technical Equipment Maintenance Program. Specifically, to determine: 1) The extent to which the ANA program is meeting its stated goals; and 2) Whether key ANA A program contract requirements are being met and, if not, assess the reasons why.
<i>Corruption in Afghanistan: Perceptions and Responses of the U.S. Government</i>	To 1) Establish a timeline of the corruption problem in Afghanistan, including when, how, and why corruption has swelled over time since 2001; 2) Analyze how the U.S. government understood the threat of corruption and how this perception changed over time, and identify the U.S. response in terms of policies, programs, and resources devoted to address the corruption problem; 3) Evaluate the adequacy of the U.S. response (policies, programs, and resources) relative to U.S. strategic goals, interests, and risks, and identify where U.S. policies or actions mitigated and/or contributed to corruption; 4) Compare U.S. perceptions and responses to corruption to those of the international community; and 5) Identify lessons learned from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan, and make actionable recommendations aimed at policymakers and practitioners as to how best to mitigate corruption or the risk thereof in future U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
<i>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</i>	To determine the extent to which 1) The Army Research Laboratory developed and awarded legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and DoD and federal regulations; 2) the Army Research Laboratory provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with Army Research Laboratory broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.
<i>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior's Headquarters Complex</i>	To assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The complex is being maintained and used as intended.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</i>	To assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The complex is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phases III and IV</i>	To assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The project is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of the Afghan National Army's Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command</i>	To assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The project is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar</i>	To inspect the 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing facilities. Specifically, to assess whether 1) The construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The facilities are being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</i>	To 1) Determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) Assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) Evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.
<i>Review of the U.S. Government's Implementation of 22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §2249e, Commonly Referred To As The "Leahy Law."</i>	To determine whether the Leahy Law may prohibit assistance to the ANDSF. The Leahy Law prohibits DoD and DoS from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces that commit gross human rights violations. The review may result in more than one report.
<i>Security Sector Reconstruction</i>	To trace the role that strategy and planning played throughout the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Specifically to answer: 1) What U.S. policy goals for the ANDSF were, why and how these goals evolved, and the implications on ANDSF design; 2) What the various designs considered for the ANDSF were, why they were chosen, and why they evolved; 3) How well the ANDSF design was implemented (inputs and outputs); 4) How well the ANDSF have achieved expected strategic outcomes and why; and 5) What the critical policy and strategy lessons learned were from Afghan security sector reconstruction. More than one report may be produced.
<i>Department of Defense Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</i>	To assess 1) the extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD's advisory efforts, including funding, the number of advisors and contractors, their assigned locations, and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.

Planned Projects

In developing the FY 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OFS, the Lead IG risk-based planning process recognized the rapidly evolving nature of the overseas contingency operations and allowed for flexibility so that oversight teams could more readily respond to the changing demands of OFS. The current list of ongoing and planned oversight projects reflects this flexibility, as a few projects listed under ongoing projects and under planned projects were not contemplated when the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan was made final in October 2015.

As of March 31, 2016, there were 15 additional FY 2016 oversight projects related to OFS that the Lead IG agencies and oversight partners plan to start in FY 2016. These projects reflect planned oversight work in nearly all the strategic oversight issue areas. No projects are being planned in FY 2016 for the retrograde and property management issue area because in August 2015, DoD OIG issued an audit report that summarized weaknesses discovered in 10 of its previously issued reports. These FY 2016 planned projects are listed in Table 5.

Table 5.

Planned Oversight Projects, as of 3/31/2016

Project Title	Objective
Department of Defense Inspector General	
<i>Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</i>	To determine whether U.S. Government and Coalition Train-Advise-Assist efforts will enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and subordinate organizations to develop a Transparency, Accountability and Oversight (TAO) capability that helps the MoD to run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.
<i>Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts</i>	To determine whether the CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD have established effective controls for oversight of MoD fuel contracts.
<i>Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence and Information Sharing/Fusion with Coalition/Afghan Partners in Support of OFS</i>	To evaluate DoD's procedures and guidelines for sharing information to include ISR with Coalition partners in support of OFS.
<i>Evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Support to OFS Counterterrorism Operations</i>	To determine 1) If DoD is setting the conditions for Afghan Special Security Forces to take the lead in employing indigenous ISR capabilities for future counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates; 2) Status of drawdown planning of U.S. OCO-funded ISR capabilities currently employed in Afghanistan.
<i>Audit of Reliability of Navy Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom's Sentinel</i>	To determine whether the U.S. Navy has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting OFS by determining the accuracy of obligations and disbursements, as reported in the Cost of War report, for select Navy appropriations.

Project Title	Objective
Department of State Inspector General	
<i>Audit of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Countries Under the Department of State Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs</i>	To determine the extent to which the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Counterterrorism have 1) Developed specific, measureable, and outcome-oriented goals and objectives; 2) Developed and implemented an evaluation process to assess host country performance; and 3) Established letters of agreement with host countries for sustaining the Antiterrorism Assistance programs. The audit will also assess the bureaus' contract monitoring and oversight, and invoice review processes.
<i>Audit of Embassy Kabul's Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Afghanistan</i>	To determine 1) Whether planning and coordination mechanisms are in place at Embassy Kabul and in Washington, D.C., for assuming DoD support functions; 2) The status of transitioning construction and infrastructure development projects to the Afghan government; and 3) Key transition issues and operational challenges.
<i>Audit of Contract and Grant Oversight Staffing in Afghanistan</i>	To determine whether the number of contract and grant oversight staff in Afghanistan is commensurate with the amount and complexity of funds being expended.

Project Title	Objective
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction	
<i>Monitoring, Evaluation, & Oversight of Reconstruction Efforts</i>	To be determined
<i>Assistance to Improve Governance in Afghanistan</i>	To be determined
<i>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</i>	To 1) Determine the extent to which counternarcotic police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) Assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) Assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.
<i>Use of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) to Track and Monitor U.S. Direct Assistance Funding to the Afghan Government</i>	To 1) Describe how the Afghan government uses AFMIS to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds; 2) Identify the capabilities and weaknesses of AFMIS for tracking and monitoring U.S. direct assistance funds; and 3) Determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.
<i>Resolute Support's Progress in Executing its Train, Advise, and Assist Mission</i>	To 1) Identify the metrics the Resolute Support Mission uses to determine the success of its mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan MoD and MoI, and assess the extent to which these metrics have been met; and 2) Determine what factors contribute to the mission's successes and failures.
<i>Afghan Air Force (AAF) Use and Maintenance of Its Mi-17 Fleet</i>	To 1) Assess the extent to which the AAF can operate and maintain the Mi-17s currently in its fleet; and 2) Assess DoD's efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the Mi-17s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.
<i>Afghan Special Mission Wing Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s</i>	To 1) Assess the extent to which the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet; and 2) Assess DoD's efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.





Refugees escaping the fighting of IS-K and the Taliban in February 2016.
(U.S. Air Force photo)

APPENDIXES

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APPENDIX A: Lead Inspector General Statutory Requirements

Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended	Pages
Appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.	107
Develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.	106
Review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.	94
Employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.	75-76
Submit to Congress on a biannual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:	
status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and	75-83
overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.	87-95
Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.	1-95
Note: The Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) are the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Inspector General of the Department of State, and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.	

APPENDIX B:

Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces.³⁰¹ These EFs comprise the following:

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Under EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD and Mol are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance
- Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable Mol and MoD to develop a budget
- MoD and Mol are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements
- MoD and Mol are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes
- MoD and Mol are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned
- MoD can fully pay all their employees accurately and in a timely and secure fashion.
- Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to Mol and MoD
- MoD and Mol possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the Mol to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, CSTC-A administers measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government's proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable
- MoD and Mol IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level
- Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 3: CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF's ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan's institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the Mol to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD and Mol have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other gross violations of human rights
- MoD and Mol identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and gross violations of human rights
- MoD and Mol inter-ministerial cooperation with AGO on corruption adjudication, and with AGO on gross violations of human rights allegations

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 4: FORCE GENERATION

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the Mol to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation train, advise, and assist mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and Mol utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force
- MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement
- MoD and Mol manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigate attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength
- MoD and Mol establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and Mol prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery
- Training delivered that results in reduced casualties

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 5: SUSTAIN THE FORCE

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Measurement and reporting has command emphasis
- ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements
- ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors
- Mol assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the Coalition-funded AMS contract
- MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable
- MoD and Mol have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill *tashkil*, the official list of personnel and equipment requirements
- MoD and Mol have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process
- ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare
- MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
- MoD and Mol are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure
- MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout its lifecycle
- MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems
- MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations
- Mol is capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 6: PLAN, RESOURCE, AND EXECUTE EFFECTIVE SECURITY CAMPAIGNS

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council, the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- ONSC delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, and National Security Strategy)
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance on time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process
- GS Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors the implementation of strategy and planning, and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP
- ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps
- ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level with strategic guidance from the MoD
- ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations
- ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force
- ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations district operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives
- Special Mission Wing develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of ASSF
- AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 7: DEVELOP SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant MoD for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the *Nasrat*. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues
- MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps level operations
- DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can act and report on intelligence requirements and tasking
- Establish a National Military Intelligence Center as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations
- DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs
- Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 8: MAINTAIN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Develops and sustains events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
- Afghan government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products

General Staff Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] *tashkil* inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT GENDER OFFICE

In addition to the eight EFs, the Resolute Support Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA and ANP levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration
- MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women
- MoI and MoD takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women

APPENDIX C: The Lead Inspector General Model

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. It directs responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the oversight of overseas contingency operations (OCO). Specifically, it details the duties of the designated Lead Inspector General for an OCO and addresses jurisdictional conflicts.³⁰²

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them,³⁰³ the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence.³⁰⁴

In general, DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However, OCO programs and operations often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies, including military operations. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When none of the three Lead IGs has jurisdiction, the Lead IG is to coordinate with the appropriate agency to ensure that comprehensive oversight takes place.³⁰⁵

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

REPORTING

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits. Reports—published each April, July, October, and January—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO.³⁰⁶ The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OFS

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ended on December 31, 2014. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) began on January 1, 2015, a new overseas contingency operation as defined by Title 10 USC 101(a)(13). Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Lead IG agencies, representing the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development, are together carrying out our mandate to provide interagency oversight for this contingency under the Lead IG model.

These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

Upon the resignation of Jon T. Rymer, CIGIE Chair Michael E. Horowitz designated Glenn A. Fine as Lead Inspector General for OFS on January 11, 2016. DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick serves as the Associate Inspector General for OFS, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended. The Associate Inspector General will draw on his experience as a career federal prosecutor, and as Director of DoJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force, to develop joint investigative capabilities across the IG community through an interagency working group.

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym	Definition
AACP	Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Police
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
AFCEC	Air Force Civil Engineer Center
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
APPS	Afghan Personnel and Pay System
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
Core-IMS	Core-Information Management System
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DoD	Department of Defense
DoD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DoS	Department of State
DoS OIG	Department of State Office of Inspector General
DPI	Directorate of Police Intelligence
FAST	Functional Area Support Teams
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	Fiscal Year
GCPSU	General Command of Police Special Units
GS	General Staff (Afghan National Army)

Acronym	Definition
IG	Inspector general
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IS-K	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<i>Kandak</i>	Battalion
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	Refers to DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG
MCTF	Major Crimes Task Force
MoD	Ministry of Defense
Mol	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NPA	National Procurement Authority
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OCO	Overseas contingency operation
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
ONSC	Office of the National Security Council
QCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan
TAAC	Train, advise, and assist command
<i>Tashkil</i>	the official list of personnel and equipment requirements
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USACE	U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG	U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

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305. As required by section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
306. In internal DoD documents, OFS was named an overseas contingency operation as defined in 10 USC 101(1)(13).



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